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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON OIL SCARCITY, GLOBAL WARMING AND ENERGY 
PRICES 
 
MAY 2012 
 
MATTHEW RIDDLE, B.A. CARLETON COLLEGE 
Ph.D UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays.  In the first essay, I construct a 
supply and demand model for crude oil markets.  I then fit the model to historical price 
and quantity data to be able to project future oil prices.  Ex-post forecasts using this 
model predict historical price trends more accurately than most oil forecasting models.  
The second essay incorporates the supply and demand model from the previous paper 
into a complex systems model that also includes oil futures markets.  Adaptive-agent 
investors in futures markets choose from a set of rules for predicting future prices that 
includes the rational expectations equilibrium rule, as well as rules that rely on more 
short-term information.  The set of available rules evolves following a genetic algorithm; 
agents choose which rules to follow based on their past performance.  While outcomes 
vary depending on the specific assumptions made, under a plausible set of assumptions 
investors can fail to anticipate shortages properly, leading to significant price spikes that 
would not occur in the rational expectations equilibrium.  The last essay addresses the 
impacts of carbon cap-and-trade policies on consumers.  I calculate how higher carbon 
prices would affect the prices of different consumer goods, how consumers would 
respond to the price changes, and how the price changes, along with revenue recycling, 
would impact consumers of different income levels.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Energy in historical context 
The ability to harness energy sources and put them toward productive use has 
played a crucial role in economic development worldwide.  The industrial revolution in 
Europe was driven in part by the use of coal to power steam engines for rail and water 
transport, to facilitate iron smelting, and to power looms and other industrial equipment 
(Heinberg, 2003).  Expanded use of easily accessible oil helped to fuel continued 
expansion in the 20
th
 century.  Agricultural production was transformed by the use of 
motorized farm equipment and petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides.  Cars, trucks 
and airplanes powered by oil products revolutionized the transportation of people and 
goods.  Electricity, largely powered by coal and to a lesser extent oil and natural gas, 
contributed to the further automation of manufacturing and made possible the 
development of numerous electricity-powered technologies (Heinberg, 2003).  
1.1.1 Problems with fossil fuel consumption 
While fossil fuels have helped spur economic growth, the rapid consumption of 
fossil fuels has also contributed to environmental damage, and may lead to even greater 
costs in the future.  The mining, drilling for and transportation of fossil fuels can lead to 
the removal of mountaintops, the contamination of ground water with methane, and oil 
spills that despoil oceans and beaches.  The burning of fossil fuels can release chemicals 
that contribute to smog, acid rain and mercury contamination.   
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These immediate environmental costs are also accompanied by two prominent 
concerns about future costs.  Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption are 
the main drivers of climate change, the effects of which are likely to become more and 
more severe as temperatures rise.  The depletion of oil and other fossil resources leaves 
less available to future generations, and increases the likelihood of price spikes if demand 
outpaces supply.  These concerns are difficult, if not impossible, to address without 
cutting fossil fuel use, since all fossil fuel combustion produces carbon dioxide, and fossil 
fuels, once consumed, cannot be re-generated.   
1.2 Oil scarcity 
Oil has several advantages over other fossil fuels: it is easily transportable and 
energy-dense, and when refined it is suitable for a wide variety of uses.  It currently 
accounts for the largest share of world energy use of any source, slightly ahead of coal 
(BP, 2011).  Changes in oil prices have been found to play an important role in predicting 
economic growth in the US (Hamilton, 2005a).   
Considering the important role that oil plays in our economy, if persistent 
shortages were to emerge, the economic implications could be enormous.  However, 
there is no consensus as to how seriously the threat of oil resource depletion should be 
taken.  Some warn of a colossal societal collapse in the not-too-distant future, while 
others argue that technological progress will allow us to shift away from oil before 
resource depletion becomes an issue.  How much of a problem oil depletion poses 
depends on the amount of oil that remains accessible at reasonable cost, and how quickly 
the development of alternatives allows the demand for oil to be reduced. 
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Chapter 2 provides one attempt to evaluate the level of the threat posed by oil 
depletion.  The focus is on projecting oil prices, since these serve as a measure of scarcity 
as well as a mechanism by which scarcity will negatively impact society.  Price 
projections are made by first constructing a demand-and-supply model and fitting it to 
price and quantity data.  Demand and supply each evolve over time following a pattern 
that is based in historical data, while supply is also constrained by resource availability.  
The responsiveness of supply and demand to price changes in the short and long run is 
also carefully modeled, and prices are set to equilibriate supply and demand.   
With this model, it is possible to project how prices and quantities would move 
far into the future if the same model continues to hold.  The price path we project 
provides an indication of how high prices would have to get, and at what rate, to make 
demand drop fast enough to accommodate decreasing supplies driven by dwindling 
resource availability.  We find that prices are projected to rise gradually but persistently 
throughout the simulation period.  Concerns about drastic consequences in the near future 
appear to be overblown, but in the long run, as oil resources approach exhaustion, prices 
do reach extremely high levels.   
These projections are clearly speculative, as any attempt to make forecasts far into 
the future is subject to concerns that the model used to fit past data may not be the best 
model of the potentially different conditions that may exist far into the future.  It is still 
useful to make these projections, however, as they provide a best guess as to what might 
happen if no dramatic structural changes occur.    
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1.3 Market anticipation of future scarcity 
While chapter two helps to establish that oil scarcity is a legitimate concern, 
chapter three addresses the ability of markets to anticipate future scarcity and make the 
transition as smooth as possible.  If market players can anticipate that oil supplies will be 
scarce in the future, they should be able to make money by holding onto oil and selling it 
once prices rise.  This should drive current prices up, which creates the right incentives 
for everyone to make the adjustments necessary to make the anticipated shortage as 
painless as possible.     
For this process to work, market participants must be able to anticipate future 
shortages.  It is not clear, however, that oil market players will look far enough into the 
future to account for long-run scarcity concerns when betting on short-run price changes.  
While there are clear benefits to accurately predicting short-run price movements, the 
benefits of factoring in long-run scarcity concerns into these calculations are not so clear.  
Chapter three aims to evaluate whether short-sighted or long-sighted rules are more likely 
to persist in an evolutionary setting where the most accurate prediction rules proliferate.   
The model built in chapter three combines adaptive agent investors who choose 
from a set of long-sighted and short-sighted price prediction rules with the demand and 
supply model from the previous chapter.  Model simulations are used to evaluate which 
types of prediction rules are favored by the evolutionary algorithm, and what oil price 
trajectories result from these prediction rules.  We find that different model runs can 
produce widely different outcomes, but in some simulations short-sighted rules dominate 
leading eventually to extreme spikes in oil prices. 
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While we do not provide evidence as to how likely such a short-sighted outcome 
is, the fact that it could exist in a plausible setting with smart investors poses a significant 
challenge to standard economic theories of exhaustible resources.  This modeling 
exercise goes a long way toward building a rigorous theoretical argument as to how 
market structures with investors responding to market incentives can lead to an outcome 
where markets do not properly anticipate future scarcity in spite of apparent incentives to 
do so. 
1.4 Climate change policy 
There is no mechanism for the market on its own to address concerns about 
climate change.  However, if policies are put in place to price the costs of climate change 
into the price of fossil fuel consumption, then this should trigger market incentives that 
should lead efficiently\to the desired emission reductions. Policies that take this approach 
include carbon taxes and cap-and-permit programs.  
One concern with this approach is that poor and middle-income families will be 
hurt by the higher price of fuels.  Studies of the distributional impacts of these policies 
have shown a consistent pattern: absolute payments into the charge increase with the 
income of the household, but payments as a percentage of income are highest for low-
income households.  If the government revenues from the charge are returned to 
consumers on an equal per capita basis, the net effect of the policy would be a significant 
progressive redistribution of income, while if the revenues instead flow to polluting 
companies, the net effect would be regressive. 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation expands on past studies of the distributional 
impacts of a carbon charge by including a more thorough analysis of producer and 
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consumer responses to a carbon charge, and how these responses could affect the 
distributional outcomes.  The main conclusions of past work on this issue hold up to most 
of these changes in assumptions.  The assumption that has the greatest impact on the 
incidence outcomes is the producers’ assumed rate of pass-through of price increases.  If 
the pass-through rate is low enough, producers could bear much of the burden of the 
charge, and this burden would be passed onto shareholders who are primarily in high-
income groups.  Other adjustments to the model provide interesting insights about the 
role of different assumptions in determining incidence outcomes, but none of the effects 
are large enough to alter the primary conclusions of past studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MODELING OIL MARKETS AND FORECASTING OIL PRICES 
2.1 Introduction 
Oil plays a crucial role in our economy.  It provides most of the energy to meet 
the world’s transportation needs, including passenger travel and cargo transport.  It 
provides fuel for home heating, electricity production, and to power industrial and 
agricultural equipment.  It provides the source material for the construction of plastics, 
many fertilizers and pesticides, and many other industrial chemicals and materials.  It is 
difficult to find any product that does not require the use of oil at some point in the 
production process.   
The current rate of consumption can not be sustained forever, since oil supplies 
are finite.  However, there is no consensus as to whether the depletion of oil resources 
will lead to any significant economic hardship, and if so, when.  Saudi oil minister Sheikh 
Ahmed Zaki Yamani was famously quoted as saying, ''the Stone Age didn't end for lack 
of stone, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out of oil.''  This quote 
reflects the view that the development of new technologies will lead to a shift away from 
oil consumption before oil resources are fully depleted. 
On the other hand, a number of observers have warned that resource depletion, 
and dwindling oil resources in particular, could lead severe consequences in the not-too-
distant future.  There is still enough oil left in the ground for many decades of 
consumption at current rates, but as the easily available oil is depleted, it will become 
increasingly difficult to continue pumping oil at the rate at which it is currently being 
consumed.  There has been an explosion of popular literature recently predicting that oil 
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production will peak soon, and that oil shortages will force us into major lifestyle 
changes in the near future – a good example of this is Heinberg (2003).  The point at 
which world oil production reaches a peak and begins to decline permanently has been 
referred to as ‘Peak Oil’.  Predictions for when this will occur range from 2007 to 2025 
(Hirsch, 2005).   
There has been debate within the economics profession as to the dangers of 
resource depletion, but in recent times many economists have questioned the urgency of 
this threat.  Tilton (2002), in a summary of the state of knowledge among economists of 
the threat of mineral resource depletion, summarizes that “during the next 50 to 100 
years, we have found that mineral depletion is not likely to rank among the most pressing 
problems confronting society,” (p. 119) and that “in the long run, should mineral 
depletion cause shortages, they are likely to emerge gradually, perhaps over decades, as 
the real prices and costs of mineral commodities rise slowly but persistently” (p. 76).   
2.1.1 Predicting price paths 
In a market environment, oil scarcity is felt through high prices.  If supply is not 
sufficient to keep up with demand at current prices, prices will rise.  This will have a 
range of negative effects.  The most visible impact of crude oil prices is on the price of 
gasoline, which is closely followed by consumers and regularly reported in the news.  
Changes in oil prices can also influence the overall health of the worldwide economy as 
well as the relative strength of different national economies.  Nine of the ten recessions 
between 1946 and 2005 were preceded by spikes in oil prices (Hamilton, 2005), and the 
latest recession followed the same pattern.   
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It is difficult to predict the path that oil prices will take.  Many factors contribute 
to changes in oil prices, from technological developments to weather patterns to 
economic trends and geopolitical events.  These factors can be difficult to model, and in 
some cases can be entirely unpredictable.  It is probably futile to try to provide an 
accurate forecast of future price movements.  Nevertheless, it is a useful exercise to 
evaluate what is likely to happen to oil prices if past trends continue.  Given the 
importance of oil prices, and the vastly differing views that exist about the prospects for 
impending scarcity, it is valuable to have an idea as to which way price trends are most 
likely to go in the short run, and as to the likelihood of shortage-induced rises in prices in 
the long run, given the currently available information.   
Economists take several approaches to addressing this question.  Theoretical 
modeling of the depletion of exhaustible resources has provided some insights into how 
prices can be expected to behave as a scarce resource approaches depletion.  Empirical 
studies have looked at how prices have evolved historically over time, and used the 
results to project what could happen in the future.  Other structural models predict how 
demand and supply are likely to evolve, and use these projections to anticipate price 
movements.  However there are some shortcomings of each of these approaches, and 
none has proven very effective at predicting prices. 
2.1.1.1 Theoretical models 
The seminal work in theoretical modeling of resource depletion was by Harold 
Hotelling (1931).  Hotelling provided a framework for analyzing producer behavior when 
extracting a scarce, non-renewable resource.  In this modeling framework, the owners of 
a resource choose the extraction rate so as to maximize the present value of the profit 
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they would receive over the life of the resource.  The primary conclusion of Hotelling’s 
original model, in its simplest form, is that the price of the resource will rise over time at 
the going interest rate.  This conclusion has an intuitive explanation: if the price of a 
resource went up faster than the rate of interest, producers would choose to put off 
extracting and selling the resource until its price had increased, because they could make 
more profit by putting off the sale.  If the price were falling or rising more slowly than 
the rate of interest, producers would choose to sell more of the resource early and invest 
their returns at the going interest rate.  The equilibrium occurs when prices are rising at 
exactly the interest rate, making producers indifferent between producing now or holding 
reserves for later. 
The Hotelling model relies on some very restrictive assumptions.  Refinements 
and extensions of the model have been developed that relax many of these assumptions.  
One simple refinement, which only slightly changes the conclusion of the basic model, is 
to include a cost of extracting the resource.  In this case, instead of the price rising at the 
rate of interest, it is the difference between the price and the marginal extraction cost that 
should rise at the rate of interest – a quantity that is referred to as the shadow price, 
scarcity rent or in situ value of the resource.  If the extraction cost is constant but 
positive, then the price rises monotonically but at a rate lower than the rate of interest 
(Krautkraemer, 1998, p. 2068).  If the marginal extraction cost falls faster than the rise in 
shadow price, the price of the resource could fall.  Eventually, however, the shadow price 
will dominate, necessarily leading to a rise in price as the resource approaches exhaustion 
(Fattouh, 2007, p. 7). 
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The price path can be further adjusted with additional extensions of the original 
model.  One common refinement is to allow the cost of extraction to vary based on the 
cumulative extraction of the resource (or conversely the amount of the resource left in the 
ground), to reflect the fact that as the resource becomes more depleted, the resources that 
remain get more costly to extract.  This allows the shadow price to rise at less than the 
rate of interest (Krautkraemer, 1998, p. 2069).  Allowing the reserve level to increase 
with new exploration can provide an explanation for decreasing extraction costs early in 
the life of a resource, which causes prices to follow a U-shaped pattern over time 
(Pindyck, 1978). 
While these models show prices eventually turning up, it is also possible that they 
never will.  Perhaps the most important and difficult-to-model factor that can influence 
the path of prices over time is the development of new technologies, both in reducing the 
cost of extracting the resource, and in developing alternative energy sources and efficient 
technologies that reduce the demand for the resource.  If technological developments lead 
to sufficient drops in demand, the long-run exhaustibility of the resource may never come 
into play.  In the words of Tilton, “the long run availability of mineral commodities 
largely depends on a race between the cost-reducing effects of new technology and the 
cost increasing effects of resource depletion” (Tilton, 2003, p. 63). 
2.1.1.2 Statistical analyses of prices 
Another approach taken by economists is to look at how oil prices have evolved 
over time in the past, and use this to make suggestions about what will happen in the 
future.  One of the first studies to use long time series for natural resource prices to make 
inferences about how resource scarcity evolves over time was by Barnet and Morse 
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(1963).  They found that the prices of nonrenewable resources were generally lower in 
1957 than in 1870, in spite of the depletion that occurred during that period.  Later, 
Margaret Slade (1982) found a U-shaped relationship between mineral prices and time, 
with prices decreasing at first but later turning up.  A more recent update by Berck and 
Roberts (1996) finds mixed results, depending on the regression technique used.  With 
their favored technique, they find that there is no significant trend for resource prices 
over time. 
The stochastic process used to model the path of energy prices plays an important 
role in these studies.  It can affect the regression results, and therefore the prediction for 
future prices, as demonstrated in Berck and Roberts (1996).  In addition, in projecting 
future price paths it is important to have projections about the types of price fluctuations 
that are likely to happen in addition to a best-guess price.  For this purpose the type of 
process followed by the time series is important in its own right.  Slade (1982) models 
prices as following a trend-stationary ARIMA (1,1,0) model.  Berck and Roberts (1996) 
argue that using a trend stationary model is inappropriate, and use a difference stationary 
model instead.  Pindyck (1999) suggests a more complicated model, with a stochastically 
moving trend-line, in addition to stochastic variation around the trend with gradual 
reversion towards the trend.   
2.1.1.3 Modeling Supply and Demand 
A final approach to projecting oil prices is to use structural models in which 
prices are set by the interaction of demand and supply.  While there is a substantial body 
of work modeling demand, supply and price movements, there is surprisingly little 
research that uses this approach to provide forecasts of future oil prices.  Groups like the 
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International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
use complicated oil market models to project demand and supply into the future.  These 
demand and supply projections are then used by analysts in the business world who 
require estimates of future oil prices in making financial decisions.  The EIA model also 
produces its own projections for oil prices, but these prices are highly dependent on their 
assumption about future OPEC supply, which is required as an exogenous input into the 
model.  OPEC supply numbers are determined based on “expert judgment and/or offline 
analysis” about anticipated OPEC “output and pricing behavior” (EIA, 2007, p. 10).  In 
practice, OPEC production levels in earlier runs of the EIA model appear to have been 
chosen based on the assumption that OPEC members will produce enough to meet 
demand at a target price, so the price projections are based mainly on the assumption 
about the target prices that OPEC will try to reach (Gately, 2001).  The IEA’s World 
Energy Model does not attempt to generate price predictions, but takes prices as an 
exogenous variable (IEA, 2007, p. 6).  It is not clear where the price projections they use 
come from.   
Other models in the academic literature have used a similar approach, combining 
demand and supply models with a price adjustment rule to show how prices are set (Dees 
et al., 2007; Bacon, 1991).  These models produce good fits with past oil price data, but 
are not used to produce future projections.  Doing so would require projections for 
several variables that are used as inputs into the model, which the authors do not attempt.  
2.2 The Model 
The approach taken in this paper is a variation of the supply and demand 
approach, but incorporates elements of the other approaches as well.  Demand and supply 
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are modeled as a function of time, current and past price levels, and the amount of oil 
remaining in the ground.  The demand and supply equations are constructed to be 
consistent with results from the literature, and are fit to historical crude oil price and 
quantity data.  Prices forecasts are produced by extending the model to future time 
periods, using the mean value for the stochastic term.   
This approach has several advantages over other approaches that have been used 
in making price projections.  It is a simple technique that allows important theoretical 
modeling considerations to be combined with historical data in a flexible framework.  
Theoretical models on their own have either been too restrictive in their assumptions, 
leading to unrealistic projections of price paths, or too broad to produce meaningful 
predictions.  Empirical work that models how prices have evolved over time does a 
reasonable job of fitting past prices, but the shape of the time trends that are fitted to the 
data generally have little theoretical basis, and do not account for the exhaustible nature 
of the resource.  As a result, using this approach to make long-run projections may be 
inappropriate.  Structural models of demand and supply do a good job of using past data 
to show how demand and supply respond to different inputs, but few models have used 
this approach to forecast future prices.  One reason may be that demand and supply 
models generally depend on several other variables that must themselves be projected 
into the future in order to produce demand and supply forecasts.
1
  By modeling demand 
and supply only as a function of time, prices and cumulative production, the model in this 
paper limits the number of variables that need to be projected and the data requirements 
                                                 
1
 For instance, EIA (2007) requires projections for GDP and OPEC production levels as 
inputs into the model.  Dees et al (2007) require projections for GDP, global natural gas 
liquids production, crude oil production by Russia and China, and OPEC capacity (p. 
184).    
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in estimating the model.  It combines the simplicity of models that focus solely on oil 
prices with some of the realism of structural models, while accounting for the exhaustible 
nature of the resource as in theoretical models. 
2.2.1 Demand Function 
Demand is modeled as a function of time and the price history.  Other variables 
that are commonly included, such as income, are left out to minimize the data 
requirements of the model and make future projections easier.  Instead, they are captured 
indirectly through shifts in demand over time.   
2.2.1.1 Relationship with time 
The log of demand is modeled as a quadratic function of time plus a price 
response term and a disturbance term: 
tttDDDt epppftbtbbQD   ),,()log( 01
2
210                               (2-1)                  
The relationship with time ( t ), along with the disturbance term ( te ), captures all 
developments that could lead to shifts in demand ( tQD ) that are not related to current and 
past price changes ( tp ).  The log-quadratic relationship captures trends in growth rates of 
demand over time, and the disturbance term captures random unanticipated movements.  
The underlying reasons for these movements in demand include changes in world income 
and how it is distributed, changes in population and in the taste of consumers, weather 
patterns that may affect the demand for heating and cooling, and any exogenous policies 
to curb demand, improvements in efficiency, or the development of substitutes for oil that 
are not driven by price changes.   
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This functional form is assumed to do a reasonable job of capturing factors that 
are evolving in a consistent pattern over time.  For example, if income or population 
growth has caused demand to increase, but the percentage rates of increase are gradually 
declining, this functional form will capture that trend and project continued declines in 
the growth rate in the future.  On the other hand, a more significant structural shift could 
lead to changes in demand that are not well captured by the model.  If a technological 
breakthrough leads to rapid adoption of a substitute for oil, for example, this could cause 
a shift in demand that is not predicted by the model.  The model instead assumes that 
trends in technological progress will proceed as they have in the past.  If technological 
development has slowed the growth in demand in the past, that trend is projected to 
continue, and if the technological progress has become more rapid, that trend also is 
projected to continue, but any technological progress that leads to a divergence from past 
trends will not be anticipated. 
Using this relationship to produce long-term forecasts entails more difficulties.  If 
the data show a decreasing growth rate in demand over time, projections into the future 
will eventually show demand growth turning negative.  This projection is highly 
dependent on the functional form chosen – a decreasing growth rate could also be 
modeled by a relationship in which growth is slowing but never turns down.   
For these reasons, projections made with this model, especially long-run 
projections, should not be taken too literally.  Any number of developments could lead 
actual demand to diverge from the model’s projection.  Still, it is useful to make 
projections as to how demand would move if past trends continue, based on a model that 
fits well with past data.  A log-quadratic form produces a robust relationship with 
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historical demand data, and as good a projection as can be made without adding more 
complications to the model. 
2.2.1.2 Demand response to prices 
Demand responds to prices for a number of reasons.  Individuals and companies 
that consume oil products may adjust their behavior immediately to consume less of 
those products.  They may also invest in more efficient equipment, such as cars with 
higher MPG, which allows them to reduce their consumption further.  Higher prices may 
also spur the development of new technologies that make further reductions possible.  
Finally, higher prices can motivate the development of new policies to help encourage 
reductions in demand.   
One consistent finding in the literature on demand responsiveness to price 
changes has been that the price responsiveness of demand in the long-run is considerably 
greater than the short-run response (Dahl, 1993; Fattouh, 2007).  This makes sense, since 
many of the ways that the demand can adjust to a change in prices are not likely to 
happen immediately.  Behavioral changes can happen the most quickly, but it may still 
take some time to change old habits.  Improvements in the efficiency of capital 
equipment, including cars and trucks, requires replacing the old capital stock, a process 
that will happen gradually over time.  The implementation of new policies and the 
development of new technologies may take even longer to have an effect on demand. 
One common approach to modeling the dynamic response of demand to changes 
in price is known as the Koyck model (Bohi, 1981, p. 18), which specifies demand as a 
function of current and lagged prices in the form:  
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In the Koyck model, et  is an independent, randomly distributed error term. An 
alternative specification known as the partial adjustment model produces the same 
relationship between demand and prices, with a slight difference in the error term: instead 
of being independent, the et would follow: ttt uee  1 , with the tu  independent and 
randomly distributed (Bohi, 1981, p. 19).  In the partial adjustment model, demand moves 
a fixed portion of the way in each period toward an equilibrium level that would be 
achieved in the long run if prices remained constant. 
Another important finding in the oil demand literature is that demand responds 
asymmetrically to rises and falls in price, and also responds differently to increases that 
represent price recoveries compared with new maximum prices (Gately, 1993; Gately and 
Huntington, 2002;  Hamilton, 2003). 
In our model, demand responds gradually to changes in what I call the ‘effective 
price’ in a similar manner to the partial adjustment model.  The effective price is defined 
in such a way that price increases, and particularly new maximums, can have a greater 
impact than price decreases, to allow for asymmetry in the demand response.   
For computer modeling purposes, it is useful to break the demand function down 
into the short-run response to prices and long-run shifts in the demand curve over time.  
The short-run demand response is given by the constant elasticity demand function:  
DSRE
ttt pDQD  1                                                                                       (2-3a) 
or equivalently:  
)log()1log()log( tDtt pSREDQD  .                                                     (2-3b) 
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In these equations, tQD  is the quantity demanded at time t, tD1  is a demand 
parameter that shifts over time, pt is the price at time t, and DSRE  is the short-run price 
elasticity of demand. 
In the long run, the demand parameter tD1  moves stochastically over time, 
following a quadratic time trend while also responding to past prices:   
ttDDDDtt epMALRAtbtbbDD  1
2
210)1log(2                      (2-4) 
Here, DLRA  is a long-run price adjustment parameter that combined with the 
short-run elasticity gives the long-run price elasticity of demand, and 1tpMA  is a 
composite of past prices and maximum prices designed to capture the delayed and 
asymmetric effects that prices can have.  Consistent with the partial adjustment model, 
pMA is expressed as a moving average of past ‘effective prices,’ which will be defined 
later. 
))log()(1(
1
1
1 




 
i
it
i
t pEffpMA                                                       (2-5) 
The error term et follows an AR(1) process:  
ttDt uee  1                                                                                            (2-6) 
The term ut is a normally distributed disturbance term with mean 0, constant 
variance 2D  and is independent of all other independent variables and error terms from 
previous periods.
2
  D  determines the extent to which demand shocks persist. 
Combining the above equations, we get: 
                                                 
2
 One possible improvement would be to check if the variance of the disturbance term is 
constant over time, and allow for heteroskedasticity if it is not.  
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This is similar to the equations from the Koyck and partial adjustment models, 
with the only differences being: 1) the use of effective prices instead of actual prices; 2) 
an additional parameter that determines the short-run elasticity separately from the long-
run elasticity and the adjustment rate; and 3) in the error term, which is similar to the 
error term in the partial adjustment model, the autoregressive term for the error, D , need 
not equal the adjustment term for prices, δ.   
Effective prices are here defined to capture the fact that demand responds 
asymmetrically to changes in price.  When prices rise, this can spur the adoption of new, 
more efficient technologies, a process that will not be reversed if prices later fall.  A 
recovery from an earlier drop in prices also is unlikely to have as much of an effect as a 
rise to a new maximum, because many of the efficient technologies and strategies that 
were implemented during the previous price rise will still be in place.  Several 
approaches to modeling this feature of price response have been tried, but none has done 
a perfect job of capturing its underlying logic.  One promising approach is to use the 
maximum price that has been achieved to date as a separate dependent variable, in 
addition to the current price (Gately, 1993; Gately and Huntington, 2002).  This would 
capture the fact that both price decreases and price increases that are below an earlier 
maximum would have less of an effect than a price increase that leads to a new 
maximum.  However, it doesn’t recognize the fact that a maximum achieved in the past 
10 years may be more relevant than a maximum achieved, say, over 100 years ago.  With 
the price series used here, prices from the first two years of the series (1870-1871) 
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reached $45.82 in real terms – a maximum that was only barely exceeded by the prices 
spike of the early 1980’s, which reached $53.14 in 1981.  As a result, most of the price 
rises in the 1970’s did not produce a new maximum, even though for practical purposes 
the price in 1871 was not likely to have been relevant 100 years later.  One way to 
surmount this problem would be to look at the maximum from some fixed period, such as 
the past 30 years.  But the choice of the number of years to pick would be arbitrary, and 
could lead to a sudden change in the variable when an old maximum price is no longer in 
the time period.  A better approach is to use a weighted average of the maximums using 
different time-length periods.  This is the approach taken in this model.  Specifically: 
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Combining equations (2-3)-(2-6) and (2-8), the demand model is determined by 
the following set of equations: 
DSRE
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2.2.2 Supply Function 
There is even more disparity in how supply is modeled in different studies.  A 
number of models predict oil supply based on purely geological considerations, 
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considering the amount of oil remaining, assumptions about the depletion rate of existing 
reserves and the rate of discovery of new reserves (Hubbert, 1962; Campbell and 
Laherrere, 1998).  Others address how production responds to changes in oil prices.  
However, there is no consensus as to the best model to use.  Supply from OPEC and non-
OPEC countries are frequently separated.  For non-OPEC countries a positive 
relationship between prices and supply quantities is generally assumed, usually with little 
theoretical justification for the form of the relationship (Cremer et al., 1991, p. 61).  For 
OPEC countries there is no consensus even as to the direction of the effect that prices 
have on production levels (Kaufmann et al., 2008; Ramcharran, 2002).  Theoretical 
models of supplier behavior, such as the Hotelling model, focus on how suppliers choose 
when to bring oil to the market depending on how the current price relates to expectations 
of future prices.   
The supply model in this paper incorporates aspects of both the geological curve-
fitting model developed by Hubbert (1962) and economic models of price 
responsiveness.  Supply levels respond to current and past market prices, and can move 
over time based on historical trends as well as geological constraints. 
Expectations about future prices could also affect supply decisions, as suppliers 
could choose to hold onto resources if they expect that future scarcity will drive up 
prices.  However, future price expectations do not enter into the supply equations in this 
paper.  We leave a discussion of the role of price expectation to chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, as the formation of price expectations is the primary focus of that chapter.  
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2.2.2.1 Short-run supply function 
I choose a supply function that responds positively to prices, subject to a 
maximum capacity constraint in the short run.  In the long run, production capacity also 
adjusts in response to past price changes.  This approach is consistent with the 
assumptions used for non-OPEC supply by the US Energy Information Administration in 
producing their International Energy Outlook (EIA, 2007, pp. 9-10).   
In the short run, there is a limit on how much can be produced, no matter how 
strong the economic incentive, because time is required to install the new capital needed 
for production.  When oil prices are high, production will be close to full capacity, and it 
will approach full capacity as prices approach infinity.  For lower prices, production 
levels will gradually drop until, at a price of zero, production reaches zero, since there is 
no incentive to produce.  A simple function that satisfies these properties is: 
t
Ap
t CeQS
t   )1(                                                                                         (2-10) 
Here, Ct is the maximum capacity at time t, pt is the price of oil at time t, and A is 
a constant that determines how quickly production approaches maximum capacity as 
prices rise.
3
   
This short-run relationship between prices and production is a middle ground 
compared to the results of past theoretical and empirical studies.  Most empirical studies 
have found very low short-run price elasticities of supply, and in some cases, negative 
                                                 
3
 It would perhaps be more realistic to model supply as a function of prices relative to some expectation of 
future prices, rather than absolute prices.  This would require an assumption about how price expectations 
are formed, which we put off dealing with until chapter 3.   
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price elasticities have been found (Fattouh, 2007, p. 18-19).  One explanation for 
negative price elasticities, known as target revenue theory, is that OPEC countries aim to 
meet budget requirements, and sell more oil when prices drop to keep revenues from 
dropping below target levels (Ramcharran, 2002). 
On the other extreme, the assumptions behind the Hotelling model and other 
related models suggest that production could jump from zero to the maximum in response 
to a small change in price.  Producers, in deciding when they should produce to maximize 
profits, should withhold production completely if prices are lower than expected future 
prices, while if prices are higher than expected future prices, they should sell all their oil 
immediately.   
A compromise, with small but positive responses to price changes, is most 
realistic, and the best to use for long-run modeling purposes, for several reasons.  While 
there appear to have been historical periods where the target revenue theory may have 
been valid, particularly the late 1980’s and 1990’s, when low prices compelled OPEC 
countries to increase their production beyond quotas due to revenue shortages, the long-
run strategy of OPEC is to try to stabilize prices around target prices by increasing 
production when prices are too high, and decreasing production when prices are too low.  
This implies a positive relationship between prices and production.   
For firms operating in a competitive market setting, one would also expect a 
positive price elasticity of supply – but not the sort of extreme response predicted in the 
Hotelling literature.  Incorporating uncertainty about future prices into the Hotelling 
model leads to the conclusion that production could respond more gradually to changes in 
price than in the basic model.  Extensions of the Hotelling model that account for the 
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costliness of capital investments needed to build production capacity also suggest a less 
dramatic response to a change in prices, as well as a limit on the amount that can be 
produced in a given year (Campbell, 1980).  With empirical studies producing mixed 
results, it is appropriate to assume a positive but limited relationship, as this has the 
strongest theoretical foundation. 
2.2.2.2 Long-run supply changes 
In the long run, several factors can cause capacity levels to shift.  Resource 
depletion decreases production capacity in mature fields.  Past prices can motivate 
changes in the level of investment in new exploration and production capacity.  As with 
demand, the price responses are asymmetric, with new maximums, decreases and 
recoveries having different effects.  In addition, technological developments, new 
discoveries, weather, political changes and conflicts can lead to changes in production 
capacity over time.  These are not modeled explicitly, but are captured by a quadratic 
time trend combined with an error term to capture random, unpredictable shifts.   
These shifts in supply, whether caused by a time trend, past prices, or stochastic 
volatility, should not be expected to have a linear effect on capacity.  No matter how 
much these variables shift, capacity can never exceed the total amount of oil in the 
ground, and in fact, it is unlikely to ever exceed some fixed percentage of total reserves.  
This is because for any given oil field it is inefficient, if not impossible, to pump all the 
remaining oil in the field in one year.  The model therefore assumes that production 
capacity will never exceed c times the amount of ultimately recoverable reserves 
remaining in the ground, where c is a constant between zero and one.  On the other end, 
production capacity cannot go below 0.   
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To fit these constraints, I use a logit transformation to convert S2, which is a 
function of time and prices, into tC , the maximum capacity at time t, which ranges from 
0 to tRc  , where tR  is the amount of ultimately recoverable reserves remaining in the 
ground at time t.     
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S2 evolves as a quadratic function of time, and also responds to a moving average 
of effective prices, along with a disturbance term.  The disturbance term follows an 
AR(1) process, as with demand:   
ttSDDDt epMALRAtbtbbS  1
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ttSt uee  1                                                                                             (2-13) 
The moving average of effective prices is defined as it was in equations (2-5) and 
(2-8).  Supply adjusts gradually to price changes because building capacity requires 
capital, and it takes time for capital levels to adjust to a new price level.  Also, as with 
demand, there is reason to believe that supply responses to price increases may not be 
reversed by subsequent decreases in price.  I am not aware of any studies that address this 
issue, but the reasons for it are similar to demand: an increase in price to new highs will 
drive the development of new production technologies, new exploration and new capacity 
investment that will not be completely reversed if prices later fall.  Therefore, the supply 
model uses the same effective price variable as the demand model.   
The reserve variable tR  represents the level of ultimately recoverable resources in 
the ground.  It begins at time zero with a fixed value 0R  that is chosen based on 
estimates from the literature.  After this it is depleted as oil is produced, but otherwise 
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does not change.  Many analysts argue against using a fixed quantity of ultimately 
recoverable resources, arguing that reserves are variable over time depending on 
technologies and prices (Lynch, 2002, p. 378; Fattouh, 2007, p. 7).  Some reserves may 
not be recoverable with current technologies, but may become recoverable with future 
technologies – others may be too expensive to be worth extracting now, but may become 
economically feasible if prices rise sufficiently.   
There is still a finite amount of oil available for extraction, however, which limits 
the amount that can be extracted no matter the price or the rate of technological 
advancement.  It is possible to allow prices and technological developments to influence 
how much oil is ultimately used while still imposing a limit on the amount of oil 
available.  Including variable reserve levels complicates the model with little clear 
benefit. 
Putting all this together, the supply function is given by the following set of 
equations: 
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2.2.2.3 Hubbert’s curve 
Although this model is motivated by some simple intuitive rules for determining 
how supply would evolve over time, it produces a supply function of a form that is 
related to another common approach to modeling oil supply developed by M. King 
Hubbert (1962).  Hubbert proposed that oil production over time would evolve according 
to the function: 
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where tmax is the time at which the peak of the distribution occurs, and w and h are 
parameters that determine the width and height of the distribution.  It is the derivative of 
the logit transformation function, and is shaped like a bell curve – though it is slightly 
different from a normal distribution.   
In a limiting case, the model in this paper can produce a supply function over time 
that is precisely equal to Hubbert’s curve.  This occurs when there is no random variation 
( 02 S ), when prices are constant at p , when there is no quadratic time trend ( 02 Sb ) 
and when )1(1
pA
S ecb
 .  However, this model adds some flexibility by allowing 
these parameters to vary, addressing some of the common criticisms of Hubbert’s 
approach.   
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One criticism is that Hubbert’s approach fails to take into consideration how 
economic factors can affect production.   The present model addresses this by allowing 
both production capacity and capacity utilization rates to respond to price changes – 
within the constraints imposed by geological factors.   
A second criticism addressed in this model is that Hubbert’s peak predicts that the 
curve will be exactly symmetric over time, with the rate of increase on the way up 
equaling the rate of decrease on the way down, and the peak occurring when exactly half 
of the total resource has been exhausted.  Several observers have noted that in places that 
are past their peak, such as the US, the down-slope has proven to be less steep than the 
upslope, with a fatter tail.  If this is true in general, models that assume a symmetric form 
overestimate the rate of depletion after the peak is reached (Fattouh, 2007, p. 16; Lynch, 
2002, p. 380).   
The model used in this paper, on the other hand, will accommodate any rate of 
increase and any rate of decrease, creating the flexibility to allow for forms with a rate of 
depletion that is either faster or slower than the rate of increase.  If prices are constant at 
p , and if there is no quadratic term ( 02 Sb ), the variable 1b  determines the rate of 
increase on the way up, and the rate of decrease on the way down is set by the quantity 
)1( pAec  .  For further discussion and mathematical derivation of these results, see 
Appendix A.  Including a quadratic term adds additional flexibility. 
2.2.3 Determining parameters of the model 
The model described above provides a flexible framework for modeling oil 
demand and supply, but to implement it and use it to make projections, specific parameter 
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values are needed.  A mix of different approaches is used in choosing these values.  The 
goal is to produce a good fit with historical data on prices and quantities, using parameter 
values that are logically sensible and consistent with estimates of similar values from 
elsewhere in the literature.   
As described below, some parameter values are estimated using formal regression 
techniques, minimizing the sum of the squares of the values of the error term ut, once the 
rest of the parameters have been set.  The remaining parameters are chosen to be 
consistent with estimates from other studies when possible, or with basic intuition when 
such estimates do not exist. 
2.2.3.1 Demand parameters 
Two key parameter choices for the demand function are the long-run and short-
run price elasticities.  There is an extensive body of literature that estimates elasticities of 
demand for oil and oil products.  Most of these studies look at demand for specific 
products such as gasoline or heating oil, where panel data is more available and 
aggregation problems are less of a concern.  Studies of the elasticity of demand for crude 
oil are less common, and rely on more limited data with less spatial variation that makes 
it difficult to separate demand from supply and obtain significant results.  Fattouh (2007) 
summarizes the results of several studies showing a range of 0.001 to -0.11 for short run 
elasticities and 0.038 to -0.56 for long run elasticities.  Dahl (1993), in an extensive 
review of the literature on energy demand elasticities, suggests -0.1 and -0.5 as 
reasonable estimates for the short and long-run elasticities (Dahl, 1993, pp. 112, 114). 
The price elasticity of demand for crude oil can also be approximated based on 
the results of studies of demand for oil products such as gasoline diesel and heating oil.  
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These studies are more common, and the estimates are more solidly established.  
However, inferring an overall demand elasticity for crude oil based on these results can 
be tricky.  The price elasticity of demand for crude oil is likely to be lower than for oil 
products for two reasons.  The first is that since crude oil is only one of the inputs that 
determines the price of oil products such as gasoline, an increase in the price of crude oil 
is likely to cause a smaller percentage increase in the price of oil products, which will 
make the elasticity of oil demand with respect to crude oil prices lower than elasticities 
with respect to retail prices such as the price of gasoline (Dahl, 1993).  The extent of this 
difference varies depending on the price of crude oil relative to other inputs, but as a 
rough approximation for an average price level, we might expect elasticities to be about 
twice as high for gasoline as for crude oil.
4
   
The second reason that the elasticity for crude oil could be lower is that if there is 
any substitution between the different oil products, an increase in the price of all oil 
products might have less of an impact on the demand for each oil product than if the 
product prices each rose separately.  This is not likely to be a major concern, however, 
since in the short run there is little possibility of substitution between products, while in 
the long run, prices of different oil products generally move together so an increase in the 
price of one product will be accompanied by an increase in other prices as well.  The 
long-run elasticities for oil products reported in the literature generally do not effectively 
control for the price of other oil products.  
A comprehensive survey of price elasticities for different oil products was 
conducted by Dahl (1993).  More recent updates have not significantly changed the 
                                                 
4
 This is based on the results of a regression of gasoline prices against oil prices in the US 
over the last 30 years. 
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conclusions (Graham and Glaister, 2002).  The best estimates for the price elasticity of 
demand for gasoline from Dahl (1993) are -0.26 for the short run and a -0.86 for the long 
run (Dahl, 1993, p. 143).  For residential fuel oil, the best estimates are between -0.2 and 
-0.26 in the short run, and from -0.75 to -1.0 in the long run (Dahl, 1993, pp. 111, 114-
115).  Industrial demand for oil products has a price elasticity around -0.2 in the short run 
and -0.8 in the long run (Dahl, 1993, p. 120).
5
   
A weighted average for all oil products would come out between -0.2 and -0.25 in 
the short run, and -0.8 to -1.0 in the long run.  Converting to crude oil prices, this comes 
close to the estimates of -0.1 and -0.5 that were found in studies that looked directly at 
the demand for crude oil.   
For the model in this paper, I use a short-run elasticity of -0.15 and a long-run 
elasticity of -0.75.  The long-run adjustment parameter DLRA  that is input into the model 
is the difference between these, -0.6.   
The short-run elasticity is chosen to be slightly higher than has generally been 
found, to help avoid major price fluctuations in response to a small shift in demand or 
supply.  In the real world, above-ground storage capacity can help to dampen these 
fluctuations since demand and supply need not be exactly equal in each period, leaving 
some more time for demand and supply to come back into balance.  Because this model 
forces demand to equal supply in each period, slightly higher short-run elasticities are 
useful to keep supply and demand in balance without major price fluctuations.   
                                                 
5
 For gasoline, this is the conclusion of the most comprehensive recent review, Dahl and 
Sterner (1990, 1991a, 1991b).  For fuel oil, the range is from a rough average of the new 
studies tables (C31 & C32) to the average of the old studies table (p. 111).  For industrial 
oil demand, the best estimate numbers were quoted in Dahl (p. 120). 
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I also chose a long-run elasticity that was slightly higher than the average for the 
literature, for a different reason.  It represents the elasticity of demand in response to a 
change in effective prices, which is only equivalent to a change in actual prices if the new 
price represents a new maximum.  The effect of a change in price to a new maximum 
should be higher than the estimates from the literature, which capture the effect of an 
arbitrary change in price.  This is supported by past studies of asymmetric price effects.  
Dahl (1993, pp. 121-122) reports that a study by Gately found a long-run price elasticity 
of demand for crude oil for non-transportation uses of -0.7 for increases in price that are 
above the maximum.  A more recent study by Gately & Huntington (2002, p. 39) finds a 
long-run price elasticity of OECD demand for oil to be -0.64 using an asymmetric model. 
To estimate the demand equation, I also need to choose parameter values for the 
constant   that determines how the effective price is defined, and  , which determines 
how fast demand converges to the long run equilibrium in response to a price change.  
The value I chose for  is 0.95.  This means that the one-year maximum received a 5% 
weight, the two-year maximum received a weight of 4.75%, and the weight applied to 
each additional year decreased by 5% per year.  With this value, 37% of the weight went 
to maxima over periods of less than 10 years, 25% to periods of between 10 and 20 years, 
and 38% to periods of 20 years or more.  This choice was arbitrary, but it felt intuitively 
like a reasonable amount of weight to give to different time periods.  
For the rate of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium in response to a price 
change, I chose a value of =0.85.  This is similar to the value for D  that will be 
calculated later, which makes sense since both represent the rate at which demand 
responds to a change; in one case via a change in prices, in the other via a shift in the 
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curve due to any other cause that is not explicitly modeled.  In a partial adjustment 
model, these two parameters will be the same. 
In addition, the short-run elasticity, long-run elasticity and adjustment rate are 
related in the partial adjustment model by the equation DD LRESRE  )1(  .  With the 
parameter values I have chosen, the short-run elasticity is slightly higher than the value 
that would satisfy this equation.  This makes sense, since some additional adjustment in 
the first period can be expected beyond the adjustment that occurs as the first year of the 
long-run adjustment process.  Some forms of consumption require converting fixed 
capital assets to make them more efficient, a process for which the partial adjustment 
model is appropriate.  However, some behaviors, such as the number of miles driven, can 
be adjusted immediately, suggesting that there should be some additional adjustment in 
the first period.   
The remaining demand variables, Db0 , Db1 , Db2  and D , are estimated using time 
series linear regression techniques and will be discussed in more detail below. 
2.2.3.2 Supply parameters 
The short-run supply function requires a parameter A that determines how quickly 
production approaches full capacity as prices rise.  I use a value of 0.1 for A in this 
model.  It is chosen to make capacity utilization levels reasonable at normal price levels.  
With this choice of A, production will be at 63% capacity when the price is $10 a barrel, 
86% of capacity when it is $20 a barrel, 95% when it is $30 a barrel, and 98% when it is 
$40 a barrel.   
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The short-run price elasticities of supply at each of these prices are 0.58, 0.31, 
0.16 and 0.07 respectively.  At average prices, these reflect a higher price elasticity than 
has generally been found in empirical studies.  As with our choice for the short-run 
demand elasticity, this makes it easier for demand and supply to reach equilibrium 
without any change in above-ground storage.   
The long-run supply adjustment term SLRA  determines how much supply adjusts 
in the long run to an extended period of higher or lower prices.  If production capacity is 
a small portion of the maximum possible capacity, the long-run price elasticity is 
approximately equal to the sum of the long-run adjustment parameter and the short-run 
supply elasticity.  As capacity approaches the maximum proportion of remaining 
reserves, the elasticity becomes lower than this number, and eventually approaches 0.   
Our choice of 0.4 for SLRA  produces long-run elasticities that are at the high end 
of estimates from the literature.  Using prices and production capacities from the past 
thirty years, this choice produces elasticities that range from 0.42 to 1.01, with a mean of 
0.69.  The higher elasticities in this range are driven by high short-run elasticities caused 
by low prices.  This can be compared to estimates of long-run supply elasticities in other 
studies summarized in Fattouh (2007), which range from 0.08 to 0.58 (p. 19).  As with 
demand, it is appropriate to have an elasticity that is higher than the average in the 
literature because the effective price variable captures changes in the maximum price, 
which should have more impact on long-run supply than the average change in price.   
Another important parameter in the supply model is 0R , the estimate for the total 
amount of oil available in the ground before any is extracted.  For this, we use an 
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estimate from the USGS (2000) for ultimate recovery of crude oil of 3003 billion barrels 
of oil (EIA, 2004). 
This is at the high end of all estimates of ultimately recoverable resources.  
MacKenzie (2000) summarizes earlier estimates from the previous 25 years, and finds 
that they had not changed much over time, and consistently ranged from 1.8 to 2.4 trillion 
barrels, compared with the USGS estimate of 3.0 trillion barrels.  Some authors have 
criticized the USGS approach, and argued that the discovery rates implied by the USGS 
projections are unrealistically high and out of line with recent history (Heinberg, 2003).  
It is the most widely cited estimate in the recent literature, however.  Moreover, a high-
end estimate suits my purposes, since I am trying to capture all oil that could possibly be 
recovered taking into account the technological progress and greater economic incentives 
that are likely to occur.  Lower-end estimates often fail to include oil that is currently not 
economical to recover with current technologies.  In addition, using a high-end estimate 
helps to guard against the criticism that our results are driven by an unrealistically low 
estimate for ultimately recoverable reserves.   
The parameter c determines the maximum that the yearly production capacity can 
reach as a proportion of total remaining ultimately recoverable reserves.  This parameter 
is set at 0.2.  This is somewhat higher than the depletion rates that have generally been 
observed for fields in decline.  EIA (2004, p. 3), for example, uses a production-to-
reserves ratio of 0.1 after production reaches its peak, based on data from existing fields 
that are in decline.  I choose a higher parameter of 0.2 to capture the absolute maximum 
that could be achieved – a maximum that is in practice never reached in the model.   
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Based on the Hubbert’s peak discussion earlier, this parameter influences the rate 
of decrease of the curve as the resource approaches exhaustion.  If supply were modeled 
as a linear function of time, this choice of c would imply a rate of decrease that is faster 
than the initial rate of increase.  However, including the quadratic term leads to 
decreasing supply and demand coefficients over time, and causes a slower rate of 
decrease.   
For the rate of adjustment parameter  , and the asymmetric price effect 
parameter  , I use the same numbers as for demand.  In principle they could be different, 
but I saw no theoretical or empirical basis for choosing either one to be higher than the 
other. The remaining supply variables, Sb0 , Sb1 , Sb2  and S , are estimated using 
regression techniques as discussed below.  
2.2.3.3 Estimation of remaining parameters 
Once the parameters discussed above have been set, it is possible to set up linear 
regressions for demand and supply to estimate values for the remaining parameters.  
Rearranging equations (2-4) and (2-12), we get: 
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The left side of these equations can be calculated using time series data on prices 
and quantities of crude oil production, along with the equations and parameter values 
discussed above.  
2.2.3.3.1 Data 
The data used in the regression are a long time series of annual prices and 
quantities for crude oil that goes back to 1870, near the time when oil was first produced 
and marketed.  This allows me to check that the model is consistent with the full history 
of the use of the commodity, rather than fitting just one historical period.  The best source 
for long time series for oil prices is Manthy (1978), in an update of earlier work by Potter 
and Christy (1962).  This series runs from 1870 through 1973, and provides the average 
wellhead prices for the major US oil fields.  After 1973, I use a US average wellhead 
acquisition price by first purchasers from EIA (2008).   I use inflation-adjusted prices.  
Before 1947, I use real prices provided by Manthy, which are adjusted by the 1967 US 
wholesale price index, as the producer price index was called before 1978.  From 1947 
on, I use the producer price index series provided by the BLS to deflate the nominal price 
data from Manthy and the EIA, and to convert to 2006 prices. 
The prices I use are average prices levels for US producers.  It would be more 
appropriate to have a world average, since I am looking at worldwide consumption of 
crude oil.  Unfortunately, no similar worldwide average price series exists that goes back 
as far, so I use the US data as a proxy for the world price.  
To construct a long time series for oil quantities, I use results from Marland et al. 
(2007), who use data on liquid fuel production from Etemad et al. (1991), along with 
more recent updates from the United Nations Energy Statistics Yearbook, to construct a 
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time series going back to 1870 for CO2 emissions from liquid fuels.  They provide the 
conversion factors that they use for the rate of CO2 emissions per ton of oil consumed, 
which can be used to back out the oil production levels in barrels per day from these data.   
2.2.3.3.2 Setting up the regressions 
From these prices and quantities, tD2  and tS2  can be calculated by rearranging 
equations (2-3b), (2-10) and (2-11), and using the quantity data tq  for both tQD and tQS :   
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Once the adjusted demand and supply variables have been calculated, the 
estimation technique is identical for demand and supply, so for simplicity I will refer to 
the estimation parameters as ib0 , ib1 , ib2  and i , where i can be either D or S.  To 
estimate the model, I use an iterative process in which values for the jib ’s and for the 
i ’s are estimated alternately until they converge.  I begin with an arbitrary initial 
estimate for i  (0.8), and estimate ib0 , ib1  and ib2  using a Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation by subtracting i  times the lagged value of the dependent variable, 
making appropriate adjustments in the interpretation of the constant, linear and quadratic 
terms (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1948).  The values for ib0 , ib1  and ib2  in the original, 
untransformed equation can be calculated from the estimated coefficients of the 
transformed equation.  The error term te  in each time period is then regressed against its 
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lagged value to get an estimate for i .  This whole process is then repeated with the new 
estimate for i  until the value for i  converges (that is, until it changes by < 10
-5
 from 
one run to the next). 
This approach is appropriate if the process is stationary, which will be true if D  
and S  are less than 1.  If 10  i , then a random disturbance in one period carries 
over partly but not completely to the next period, so that demand and supply revert 
gradually toward a trend, with i  determining how quickly it converges toward the trend.  
If i  = 1, on the other hand, then the series is non-stationary, and the error term follows a 
random walk, with no reversion toward a trend.   
I find that D  converges to 0.84 and S  converges to 0.81.   To test that this is 
significantly different from one, I use a Dickey-Fuller test on the error term from the final 
repetition of the regression.  For both demand and supply, I find that it is different from 1 
at the 1% significance level.
6
  It is therefore appropriate to model this as a trend 
stationary process, with gradual reversion toward the trend at a rate determined by the 
estimated values for theta.   
The estimates for ib0 , ib1 , ib2  and i  in the demand and supply equations are 
shown in Table 2.1.  All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 This is for a Dickey-Fuller test with the constant term suppressed, since there should be 
no drift in the error term.  Stata doesn’t provide p-values for this test, but for a Dickey-
Fuller test with drift, the estimated p-values are 0.0003 and 0.0002 for demand and 
supply respectively. 
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Table 2.1. Demand and supply regression results 
 Demand
a
   Supply
a
 
Const 5.80  -12.37 
 (0.15)  (0.17) 
    
T 0.090  0.109 
 (0.005)  (0.006) 
    
t
2
 -0.00021  -0.00034 
 (0.00004)  (0.00004) 
    
Θ 0.84   0.81 
Standard errors in parentheses.  A Cochrane-Orcutt 
transformation was used in the estimation, but 
coefficients and standard errors reported are for the 
coefficients in the original, non-transformed 
equation. 
a
The dependent variable is adjusted demand and 
supply variables as defined in the text in equations 
(14) and (15). 
 
One important thing to notice is that the coefficient for t2 is negative and highly 
significant.  There is no clear theoretical basis for deciding whether or not to include a 
quadratic term in the estimations, but the significance of the coefficient of the quadratic 
terms suggests that it is important to include it.  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show how closely the model fits the actual values for the 
adjusted demand and supply variables that serve as the dependent variables in the 
regressions.  The fit for demand is closer than the fit for supply, which has more random 
variation that is unexplained by the model.  This makes sense because of the difficulty 
predicting OPEC behavior, the presence of conflicts that affect supply, and other random 
supply shocks. 
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Figure 2.1. Fit of demand regression 
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Figure 2.2. Fit of supply regression 
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show how closely the model fits the original demand and 
supply variables, tD1  and tC , with long-run price adjustments and supply responses to 
reserve depletion taken into account.  In the case of demand, the model captures well the 
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steady increase in demand through the end of the 1970s, the fall in demand in the 1980s, 
and the resumption of demand growth afterwards.  One minor shortcoming is that after 
the dip in the 1980s, demand has not resumed growing as fast as predicted by the model.    
The supply model does not come as close to capturing the movements in supply 
that have occurred over time.  Again, this can be explained by the fact that many of the 
factors that influence supply are not included in the model, but are modeled as random 
supply shocks.   
Figure 2.3. Model fit with demand 
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Figure 2.4. Model fit with supply 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
year
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 C
a
p
a
c
it
y
 (
C
) 
(b
a
rr
e
ls
/d
a
y
)
Actual
Fit
 
 44 
 
2.2.4 Price Setting 
In each period, prices are chosen to equate the quantity demanded to the quantity 
supplied.  Setting prices to equilibriate demand and supply is a common assumption of 
economic models, but in models of oil markets it is not universally adopted.  In reality, 
supply need not equal demand in each period because above ground stocks can be built or 
drawn down to accommodate a temporary imbalance between demand and supply.  Some 
models address this by including a price setting rule in which prices respond to the 
amount of oil stored above ground (Dees et al., 2007).  Others argue that significant 
imbalances cannot persist for long, so using an equilibrium model is appropriate for long-
run forecasting (EIA, 2007).  For simplicity, I stick with an equilibrium model in this 
chapter, and put off addressing the role of above-ground storage until chapter 3. 
The equilibrium price is calculated numerically by testing different prices until an 
equilibrium is reached between the short-run demand and supply functions 
DSRE
ttt pDQD  1  and t
Ap
t CeQS
t   )1( .  The demand and supply functions are 
constructed in such a way that there will always be a unique equilibrium price p > 0 as 
long as there are any oil reserves in the ground.  This is guaranteed by the combination of 
three facts: 1) the short-run demand curve is monotonically decreasing while the short-
run supply curve is monotonically increasing; 2) at p = 0, supply is always less than 
demand (in fact supply is zero while demand approaches infinity); and 3) as p approaches 
infinity, supply eventually exceeds demand.  The first two facts are clear from the short-
run demand and supply equations.  The third fact is true because as p approaches  , 
demand approaches 0, while supply approaches 
tC , which is given by tS Rc
e t

  )1(
1
2
.  
 45 
 
Each term in this expression must be positive as long as 
tR  is positive, which will always 
be true since production in each period can never exceed 
tRc  .   
Figure 2.5 shows the prices predicted by the model during the sample period, and 
how they compare to actual prices.  It replicates the price rise in the early 1980’s, though 
the timing of the spike doesn’t quite match perfectly with the data. 
Figure 2.5.  Model fit with price 
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
year
p
ri
c
e
 (
2
0
0
6
 $
/b
a
rr
e
l)
Actual
Model Fit
 
The fit for oil production and consumption levels is shown in Figure 2.6.  The 
model shows a slight slowdown in the growth of production in the 1980’s at the same 
time as actual production dips, but it doesn’t come close to matching the extent of the 
downturn.  A greater demand response to the high prices of the early 1980’s might be 
needed to replicate this better.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
Figure 2.6.  Model fit with quantity 
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2.3 Model output 
2.3.1 Projections 
Projecting prices and quantities into the future is a straightforward exercise with 
this model, since everything is modeled directly or indirectly as a function of time.  The 
projections can be broken down into an extension of the trend line along with a projection 
of the error term, starting with the error term in the final period of the sample, and 
assuming that the random part of the error term takes on its mean value of zero.   
2.3.1.1 Quantity Forecast 
The projections for the quantity of oil produced and consumed are shown in 
Figure 2.7.  The shape looks similar to a Hubbert’s curve, with production levels 
projected to peak in the year 2017, after which they begin to fall.  The drop in the 
quantity supplied comes largely because resource depletion constrains supply more and 
more as time goes on.  In addition, the time trends for supply and demand have negative 
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quadratic terms, which leads to additional drops in the growth rate of quantity supplied 
over time.  
Figure 2.7.  Quantity forecast 
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2.3.1.2 Price Forecast 
The projections for the price of oil (adjusted for inflation) are shown in Figure 
2.8.  They show that prices are likely to increase persistently, though not too dramatically 
in the near term.  In 2010, prices are projected to be at $60.44 per barrel, rising further to 
$93.72 in 2020 and $155.45 in 2030.  Looking farther ahead, projected price levels 
become more extreme, reaching $400 a barrel in 2050.  Beyond the years shown in 
Figure 2.7, prices are projected to continue to rise, eventually surpassing $10,000 a barrel 
in the year 2104, and $30,000 a barrel by 2124.   
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Figure 2.8.  Price forecast 
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These results reflect the fact that resource exhaustion eventually leads to 
significant scarcity in this model.  In the race between technological developments to 
reduce demand and the depletion of resources, resource exhaustion comes first.  This 
outcome is not inevitable with the model assumptions we use.  Since demand is projected 
to turn down eventually, continued reductions in demand could be fast enough to keep up 
with drops in supply due to resource exhaustion without the need for high prices.  The 
fact that prices eventually rise to extreme level indicates that under the assumptions of the 
model, if past trends continue, the reductions in demand will not occur fast enough to 
avoid shortages without significant price increases.   
This result is dependent on the assumptions of the model holding throughout the 
period for which the forecasts are made.  The results could change if ultimately 
recoverable resources turn out to be higher than in the model, or if innovations can help 
spur more rapid demand reductions than could be forecast from past trends.  Prices also 
may not rise as high as they do in these forecasts if demand responds more strongly to 
price increases once they reach a certain level.   
 49 
 
Sensitivity analysis of how robust the results are to changes in these assumptions 
could help to address these concerns.  Alternative assumptions about the shape of the 
demand relationship with time and price are more difficult to formulate, and I do not 
attempt to do so in this paper.  Adjusting the resource level is much more straightforward, 
and provides some indication of how sensitive the results are to changes in the 
assumptions that drive the long-run forecasts.   
2.3.1.3 Sensitivity analysis 
As a test of the sensitivity of our results to the assumption about resource levels, 
we try two alternative scenarios, one with remaining resources in 2004 half as high as in 
the baseline model, and one with remaining resources doubled.  The results are shown in 
Figures 2.9 to 2.12.  Prices rise more quickly when resources are lower, and less quickly 
when resources are higher.  By 2020, prices are projected to reach $149 per barrel in the 
low reserves case and $79 in the high reserves case, compared with $94 in the base case.  
Peak oil also occurs sooner (2009) with a lower resource estimate and later (2024) with a 
higher resource estimate. 
Even in the high resource scenario, prices eventually rise to over $3000 / barrel by 
2100.  In other words, even if we double the amount of remaining resources from one of 
the highest estimates currently available, demand is not projected to decrease fast enough 
to avoid future scarcity.  A more dramatic change in demand is therefore needed to avoid 
significant increases in the price of crude oil in the long run.   
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Figure 2.9.  Price forecast with low reserves 
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
450.00
500.00
1870 1920 1970 2020
year
p
ri
c
e
 (
2
0
0
6
 $
/b
a
rr
e
l)
Actual
Trend
Projection
 
 
Figure 2.10.  Price forecast with high reserves 
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
450.00
500.00
1870 1920 1970 2020
year
p
ri
c
e
 (
2
0
0
6
 $
/b
a
rr
e
l)
Actual
Trend
Projection
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
Figure 2.11.  Quantity forecast with low reserves 
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Figure 2.12.  Quantity forecast with high reserves 
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2.3.2 Simulations 
In addition to projecting a best estimate for the expected price in each coming 
year, it can also be useful to see a simulation of how prices and quantities could behave, 
with random fluctuations included.  This allows us to get a sense of the likely volatility of 
the series. 
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I estimate the variances 2d  and 
2
S  of the disturbance term ut to be 0.009 for 
demand and 0.016 for supply.
7
  I also test whether the disturbance terms of the two series 
are correlated.  This is important in order to accurately capture the volatility of the price 
and quantity series.  Positively correlated movements in demand and supply will have 
less effect on price than negatively correlated or uncorrelated movements.   
I find that the correlation coefficient for the disturbance terms for demand and 
supply is 0.62.  It is not clear if this correlation suggests that there is a legitimate reason 
for demand and supply to be correlated (possibly because of technological developments 
that affect both demand and supply), or if it simply a product of how our demand and 
supply variables were constructed.  In either case, it is important to include it in our 
simulations, to produce as accurate as possible a simulation of prices and quantities. 
Using a randomly generated normally distributed disturbance term, I construct 
simulated demand and supply variables, and use them to calculate the associated 
equilibrium prices and quantities.  The simulation results for price and quantity are shown 
in Figures 2.13 and 2.14 respectively, along with actual price and quantity data.  During 
the sample period, the simulated patterns look similar to the actual patterns – the ups and 
downs do not occur at the same time, but the size of the spikes and the length of time that 
they persist looks similar.  As the simulation is projected into the future, it can be seen 
that the price projections presented earlier do not tell the whole story.  In addition to the 
general increasing price trend, the simulated price variable shows some significant 
fluctuations in price, with a peak of $87 per barrel occurring in the year 2006 and $160 in 
2017.    
                                                 
7
 If the variance of the disturbance term changed over time, this should be accounted for 
in projecting the disturbance term into the future. 
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Figure 2.13.  Price simulation 
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Figure 2.14.  Quantity simulation 
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 2.3.3 Testing effectiveness of forecasts 
To test the effectiveness of the forecasts, I run the model on data from part of the 
sample period, and use it to predict prices for the remainder of the period.  These ex-post 
forecasts can then be compared with actual prices to see how effective they were.  Figure 
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2.15 shows the results of eight different ex post forecasts, each of which uses data from 
before a given base year to project prices after that year.  The base years range from 1964 
to 1999 in five-year increments.   
Figure 2.15.  Ex-post forecasts 
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The forecasts that result are not perfect, but they compare favorably with the 
results of most other attempts at forecasting oil prices.  They do not predict the spike in 
prices of the early 1980’s, but this is understandable since it was driven largely by 
geopolitical developments that were hard to anticipate.  The drop in prices in the end of 
the 1980’s is different; it was driven largely by an imbalance between demand and supply 
due to adjustments in demand and in non-OPEC supply that occurred in response to the 
high prices of the early 1980s.  Our model anticipates this well: the prediction from 1984 
correctly predicts the drop in prices, followed eventually by a price rebound.  The price 
rise beginning in 2000 is also predicted, though the timing of the predictions is not 
perfect. 
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To compare these forecasts with other forecasts that were made over this period, I 
look at two studies that summarize the results of other forecasts:  Huntington (1994) and 
Lynch (2002).  Huntington focuses on ten models that were collected as part of the 
Energy Modeling Forum’s World Oil Study conducted in 1980 and 1981.   Huntington 
summarizes the results of the projections for 1990 using each of the different models and 
compares them with the actual data.  The predictions for crude oil prices in 1990 range 
from 133% to 301% higher than the actual price (Huntington 1994, p. 5).  The model in 
this paper performs much better.  Its prediction for the price in 1990 using data through 
1980 is actually 29% lower than the actual price.  For the years immediately before and 
after 1990, when prices were lower, the model projection comes even closer to the true 
value.   
Lynch (2002) looks at a series of forecasts made by the US Energy Information 
Administration between 1978 and 2001.  As with Huntington (1994), he finds that 
forecasts from the 1980’s give price projections that were significantly too high, while 
more recent projections kept being revised downwards until the projections for 2000 and 
2001 predicted that prices would remain near $20 per barrel through 2020.  The earlier 
forecasts failed to anticipate the fall in prices in the 1980’s and the continued low prices 
of the 1990s, while the later forecasts failed to anticipate the even greater rise in prices 
that has occurred in the 2000s.  The model in this paper performs significantly better at 
anticipating both these shifts. 
In making ex-post forecasts, I have one advantage over studies that were 
conducted in 1980 and 1981.  In choosing the form of the model and some of the 
parameters I was able to benefit from experience and research that has occurred since 
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1981.  For example, my estimate for ultimately recoverable reserves was based on a 
USGS study that was conducted in 2000.   
It is impossible to adjust the model to make it entirely based on information that 
was available before 1980, since the general form of the relationships used in this model 
drew on studies conducted since 1980, but we can adjust some key parameters to be 
based only on data that were available then.  Predictions of ultimately recoverable 
resource level that were made in the 1970’s were notably lower than the USGS estimate 
from 2000 that was used in this paper.  The elasticities of demand for oil can also be 
adjusted based on differences between estimates available in 1980 and those used in this 
paper.  Specifically, the estimates of price elasticity of demand for gasoline from the 
review in Bohi (1981) are slightly lower than the estimates in Dahl (1993) that contribute 
to the elasticities chosen for this paper.  To estimate what parameters I would have 
chosen given the information available in 1980, I revise the demand elasticities 
downward based on the ratio of the gasoline estimates from Bohi (1981) and Dahl 
(1993), and replace the USGS resource estimate of 3.003 trillion barrels with the average 
prediction from the 1970s of 2.283 trillion barrels as reported in Horn (2007).   
The price forecasts from 1980 with this adjusted model are shown in Figure 2.16.  
The estimated price in 1990 increases slightly, but still remains 17% lower than the actual 
price.  Looking farther forward, the model performs somewhat less well, predicting that 
prices would rise again sooner than actually occurred.   
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Figure 2.16. Ex-post forecast from 1980 
 
A final check on the forecasting model is to look at how it has performed at 
predicting prices in the years since 2004.  Extending the data through 2010, we see that 
the predictions for recent years from the forecasting model using all data through 2004 
have been fairly accurate (see Figure 2.17).  The price spike in 2008 was higher than 
anticipated, but prices in 2009 and 2010 returned to levels very near the model forecast.   
Figure 2.17. Extended price data 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This paper presents a straightforward way of combining an analysis of actual data 
with simple theoretical considerations to produce a reasonable forecast of future prices 
and quantities.  It combines curve-fitting techniques with some basic theory to ensure that 
the model being fitted is consistent with economic and geological constraints.  Its 
performance, when tested through ex post forecasting, compares favorably to forecasting 
attempts from other studies.  
The results provide some evidence that oil depletion is a legitimate concern.  
Under the assumptions of the model, prices rise gradually in the short run, but continue to 
rise long into the future, eventually reaching extreme levels.  The price increases are 
reduced, but not eliminated, if a more optimistic assumption about resource levels is 
used.  The results do not support warnings by some in the ‘peak oil’ camp about extreme 
hardships in the relatively near term, but they do point to oil scarcity eventually being a 
significant problem if demand is not reduced beyond levels suggested by past trends. 
While any forecasts made this far into the future are tenuous at best, and heavily 
dependent on the functional forms used in the model, it is still useful to evaluate 
competing claims about resource scarcity with a model that captures current trends as 
well as possible.  Considering the vast differences in beliefs that exist about resource 
scarcity and its impacts, and the societal importance of these questions, it is surprising 
that more rigorous modeling has not been done to attempt to evaluate these claims.  By 
combining trend-fitting models of supply and demand with information from studies on 
resource availability and responses to price changes, this paper provides an important 
contribution to this literature.  
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There is also considerable room for improvement in this model.  It provides a 
framework for modeling oil markets that can be built on in a number of different ways.  
The supply and demand functions can be made more realistic by introducing more 
complexity.  More variables could be added, consumers and producers could be 
disaggregated into different groups with different supply and demand functions, and the 
functional forms could be refined further to capture actual behavior more accurately.  The 
effectiveness of this model demonstrates that even with a relatively simple model, some 
good results can be produced.   
The supply and demand functions from this model can also be combined with a 
more realistic price setting rule to analyze some even more interesting questions.  In 
chapter 3, I look at how prices are set more closely, considering the role of futures 
markets and how the behavior of investors in futures markets can affect the path of oil 
prices.  In a correctly functioning market, standard economic theory predicts that futures 
markets could help to smooth out price series by allowing investors to anticipate future 
shortages or gluts.  On the other hand, a popular theory has emerged that speculators have 
created bubbles in futures markets, leading prices to diverge from fundamental values.  
Incorporating the role of futures markets and above-ground storage into the model can 
help evaluate each of these theories, and provide some insight into the conditions under 
which each of these theories might hold.  The supply and demand model described in this 
paper provides a good basis that can be used in that analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A MODEL OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR IN CRUDE OIL FUTURES MARKETS  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 laid out a model of producer and consumer behavior in oil markets, and 
how they adjust over time.  One shortcoming of this model is that there is no mechanism 
for market participants to anticipate future developments in the market, and adjust their 
current behavior accordingly.  This chapter addresses this shortcoming by introducing oil 
futures markets in which participants try to predict how oil prices will move.  These 
predictions then influence real markets by determining when holders of crude oil choose 
to buy and sell their oil. 
3.1.1 Anticipating future shortages 
The model in chapter 2 suggested that if prices are set to equilibriate current 
demand and supply, with no anticipation of future developments, oil shortages are likely 
to occur at some point.  Simulations based on the model show temporary shortages at 
times throughout the model run, in the form of sharp price spikes, with the highest price 
spikes occurring late in the model as the resource approaches exhaustion. 
If participants in oil markets are able to anticipate these shortages, sudden price 
spikes like these should not occur.  Anyone who can correctly anticipate that a rise in 
prices is likely can buy oil before the price spike, store it, and sell it when the price goes 
up.  If enough people do this, it should drive up prices before the price spike, and keep 
them from ever getting as high as they would have otherwise.   
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James Hamilton, a prominent economist who has written about oil markets, has 
posted frequently to the EconBrowser blog about oil market issues from an economist’s 
perspective.  In one post “How to talk to an economist about peak oil” (July 11, 2005), he 
outlines the economic argument as to why a predictable oil shortage should be able to be 
anticipated by the market in advance, raising current prices.  He explores a hypothetical 
scenario in which an anticipated 30% drop in oil production would cause prices to rise 
from $60 a barrel to $200 a barrel in two years.   
Anybody who pumps a barrel out of a reservoir today to sell at $60 could make 
three times as much money if they just left it in the ground another two years 
before pumping it out.  The same is true for anybody with above-ground storage 
facilities—they’re throwing way money, and lots of it, for every barrel they sell at 
$60 that they could have instead stored for two years and sold at $200.  If oil 
producers did respond to these very strong incentives by holding back oil from 
today’s market, the effect would be to drive today’s price up.   
 
He then goes on to explain the effects that an immediate rise in prices to $180 a 
barrel would have: 
For one thing, it would be a very powerful incentive to force today’s users of oil 
to reduce their consumption immediately.  It would likewise be a very powerful 
incentive for investing heavily in oil sands and alternative technologies.  And of 
course, it would leave us more oil in the future to keep the economy going as we 
make the needed transitions.  In other words, the consequences of oil producers 
trying to sell their oil for the highest price would be to help move society 
immediately and powerfully in the direction that we earlier determined it ought to 
move in anticipation of what is going to happen in the future.   
 
In other words, if future oil shortages are anticipated properly, the profit motives 
of participants in oil markets will be sufficient to generate socially desirable outcomes, 
with smooth price paths and as graceful a transition as possible.  This argument helps to 
explain why many economists are not too concerned about resource depletion, and feel 
that, in the absence of other market imperfections, resource scarcity on its own is not a 
reason for government intervention into oil markets. 
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3.1.1.1 Questions about ability of market to anticipate future shortage 
A number of observers of oil markets are skeptical that economic factors could do 
much to alleviate oil shortages.  Geologists in the ‘peak oil’ camp, such as Colin 
Campbell, argue that the geology of oil reservoirs, combined with the difficulty of 
finding substitutes for oil, will trump any economic or political factors (Campbell, 2002).  
Some more substantive arguments why markets may not respond sufficiently to 
impending shortages were made by anonymous posters in response to the blog posting by 
James Hamilton in EconBrowser:   
“Markets thrive on uncertainty, but they function best when there is quantifiable 
uncertainty -- that is, when probabilities can be estimated, based on past 
experience. When a market enters completely new territory, it's difficult to make 
intelligent bets.  Right now, the players are still mostly betting that things will 
continue as they are at least for several years. Put yourself in their place. Wouldn't 
you have a hard time facing your shareholders if you didn't lay down the majority 
of your chips down on the square labeled "status quo"?  That's called fear 
overwhelming greed, and it happens all the time.” (posted by Ralph on July 11, 
2005) 
 
“The result [of lack of information] is that the markets become nervous and 
unstable, easily swayed by rumors, everyone looking at everyone else to try to get 
a sense which way things will break. Prices often become metastable, sticking to 
one trading range for no particular reason and then suddenly switching to a new 
price range, seemingly on a whim.” (posted by Hal on July 11, 2005) 
 
“Markets are just a community of humans. Humans are very emotional in their 
decision-making. They cannot really credit that the future will be sharply different 
than the past until they have experienced the emotional consequences of a new 
regime. This is especially true of humans in groups, whose individual judgement 
gets subjugated to that of the herd, until the situation become so obviously 
untenable that everyone starts to change (as in the sudden changes of prices across 
a bubble-crash sequence). We create fire brigades only after major fires, 
earthquake codes only after major earthquakes, departments of homeland security 
only after 9/11, and we will figure out how to price post-peak oil only after the 
peak.” (posted by Stuart Staniford on July 11, 2005) 
 
These comments raise important questions about how market participants form 
their expectations as they predict what will happen with future oil markets.  It may 
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difficult for many players in oil markets to make purely rational calculations in their 
predictions.  However, these arguments also raise questions about why sub-optimal 
investment strategies would persist over time.  Would the participants who did a better 
job of predicting market developments be rewarded financially, and therefore be copied 
by other investors, moving markets toward the optimal outcome?  More research is 
needed to evaluate these questions. 
3.1.2 Futures markets 
Oil futures markets play an important role in forming expectations as to what will 
happen to oil prices over the next several years.  Futures markets for crude oil are 
markets that allow investors to exchange contracts to buy and sell crude oil meeting 
certain specifications, at specified location and date.  Futures markets are set up to allow 
investors of all sorts to participate in oil markets, without having to physically engage in 
storing and transporting oil.  Anyone with information that could affect oil prices 
movements can bet on oil prices rising or falling by taking a long position (entering 
contracts to buy oil) or short position (entering contracts to sell oil) in futures markets.  
They can then zero out their position before the contract comes due so that they can profit 
or lose money without ever having to physically engage in buying or selling crude oil.  
The result is that the prices of crude oil futures at different time periods represent the 
market’s aggregate ‘best guess’ as to how oil prices are likely to move over the next 
several years.   
In US media reports on the movement of oil prices, the price most commonly 
reported is the price of the nearest term oil futures contract traded on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).  This represents the price of futures contracts for light 
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sweet crude oil in Cushing, Oklahoma, on the last business day before the 25
th
 of the 
coming month.  The actual spot price paid in Cushing for immediate delivery of crude oil 
usually does not vary much from these near term futures prices.  There are also longer 
term futures markets for contracts to buy and sell crude oil farther into the future.  There 
are futures markets that come due every month up to 30 months, and every year up to 7 
years from the current time. 
Many factors are reported in news reports to cause changes in oil prices: supply 
disruptions from wars and other political factors, from hurricanes or from other random 
events; changes in demand expectations based on economic reports, financial market 
events or even weather in areas where heating oil is used; changes in the value of the 
dollar; reports of inventory levels, etc.  These are all factors that will affect the supply 
and demand for oil, but they often influence the price of oil before they have any direct 
impact on the current supply or demand for crude oil.  The information affects oil prices 
immediately because investors in futures market use this information to change their 
assessment of what oil prices should be and how they are likely to change.  Futures prices 
then affect spot prices because if there are significant differences between spot and 
futures prices, anyone who has flexibility as to when they can buy or sell oil supplies will 
choose to buy when prices are lowest and sell them when prices are highest.  If spot 
prices are higher than futures prices, they will sell oil now, driving spot prices down 
closer to futures prices.  If spot prices are lower, they will buy oil now at spot prices, and 
wait to sell it at the higher prices of futures contracts.   
 65 
 
3.1.2.1 Role of futures markets in aiding price prediction 
Properly functioning futures markets should help market participants to anticipate 
future developments in oil markets more easily by allowing more people to use diverse 
sources of information to predict future price movements, allowing more information to 
be brought into the price discovery process. The price discovery role of futures markets is 
seen as an important economic benefit of futures markets (US CTFC, 2011).  
While allowing more people to participate in the process of price formation 
should, in principle, make price predictions more accurate, there is also a risk that 
allowing too many people to participate in future markets could lead markets to be 
dominated by psychological factors that could lead to bubbles and busts that are unrelated 
to market fundamentals.  This idea has gained attention recently as several observers have 
argued that the participation of institutional investors in futures markets led oil prices to 
diverge from their fundamental value during the rise in oil prices that peaked in 2008.  
The sharp price spike and the sudden drop in prices that followed certainly had the 
appearance of a speculative bubble bursting.  A report by a US Senate subcommittee (US 
Senate, 2006) identified excessive speculation on future price increases as a key reason 
for the rise in prices that had already occurred up to that point.  Between 2003 and 2008, 
there was a large increase in the allocation of investment funds into commodity index 
trading strategies that took long positions in futures markets for a number of different 
commodities, including oil (Masters, 2008).  Once commodity prices started falling in 
2008, many fund managers dropped those positions (Masters and White, 2009).  The 
claim is that this led to a speculative boom and bust, with prices diverging from what 
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fundamentals of supply and demand would suggest that they should be (Masters and 
White, 2009). 
A number of authors have attempted to address the question of whether the price 
movements of 2008 were driven by market fundamentals, or were a speculative bubble. 
Phillips and Yu (2010) use statistical modeling of price patterns to find evidence of a 
speculative bubble during the price spike in 2008.  Lagi et al (2011) use a behavioral 
model to address the question of whether the spike in grain prices was driven by 
speculation or by market fundamentals.  They break down price changes into those driven 
by fundamentals and those driven by speculation using a model of trend following with 
reversion to mean that leads to speculative oscillations, along with fundamental factors 
such as demand growth and ethanol production.  They find that most of the price 
movements of 2008 fit better with the trend following speculative model then they do 
with the fundamentals-based model.    
Other authors have argued against the speculative nature of the price movements 
on the basis that inventories did not adjust as would be expected in the presence of a 
speculative bubble.  Hamilton (2009a) and Krugman (2008) argue that if speculation 
caused prices to diverge much from fundamentals, demand and supply would no longer 
be in equilibrium, leading to changes in inventories that were not observed.  In other 
work, Hamilton also finds that the changes in oil prices between 2005 and 2011 were 
fairly consistent with what might have been expected due to stagnation of oil production, 
using reasonable elasticity estimates (Hamilton, 2011).  Ederington et al (2011) provide a 
good overview of research on this question.   
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3.1.3 Modeling investor behavior in futures markets  
The discussion in the previous section suggests two very different views of the 
role of futures markets.  They can reduce volatility of oil prices by allowing market 
participants to draw on the full knowledge base of futures market in predicting future 
price movements, allowing markets to anticipate shortages better and smoothing prices 
over time.  Or they can increase volatility by allowing more uninformed speculators to 
get involved, generating bubbles that lead to price spikes that would not have otherwise 
happened.  These divergent outcomes are driven by different views about investor 
behavior. 
While the authors in the last section focused on evaluating the causes of recent 
price movements, the goal for this paper is to explore what could happen to oil prices if 
oil resources become more scarce and approach exhaustion.  The behavior of investors 
also has significant implications for this question, as it determines how well the market 
anticipates the scarcity so it can make adjustments in advance. 
It is difficult to answer this question using an empirical analysis based on 
historical data.  There is no real historical precedent for the exhaustion of a resource such 
as oil.  Many historical examples of resource exhaustion are for renewable resources such 
as forests or fisheries.  No non-renewable resources have been exhausted that play nearly 
as important a role in the economy as oil does.  
Analyses of oil markets up to this point also do not give a great idea as to what 
would happen if oil ever approached exhaustion.  While there is certainly much to be 
learned from analyzing past price movements, there is no guarantee that as a resource 
moves closer to being exhausted the patterns observed up to that point will persist.  
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Hamilton (2009b) finds that scarcity rent contributed little to oil price in 1997, but could 
now play more of a role.  The short-run concerns of developing supplies fast enough to 
keep up with rapidly rising demand have dominated price setting in oil markets through 
most of their history, but this could be less true moving forward.   
Since there is little relevant data to use as a basis for empirical analysis, this paper 
focuses on developing a theoretical model of oil markets that can be used to explore 
potential scenarios as to how prices might evolve with different assumptions about 
investor behavior.  The model is set up so that attempts to anticipate future shortages 
could help lead to smoother price paths, while also allowing for the possibility that 
investors are not perfectly rational in their predictions of future prices. 
This modeling exercise will not provide any definitive answers about how 
investors will behave or what will happen to oil prices, but it should help to clarify our 
thinking about the problem. Patterns observed from running model simulations should 
help to highlight important issues that need to be considered when developing approaches 
to deal with possible resource scarcity.  It could also provide a basis for doing more 
empirical analysis in the future, using the model as a basis to make comparisons between 
historical data and model outputs under different assumptions to evaluate what scenario 
we might currently be in.   
There have been no modeling efforts to date, that I am aware of, that incorporate 
the ability of market participants to anticipate future shortages in setting oil prices, while 
also allowing for the possibility that human investors may not properly anticipate 
shortages, or even create periods of speculative booms and busts.  There is a large 
literature of exhaustible resource modeling in economics in which the anticipation of 
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future scarcity plays a major role.  However, these models are entirely based on rational 
actors who, by assumption, cannot behave in ways that would lead to a speculative 
bubble.  There is also a large literature that looks at behavioral models of different 
financial markets, with investors following boundedly rational behavior such as adaptive 
experimentation or herding.  However, the few models that look at oil futures markets do 
not combine the behavioral models with a model of oil markets that takes into account 
the exhaustible nature of the resource.   
3.1.3.1 Rational actor models 
The classic model of non-renewable resource price setting in economics is the 
Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1931).  In this model, applied to oil, owners of oil reserves 
decide when to extract the oil and sell it to consumers in order to maximize the present 
value of their profit, given the changing price of oil over time.  The conclusion is that oil 
prices must satisfy an equilibrium condition known as the Hotelling rule: the in situ value 
of the oil (the price minus the extraction cost) must rise at the rate of interest.  The 
extraction path over time in this model matches the optimal path to maximize discounted 
societal benefits. 
A key assumption of this model is that the actors are able to properly anticipate 
what prices will be.  This assumption is a version of the rational expectations assumption 
commonly made in economics.  The same assumption is also the basis for a whole set of 
more sophisticated models that have been developed based on the idea of the Hotelling 
model but with less restrictive assumptions.  While these models add uncertainty about 
resource discoveries, changes in demand and extraction cost, they all use the rational 
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expectations assumption that market participants are able to make the best calculation 
possible of the path prices will follow, given the information available at the time. 
However, this assumption requires a very strong notion of rationality that is not 
likely to exist in the real world.  In order for actors to correctly anticipate what prices will 
be, they must not only being able to calculate correctly the expected value of many future 
variables that will affect demand and supply, but they must also assume that all other 
actors will make the exact same calculation and invest on the same basis.  If, however, 
other investors act differently, prices will not follow the Hotelling-optimal path, so the 
choices made will not be optimal.  With heterogeneous agents, the assumption that all 
actors will follow the logic needed to reach the rational expectations equilibrium seems 
unreasonable (Arthur et al., 1996, pp. 4-6).  
In such situations – where there is little rational basis for behavior without 
knowing how others will act – an alternative approach is to use evolutionary models in 
which investors try out different investment rules, compare their effectiveness with other 
strategies, and stick with those rules that prove to be most effective.  This approach has 
been used to model investor behavior in stock markets and other asset markets in the 
behavioral finance literature.   
3.1.3.2 Behavioral models of stock markets 
Behavioral models of stock markets have grown out of concern that the efficient 
markets hypothesis (EMH) advanced by Fama and others (e.g. Fama, 1965; Fama, 1970; 
Fama, 1997; Rubenstein, 2001) does not explain some market phenomena.   
It is hard to justify many of the historically large price swings that have occurred 
entirely based on fundamentals.  One particular instance was the 1987 stock market crash 
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in the US, where the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by a record 22.6% in one 
day, with no significant news to justify such a large price change (Shleifer, 2000).  Shiller 
(1981) also demonstrates that stock prices are considerably more volatile than can be 
explained based on variation of market fundamentals.  Another challenge to the EMH is 
that many studies have found evidence of market predictability.  Low market-to-book 
ratios (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987) low price-to-earnings ratios (Shiller, 2005) and an 
extended history of bad returns (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) have all been shown to 
predict higher future returns in the long run.  On the other hand, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) show that a shorter history of price losses can predict that those losses will 
continue in the future (Shleifer, 2000).  Some additional puzzles that are difficult to 
explain based on the EMH are surveyed in LeBaron (2006).  The volume of trading is 
much higher that would be expected with purely rational agents, and high volumes tend 
to persist for many periods.  The same applies to market volatility as well: in addition to 
the surprisingly high levels of volatility found by Shiller, there are swings between 
periods of high volatility and periods of more stability. 
A number of authors have put forward models that show how boundedly rational 
behavior can lead to market outcomes that differ from the rational markets equilibrium.  
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) considered the evolutionary outcome if there is a cost to 
obtaining accurate information about fundamentals.  They find that in this situation, the 
equilibrium prices can’t perfectly reflect fundamental values.  DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldmann (1990a) developed a model that showed that even if 
information is not costly, the presence of some noise traders who make arbitrary trading 
decisions could keep prices from reaching their fundamental value.  In a model with 
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noise traders and rational investors, the rational investors have to be aware that noise 
traders could cause prices to diverge further from their fundamental value, which adds a 
level of risk to their investment decisions.  As a result, rational investors bring prices only 
part way toward their fundamental values.   
Some models have attempted to provide an explanation for specific empirical 
findings that rational market models can’t explain.  Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et 
al. (1997) present two alternative behavioral models to explain why the market tends to 
under-react in the short run to a single bit of new information, but overreacts to longer 
term, repeated information.   Lux and Marchesi (2000) reproduce higher volatility than 
would be found in the efficient market hypothesis, as well as clustered volatility, with 
switches between more and less volatile periods, using an evolutionary model with three 
types of agents: fundamental traders, optimistic chartists and pessimistic chartists.   
More complicated simulation models have been developed based on agents 
selecting strategies from a wide variety of different types of rules.  A classic example of 
this type of model is the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (Arthur et al., 1996), in which 
investors choose from a set of available rules that adapts over time following a genetic 
algorithm, with rules that are used successfully being more likely to survive.  These 
models have also replicated some features of real world markets that are not explained by 
rational market theory, such as high volatility and volatility clustering.  This approach 
comes closest to the type of modeling that is applied to oil markets in this paper.   
3.1.3.3 Behavioral models of oil markets?   
There have been very few behavioral models that have focused on oil markets.  
Spyrou (2006) looks at evidence of overreaction or underreaction in futures markets, with 
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mixed results, but does not include a model of why this may be happening.  Ellen and 
Zwinkels (2010) introduce a behavioral model of oil futures markets, with investors who 
choose between fundamentalist and chartist rules for predicting oil price movements.  
Both rules focus on past price patterns to predict future movements, with fundamentalists 
assuming that prices will revert to past mean levels, while chartists follow trends in 
prices.  There is no mechanism for investors look forward at the possibility of future 
shortages and take that information into account in their investment decisions.    
None of these papers provides much direction as to how to design a behavioral 
model that will help to address the question of how predictions about future price 
movements can affect the long run trajectory of oil prices in the face of future scarcity.  
The model in this paper draws on the literature for parts of the model.  It uses ideas from 
behavioral economics for the process by which investors select their price prediction 
rules from the set of possible rules.  It also draws on rational actor models of oil markets 
for the relationship between above-ground storage, spot and futures prices, and to aid in 
constructing the set of possible price prediction rules.  The types of behavioral 
differences assigned to investors in the model, however, are not taken from the academic 
literature, but are based on my own evaluation of what are the most important behavioral 
differences for the understanding of oil markets and how well investors might be able to 
anticipate future scarcity.   
The two key behavioral differences that are highlighted in the model are the 
beliefs that players have about the abundance of the resource – specifically the rate of 
discovery of new reserves – and how far investors look into the future in making their 
calculations.  How much oil there is in the ground is a hotly contested question.  Some 
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observers have warned that we are near the point of using half of the oil resources that 
were initially in the ground and recoverable before we started consuming oil, based on 
estimates of ultimately recoverable reserves (URR) of around 2 trillion barrels (Campbell 
and Laherrere, 1998; Heinberg, 2003).  A more optimistic view has come from the 
USGS, whose estimate for URR of 3 trillion barrels we used in the last chapter (USGS, 
2000).  Others observers have argued that even the USGS estimate is too low, because 
new technological developments are likely to make oil available that is not currently 
feasible to recover (Lynch, 2002).  The answer to this question has important 
implications for the long-run trajectory of oil prices.   
The other question is how far into the future market players look to determine 
what prices should be.  There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that most market players 
focus on short to medium-term developments.  News stories about oil price movements 
focus on developments that are likely to affect oil markets in the next few months, and 
rarely mention new discoveries that won’t come to market for years to come.  Another 
indication of how far into the future oil market participants tend to think is that crude oil 
futures traded on NYMEX only go up to seven years into the future, with the near-term 
markets generating by far the most activity.  Even the US Energy Information 
Association’s longest projections for oil market developments only look about 25 years 
into the future (EIA, 2011).  Yet in the Hotelling model, actors may have to look 
hundreds of years into the future, or as long as needed for the resource to be exhausted, to 
determine what the current market price should be.  How far investors look into the future 
could have significant implication for their calculation of what prices should be.   
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We focus on these two factors because of their prominence in discussions about 
oil scarcity, and their importance for the ability of market players to correctly anticipate 
future scarcity.  There are other factors that may also play an important role that I do not 
address in this model.  Most notably, differences in beliefs about the availability of 
alternative technologies that can substitute for oil, and about how much these 
technologies will progress, could also play a key role in determining whether oil supplies 
will become scarce in the long term.  This could be an important area for future research.  
However, I believe that some of the dynamics associated with differences in these beliefs 
would be similar to the dynamics of this model based on differences in beliefs about 
resource abundance, since both differences primarily affect the prospects for long run oil 
scarcity. 
3.1.4 Overview of remaining sections 
Section two describes how the model of supply, demand, storage, and futures 
market investment is constructed.  This model is implemented in java, using the Repast 
java library for constructing the agent-based model.  Section three provides an overview 
of results from model simulations, and section four concludes with thoughts about the 
contributions of the model and areas for further work. 
3.2 The model 
The model used in this chapter builds on the demand and supply model from 
Chapter 2.  A behavioral model of speculation in oil futures markets is added in which 
investors try to predict the price of oil, and invest in futures markets based on their 
prediction.  Futures prices are related to spot prices through the addition of above-ground 
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storage markets.  In addition, the supply model is adjusted to add some uncertainty about 
resource levels through an exploration and discovery process. 
3.2.1 Roles 
The key roles played by participants in the model are: demand, supply, storage, 
and speculation.   
In the Hotelling model and many others based on it, suppliers of oil predict future 
prices and make decisions about how much to produce and how much to store for later 
based on that prediction.  The model in this paper divides that process into three steps: 
futures market investors make price predictions and choose to buy or sell futures on the 
basis of their prediction – this determines futures prices.  Holders of above-ground 
storage then adjust their storage levels based on the levels of futures prices relative to 
spot prices.  Producers then use spot prices in choosing how much to supply in this 
period.  The decisions of speculators, storage holders, producers and consumers are 
modeled separately. 
Although the roles are modeled separately, the same people or companies could 
be playing more than one role.  An oil producer can also invest in futures market and hold 
above-ground stocks of oil.  However their decisions as to what to do in each case can be 
decided separately.  
Under reasonable assumptions, a utility maximizing producer, consumer or holder 
of oil can use the price of futures as the basis for their timing decisions.  If their own 
prediction about how oil prices should change differs from the futures price, they can best 
take advantage of this by investing in futures markets while still basing their supply and 
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demand timing decisions on the price of futures.  This is demonstrated to be true for a 
fairly general form of optimization problem in Appendix B.   
3.2.1.1 Demand  
The demand model we use in this model is the same as in the model from chapter 
2, and is specified by equations (3-1): 
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3.2.1.2 Supply 
3.2.1.2.1 Supply from previous essay 
The supply model we use is similar to that in equations (2-14) from the model in 
chapter 2.   
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The parameter values for both the supply and demand equations taken from 
chapter 2 are also the same as those used in chapter 2.  It should be noted that since these 
were calculated by fitting the chapter 2 model to data, the expanded model in this chapter 
will not be properly fit to data.  While the supply and demand models used in this paper 
are nearly the same as in chapter 2, the ability of investors to anticipate future 
developments in oil markets may help to smooth price paths, leading to less price 
variation in this model than in the model from chapter 2.  Since the demand and supply 
parameters were chosen so that the chapter 2 model would replicate the amount of price 
variation in the real-world data, there may not be enough random variation in demand 
and supply to produce the correct historical levels of price volatility once the anticipation 
of future movements is taken into account.  Therefore these model runs should not be 
seen as fitted projections of how prices are likely to behave, but as an illustration of how 
changing particular behavioral assumptions affect the results, under a reasonably realistic, 
but not perfect, demand and supply scenario. 
3.2.1.2.2 Uncertainty about resources 
Since uncertainty about resource abundance is a key component of the behavioral 
model, we expand the supply model from chapter 2 to allow for some uncertainty.  To 
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implement uncertain resource levels, we distinguish between proven reserves, which have 
been discovered and are available, and ultimately recoverable resources, the level of 
which is unknown.  Exploration is required to turn resources into reserves.  Production 
capacity is limited by proven reserves, so we replace the production capacity equation 
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, where tP  represents proven reserves.  To 
make the model as similar as possible to the one used in chapter 2, enough exploration is 
done in each period to bring proven reserves at least as high as ][ tREc  .  The amount of 
exploration needed to reach this level depends on how successful the exploration is.   
Our model of the distribution of deposits follows Lasserre (1984).  Exploration 
produces deposits according to a Poisson process with rate parameter 1 (we can set the 
rate parameter as desired by adjusting the units of land).  There is a fixed total amount of 
land to be explored, all of which is equally likely to produce deposits, and all deposits are 
of equal size, r.  The total number of deposits follows a Poisson distribution: 
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The parameter   is the expected number of deposits, which is equal to the 
number of units of land, 0X , available for exploration.  This is set to be 500.  The 
number of deposits affects the amount of uncertainty that can exist as to the total resource 
levels.  A small number of large deposits leads to more variation in the distribution of 
total resources than a large number of small deposits.  The size of each deposit, r, is set to 
be one 500
th
 of 3003 billion barrels, so that the expected level of ultimately recoverable 
resources is equal to the starting resource level from Chapter 2.   
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The amount of exploration needed to produce a deposit is a random variable E  
that follows an exponential distribution, with density function:  
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In each period exploration continues until the level of proven reserves is at least 
as large as c times the expected value of ultimately recoverable resources.  If a total of n  
deposits are needed to reach this level, the amount of exploration it will take to reach this 
is the sum of n  independent exponential distributions, or the gamma distribution  1,n .  
Some additional exploration may occur without a discovery if the drop in expected 
resources from the lack of discovery makes the condition be satisfied before a discovery 
occurs.  
3.2.1.3 Storage  
3.2.1.3.1 Price smoothing 
An important part of our model is the mechanism by which futures price affect 
spot prices.  As discussed in the opening section, if investors anticipate a future rise in 
prices, this should help drive current prices up. 
There are two mechanisms by which this could happen.  One is that suppliers of 
oil would delay pumping oil out of the ground, and instead wait until the price rises to 
produce the oil.  The other is that anyone with storage facilities could purchase oil at the 
lower price, hold onto the oil, and sell at the higher price.  
In the Hotelling model, it is suppliers who adjust their production patterns based 
on the relative value of current and future prices.  Producers have a fixed reservoir of oil 
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which they can extract at any time.  They choose when to extract it based on the relative 
prices at different times.   
This model is not very realistic however – in the real world, oil suppliers do not 
have so much flexibility as to when they pump their oil.  They have a limited production 
capacity based on the wells they have drilled, and draining a reservoir too quickly can 
damage the reservoir, reducing the amount of oil that can ultimately be recovered (Banks, 
2000).  In addition, if producers adjusted their extraction levels significantly over time in 
response to oil prices, they would on average be producing well below capacity, which 
would not be the most efficient use of their capacity investments.  As a result most wells, 
once drilled, operate at full capacity most of the time, regardless of the current price of 
oil.   
Storage facilities can be much more flexible about when they move their oil to the 
market, and therefore respond most directly to the relative value of current and future 
prices.  A number of economic models of exhaustible resources use a price smoothing 
rule based on equilibrium in the above ground storage market, rather than supplier 
decisions.  In the industry standard oil pricing model, the difference between spot and 
futures prices depends on the equilibrium in the above ground storage market (French, 
2005, p. 2, 3-4).    
The flexibility of above-ground storage makes it the logical way of exploiting a 
short-term differential between spot and futures prices.  However if a longer-term trend 
of increasing prices is expected, then putting off developing new fields until prices are 
higher may be a better strategy, since the amount of storage necessary to offset a long-run 
trend like this would become very expensive. 
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However, finding the optimal choice of investment in capacity and capacity 
utilization in the face of an anticipated path of future prices would be a very difficult 
optimization problem, and would be even more difficult to work into the model in this 
paper.  I therefore focus on above ground storage for all price smoothing purposes.  To 
allow long-run price smoothing, I keep the cost of above ground storage low enough that 
huge build-ups of above ground storage are possible when necessary.  This approach can 
lead to levels of above ground storage that would be unlikely to occur in the real world, 
but it provides an alternative to allowing suppliers to hold resources underground as a 
method of long-term price smoothing.   
3.2.1.3.2 Storage equilibrium 
Stocks of oil, or oil that is held in storage above ground, are useful for several 
reasons.  They may allow suppliers to provide a smooth supply of oil to customers 
(French 2005, p. 1, refs to Kaldor 1939 and Working 1948).  Large consumers may also 
hold reserves to ensure that they have oil available when they need it.  There is also an 
option value of holding resources, as it gives you the option of exploiting price 
movements (French 2005, ref to Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  For these reasons, there is a 
‘convenience yield’ to holding reserves.  There is also a cost of physical storage of oil. 
Holders of oil stocks can also command a profit or loss on their storage depending 
on the relative levels of spot and futures prices.  We can use current futures prices instead 
of the actual price in the next period because owners of storage facilities can minimize 
their risks by buying or selling futures to lock in a price they will buy/sell their oil at, as 
shown in section 3.2.1.  However, futures prices must be discounted, since they will not 
be received until the oil is sold at the end of the period.  We use a real interest rate, r, of 
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2%, which may seem low by historical standards, but is not too low for an inflation 
adjusted risk free interest rate.  The investment should be risk free since futures markets 
offset any risk from unforeseen price movements during the period.   
Owners of oil storage will choose to hold enough oil so that the marginal 
convenience yield from holding an additional barrel of oil minus the marginal storage 
costs of storing the oil equals the loss of value from holding oil, as measured by the 
difference between spot prices and discounted futures prices.   
The convenience yield and storage cost functions are given below:  
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D is the demand for oil, and a and c are constants.  The shapes of these curves are 
generally consistent with those suggested by French (2005).   
Setting marginal benefits equal to marginal costs, we have:  
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If there is no gain or loss of value from holding oil, then the optimal level of 
stocks will be equal to  
c
Da 
.  I set set a/c = 0.2, so that the optimal stock level is 20% of 
demand – or that there are 73 days of forward cover.  This is slightly higher than is 
common in the current market – forward cover has ranged from 51 to 61 days from 2006-
2010 (IEA, 2011).  C is set to be 2.0, which means the cost of storing oil is $2/barrel per 
year.  True costs vary depending on how the oil is being stored.  When storage needs are 
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high, companies can store oil in tankers at sea at costs of $0.70 – $1.00/barrel per month 
according to one estimate, or $8.40-$12.00/barrel per year (Saul and Johnson, 2010).  
However, storage costs could be reduced if there is a long-term need for large amounts of 
storage.  Since we are using above-ground storage as a substitute for withholding 
production as a way to anticipate long-term shortages, we need to keep storage costs low 
enough to make it reasonable for there to be large amounts of above-ground storage held 
for long time periods.   
3.2.1.4 Speculation 
Speculators determine prices in futures markets.  All speculators follow the same 
general approach to choosing what position to take.  Each year, they make an evaluation 
of what prices should be based on a set of fundamental information and a belief about 
how prices are set.  They also use information from the positions other investors take – if 
their own evaluation is that the price should be p, and the market value for futures prices 
is f, they assume that the price will actually be fp  9.01.0 .  This adjustment is made 
based on the belief that whatever led everyone else to predict prices differently from their 
prediction may still be true in a year.   Since everyone is doing this, it doesn’t affect the 
value of futures prices, but it does affect how predictions are evaluated.  The most 
accurate predictions are more likely to be copied by others, and without this adjustment, 
predictions that are in the right direction but differ significantly from the market average 
would be unlikely to be rewarded.   
If their final prediction is higher than the market price of futures, they take a long 
position in futures markets; if it is lower, they take a short position.  The amount they 
take is chosen to maximize their expected utility, using the constant absolute risk 
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aversion utility function xexu  )( , and the belief that prices could take on a value 
that will be drawn from a normal distribution with variance 2  centered around their 
price prediction, ][ 1tpE .  The result is that the position they would take in the futures 
market is 
2
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c . (Arthur et al., 1996).  If c is negative, this means a short 
position, if it is positive this means a long position. 
Two things affect how strong a position investors take: the rate of risk aversion, 
 , which may depend on the amount of money available, and the confidence that the 
person has in their estimate for 1tp , as measured by the variance of the distribution, 
2 .  
I assume for now that all investors have the same amount of risk aversion, and the same 
confidence in their estimate, so that the predictions of all investors are given equal weight 
in determining the price of futures.  A promising area for future research would be to 
explore how variation in these factors could affect the results.  
3.2.2 Equilibria 
Equilibrium spot prices and futures prices are set simultaneously each period.  
Futures market equilibria are set based on the price predictions of investors, and spot 
market equilibria are set to equilibrate demand and supply from producers, consumers 
and holders of above-ground storage, taking futures prices into account.  
3.2.2.1 Futures markets 
The futures market we focus on is for crude oil for delivery one year into the 
future.  One year is the shortest time period we can look at because we only update the 
model once a year.  Real-world markets of course are updated much more regularly, but 
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yearly updating should be enough for our purposes of looking at long run trends in prices.  
More frequent updating would slow down model runs, making it more difficult to look at 
results from large numbers of runs.    
The model does not include markets for oil futures more than one year into the 
future because the price of oil in the next period is the only thing that should affect 
behavior in our model.  Above-ground storage is the only market that is affected by 
future prices.  If the price next period is lower than the current price, expectations of price 
increases further into the future should not lead to any additional storage today, because 
holders of storage would prefer to wait until the price drops to buy the oil.  
Even though we only look at the price of futures one year away, people may still 
have to look farther into the future to determine what that price should be.  In a rational 
expectations model such as the Hotelling model, long-run calculations are needed to 
determine what the current price of oil should be, as well as the price one year away.   
Equilibrium in the futures market is easy to calculate: it is the average of the price 
predictions of the investors.  This is because all investors use linear investment functions 
with the same risk aversion and confidence parameters, so all predictions get the same 
weight. 
3.2.2.2 Spot market 
Spot prices are set so that the supply from producers equals the demand from 
consumers plus the net demand from storage, given the value of futures prices.   
),()()( tttttt fpStpSpD          (3.9) 
A unique equilibrium will exist as long as oil has not been 100% used up.  The 
equilibrium value is calculated numerically. 
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3.2.3 Possible prediction rules 
The prediction rules used by investors in our model can be broken down into two 
categories: long time horizon or long-run rules and limited time horizon or short-run 
rules.   
3.2.3.1 Long-run price prediction rules 
Investors using long-run rules use all the information available at a point in time 
to make a long-run calculation of how demand, supply, storage and speculators will 
behave over time, assuming that all other speculators behave the same as them.  They are 
able to project supply and demand arbitrarily far into the future based on full knowledge 
of the supply and demand equations in the model as well as the current values of the 
supply and demand constants, proven reserves, and the amount of land left available for 
exploration.  However, they are not able to predict how the stochastic terms in the supply 
and demand equations will come out – instead they assume that they will always take on 
their mean value of zero.  They also assume that new discoveries will be made at a 
constant rate, but they can have different beliefs about what that rate is. 
In principle, long-run investors should look infinitely far into the future.  
However, our supply and demand model leads to near exhaustion of the resource and 
very low demand 250 years from the start of the model run.  For programming ease we 
therefore cut off these long-run evaluations, as well as our model runs, at that time.   
To predict what prices should be, long-run investors need to calculate a price for 
oil in each period that would lead to equilibriums in the spot market every year until the 
end of the run, given their assumptions about supply and demand.  Futures prices are 
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assumed to correctly predict prices for the next period.  At the end of the run, there 
should be no oil left in above ground storage.  
The equilibrium problem can be expressed as:  
Choose 250,,0 ppt   to satisfy: 
 250,,)(
~
)(
~
0 ttStpSpD ttttt   
 249,,),( 01 ttppStSt ttt         (3.10) 
0250 St  
Where tD
~
 and tS
~
 are projected demand and supply at time t based on demand 
and supply updating rules with stochastic terms set to mean value, and discovery rate set 
to belief of investor.   
These long-run rules are similar to what the rational expectations rule would be 
for this model.  The only differences are that the long-run rules may have different beliefs 
about discovery rates, and they do not properly account for random variation in the 
model, which could affect the optimal strategy.  Doing the full stochastic optimization 
problem is not computationally feasible in model run time, so these long-run price 
prediction rules (with the correct beliefs about the most likely discovery rate) are the 
closest we can come to a rational expectations rule.  When all investors use a long-run 
rule with the correct belief about the most likely discovery rate, the model output looks 
similar to what we would expect in a rational expectations equilibrium.   
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Figure 3.1.  Price simulation with long-run investors only 
  
The y-axis is a logarithmic scale, so a straight line increase represents a constant 
percentage increase in price each year.  There seem to be two distinct regimes, one for the 
first half of the model run, and one for the second half.   
For the first half of the model run, short-run concerns dominate, and keep prices 
higher than they would need to be to anticipate long-run shortages.  Stochastic variations 
in the demand and supply constants lead to some volatility. 
In the second half of the model run, the long-run scarcity dominates, and investors 
anticipate this, building up above ground storage levels while prices rise gradually.  The 
rate of increase depends on interest rates and storage costs.  It is a little faster at first 
because storage costs are a higher percentage of prices.  The high levels of above-ground 
storage also make it easier for markets to adjust smoothly to short run variations in 
demand and supply constants, smoothing out some of the volatility from the first half. 
The relationship between model years and actual years should not be taken too 
literally since is based on the fit to real-world data taken from chapter 2, but it is still 
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interesting to note that, based on this fit, the transition to the long-run scarcity regime 
occurs around 1980.  However, the timing of this transition is highly dependent on our 
assumptions about the interest rate and storage costs – a higher interest rate or storage 
cost would put off the transition and lead to more rapid increase in prices after it occurs.   
3.2.3.2 Short-run price prediction rules 
Short-run rules are similar to long-run rules, except that they have a limited time 
horizon for which they do their analysis.  They are formed by looking at projected supply 
and demand a fixed number of periods into the future.  As with long-run rules, we assume 
that in projecting supply and demand, speculators know the predictable parts of the 
demand and supply function, but not the stochastic parts.   
Based on their projections of supply and demand, they make the same calculation 
as long-run investors make up to their time horizon.  To complete the calculation of what 
the equilibrium price should be, they need to make an assumption about what state they 
expect above ground stocks to be in at the end of the period they are evaluating.  
Investors can have different beliefs about the number of days of forward cover there 
should be at that point - that is, how long stocks would last if demand remained at current 
levels with no new supply.  The evolutionary algorithm can help this assumption adjust 
depending on what is proving most accurate.  Beliefs that stocks should increase will lead 
to higher price predictions, and beliefs that stocks should fall will lead to lower price 
predictions.    
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3.2.3.2.1 One year time horizon 
If we restrict the model to allow only short-run investors with one-period time 
horizons who have the same assumption about forward cover at the end of the period, we 
get a good approximation of the results from the model in chapter 2.  This is because with 
very little change in stock levels over the course of the year, prices are being set to 
equilibriate supply and demand during that year.  There are slight differences between 
this model and the one in chapter 2.  The amount of above-ground storage can change 
slightly as demand for oil increases.  There is also variation in the discovery rate from 
new exploration, which leads to some additional variation in supply over time that did not 
exist in chapter 2.  However, these changes are small, and the results do not differ much 
from those in chapter 2, except perhaps at the very end when each discovery starts to 
have more of an effect.  The results of one randomly chosen simulation are given below.  
There are price spikes that go as high as $57,000/barrel as the resource nears exhaustion.    
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Figure 3.2. Price simulation with short-run investors only 
  
 
Figure 3.3. Comparison between short-run simulation and chapter 2 
  
Figure 3.4 shows how the price trajectory compares to the trajectory with long run 
investors.  In addition to the extra fluctuations from year to year, we can observe that 
prices are lower than in the long-run simulation during the period from years 110 to 170, 
but get to be higher by the end of the run. 
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Figure 3.4. Time horizon comparison: two way 
  
3.2.3.2.2 Seven-year time horizon 
If the time horizon is increased, some smoothing is observed.  We look at a seven-
year time horizon as an example because this is the farthest in the future that oil futures 
are traded on NYMEX.  There are fewer oscillations over the course of the model run 
than with a one-year time horizon, especially in the second half as the price is increasing.  
But the long-term trend in prices follows a trajectory that is closer to the one-year horizon 
trajectory than the long-run trajectory.   
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Figure 3.5. Price simulation with seven-year investors only 
  
Figure 3.6. Time horizon comparison: three way 
  
3.2.3.2.3 Twenty-five year time horizon 
If investors look 25 years into the future (the longest projections done by the 
EIA), the short term variations get smoothed out even further, but the long-run path is 
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still closer to the short-run model than the long-run model.  By the end of 230 years, 
prices are near $10000/barrel, compared to $1000/barrel in the long run model. 
Figure 3.7. Price simulation with 25-year investors only 
  
Figure 3.8.  Time horizon comparison: four way 
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3.2.4 Evolutionary updating 
Investors don’t know the best strategy for predicting future prices, but they can 
judge the effectiveness of different strategies by seeing how well they have predicted 
prices in the past.  They will tend to adopt strategies that have proven to be more 
effective.  The goal of the evolutionary algorithm is to have the most effective strategies 
be the ones that are most commonly used, but with a range of reasonable strategies in use 
at a time.   
There are a number of decisions to make about how the algorithm should work.  
How fast should investors switch to a new strategy that starts performing well?  How 
much variation should there be in the strategies that are used – should some people keep 
using strategies that are consistently underperforming?  
I use an approach where there is a set of active strategies that evolves over time, 
and a set of investors that can move between strategies from the active set.   
The size of the active set of strategies is important.  If it is too large, the running 
time of the model becomes very slow, because this increases the number of times that the 
price prediction calculations must be made.  However, it has to be large enough to ensure 
that the space of possible strategies is being explored well, so that everyone doesn’t get 
stuck too long at a sub-optimal strategy.   
In order to explore the space of possible strategies efficiently without producing 
too many unnecessary strategies, it is important to have a good method of targeting 
strategies that have a good chance of being improvements on the existing strategies.   
There is an extensive literature on the use genetic algorithms for optimization 
purposes.  One goal in this literature is to develop efficient ways of exploring a space to 
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find potential optimums.  Since the model uses continuous parameters, we refer to the 
literature on continuous genetic algorithms in particular.  The approach we came up with 
includes a combination of three different types of exploration: experimentation, mutation, 
and crossover.  Experimentation involves choosing a new random strategy from the 
space.  Mutation involves making a small change from an existing strategy.  Crossover 
involves using the information from two existing strategies to produce a third strategy. 
3.2.4.1 Updating set of prediction rules 
The updating rules use approaches taken from real-coded genetic algorithms, 
which we use because two of the factors that vary between rules are continuous variables: 
the rate of discovery of new reserves and the number of days of forward cover at the end 
of the evaluation period.  There is also a binary decision as to the type of rule that is used 
(long-run or short-run).  There are ways of coding continuous variables using binary 
genetic codes that approximate the real numbers being modeled, but there are advantages 
of using real coding directly (Herrera et al., 1998).  Therefore I use a hybrid approach, 
using two real-coded genes and one binary-coded gene.  
3.2.4.1.1 Experimentation: new random value 
In maximization problems, this is primarily used to generate the starting strategies 
that initially populate the strategy space, with no new randomly generated strategies 
appearing later in the model.  However, in a context where the underlying game is 
constantly changing as supply and demand are updated and new information emerges, it 
is important for agents to occasionally test the entire strategy space to see if new areas of 
high pay-off have appeared.  It also makes sense that this would happen in the real world: 
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while many investors will base their investment strategies on what other people have 
found to be successful, there will occasionally be investors who make their own 
independent analysis of investment strategies without taking other people’s decisions into 
account. 
New random strategies have a 50% chance of being short run strategies and 50% 
chance of being long run.  The predicted discovery rate is drawn from a log-normal 
distribution centered at the true expected discovery rate, with scale parameter 5.0 .  
This creates a slight bias toward picking strategies with the actual rate, but the standard 
deviation is large enough that a wide variety of them will be chosen.   
The expected forward cover is drawn from a log-normal distribution centered at 
the current number of days of forward cover.  This value can change throughout model 
runs.  The scale parameter is set to be 2.0 .   
3.2.4.1.2 Mutation: small change from old 
Another way that investors may try new strategies is by making small adjustments 
to existing strategies.  The probability of picking a particular strategy for mutation is 
proportional to the amount of money being invested using that strategy.  This way, 
successful strategies that have been chosen by many investors are more likely to be 
selected for mutation, so that the region that is close to the successful strategies will be 
explored most thoroughly. 
Each mutation is done to one of the two real-valued genes – discoveries and 
ending forward cover.  Mutations do not switch agents between short-run and long-run 
rules.  The size of the adjustments we use is generated using Muhlenbein’s mutation 
(Herrera et al. 1998, Muhlenbein et al. 1993): 
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Each k  is independently chosen to be 1 with probability 1/16 and 0 otherwise.  
This generates changes that have a high probability of being small (60% chance of being 
< 1/8), which allows for fine tuning of strategies to come close to the optimum, while still 
having a non-negligible chance of larger changes (6% chance of being >= 1).   
The constant irang  determines how large these mutations can be.  It is set 
separately for the two terms of the model – the amount of resource discovery and the 
final stocks – to be proportional to the standard deviation of distribution that random 
strategies are drawn from, as described in the last section. 
3.2.4.1.3 Crossover: combining information from two rules 
Crossover occurs when information from two different strategies are combined to 
form a new strategy.  As with mutation, the two strategies are chosen from the set of 
possible strategies in proportion to the amount of money being invested in the strategy.  
Also, as with mutation, crossover is used only to adjust the final stocks among short-run 
investors, or the resource availability among long-run investors.  It is not used to switch 
between short-run and long-run.  Therefore, if a long-run and a short-run investor are 
selected, no crossover occurs. 
The standard crossover mechanism in a genetic algorithm is modeled after the 
process of genetic recombination, where the genome is split at a random point and 
recombined.  In the case of real-coded genetic algorithms with one genome, the genetic 
recombination approach does not apply; instead another way must be found to use 
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information from two promising strategies to devise a third possible strategy that has a 
good probability of being useful.   
The approach we use is known as Extended Intermediate Crossover (Muhlenbein 
et al., 1993) or BLX-0.25 (Eshelman et al., 1993).  This rule can be applied to cases with 
more than one genome, but for our purposes, we only need the simple rule: if the two 
parents have strategies c1 and c2, the child will have a strategy that is generated 
randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval  25.0,25.0 maxmin  IcIc , 
where minmax ccI  .  In words, this means picking a random strategy that falls either 
between the two parent strategies, or slightly to the outside of them.  
The benefit of this approach relative to simple mutation is that agents can explore 
either a large or a small region depending on how much variation there is between 
different agents’ strategies.  When using genetic algorithms for maximization, this allows 
for more fine-tuning if agents have congregated around a maximum, and more 
exploration if the agents haven’t settled on a clear maximum yet.  It is also has a plausible 
explanation in the context of investors predicting futures prices: if other investors have 
very different strategies, this is likely to induce more experimentation, whereas if there is 
a consensus among investors, there is likely to be less exploration of significantly 
different strategies.  
In the usual genetic process, two parent strategies are replaced by two children’s 
strategies.  In the world of investors predicting futures prices, there aren’t parents 
producing children in the same way, but it is realistic for one investor to look at another 
investor’s strategy, and use that as a basis for deciding which direction and how far to 
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explore in choosing a new strategy.  To replicate this, I use the crossover operator to 
replace one of the two parent nodes. 
3.2.4.1.4 Elimination of unused strategies 
Strategies that are unused by investors for three years in a row are eliminated 
from the set of possible strategies.  If no one adopts them by that time, it is likely because 
they are not performing very well, so it is not worth continuing to make calculation of the 
effectiveness of those strategies. 
3.2.4.2 Selection of strategies by investors 
Selection is the process where investors decide which prediction rules to use when 
making their investments.  The idea is that the most successful strategies become more 
popular, and the least successful strategies don’t get used and eventually disappear.   
3.2.4.2.1 Timing of judging fitness 
Prediction rules attempt to predict prices for the next period – a year into the 
future.  The effectiveness of a prediction rule can’t be evaluated until the period has 
passed and the actual price has been revealed.  If investors adopted a prediction rule 
before it had been evaluated, there is the potential that they would make wildly erratic 
price predictions leading them to make investments that would throw off the whole 
market.  To avoid this, we adopt the rule that no prediction rule is used by investors until 
it has been evaluated.  When the set of possible prediction rules is updated, the new 
strategies are assigned a performance rating of zero – the worst possible.  Once its 
predictions can be tested against actual prices, this performance rating is adjusted based 
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on the accuracy of the predictions.  Investors may then choose to adopt that investment 
strategy if it has performed well.  If no one adopts it after three periods, it is dropped 
from the set of possible strategies.  
3.2.4.2.2 Performance rating  
The performance rating of each strategy determines whether or not agents choose 
to adopt it.  This is the equivalent of a fitness function or payoff function used in other 
evolutionary models.  Each new strategy that is tested begins with a valuation of zero.  Its 
performance in each period is judged based on the distance from its prediction to the 
correct price. 
The effectiveness of a strategy in a given period can be judged by how close it 
comes to correctly predicting prices in the next period, based on the formula: 
  ttt fpdExpr 111          (3-12) 
In this formula, tf 1  is the predicted future price, predicted at time t of what prices 
will be one period into the future, and 1tp  is what the price turns out to be in the next 
period.  The exponential makes the ratings positive, so that the probability of adopting a 
strategy can be proportional to its performance rating.  The constant d  determines how 
strong the pressure is to adopt the most accurate strategy.  If d  is large, a small 
difference in prediction accuracy can greatly increase the probability that a strategy is 
chosen.  This can lead to more precise predictions, but less variation in the strategies 
available, as strategies that are not making the very best price predictions may be 
abandoned too quickly, even if their predictions are close to the optimum strategy. 
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If the same strategy is used over more than one period, its performance rating 
begins at zero and is updated each period by moving a fixed portion c  of the way from 
its previous rating to the value of its performance in that period: 
ttt rcRcRR  10 )1(;0       (3-13) 
The values of d and c use in the model runs presented in this paper are 2.0 and 0.5 
respectively. 
3.2.4.2.3 Strategy selection 
In each period, each agent compares their current strategy, 1S  to a randomly 
chosen strategy, 2S , from the active strategy set.  The probability that they will switch to 
this new strategy is proportional to its performance rating: 
)2()1(
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By only evaluating one possible alternative strategy to switch to, this makes it 
more likely that agents will stick to their old strategy than if they evaluated more possible 
alternatives in each period.  This helps to add some inertia into the system, where 
investors stick with their old strategies even if they are not the very best out there; 
however, if a strategy is clearly underperforming relative to most other strategies in the 
active strategy set it will still be abandoned quickly.   
3.2.4.3 Testing evolutionary mechanism 
The evolutionary updating rules I use are generally a reasonable representation of 
how investors might actually behave in the real world – certainly more so than the 
rational expectations model commonly used in economics – but I do not intend to 
perfectly replicate the process by which investors actually behave.  The goal is that the 
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evolutionary process will be able to find the most successful strategies and make those 
strategies more and more commonly used over time, while keeping a range of reasonably 
successful strategies in use.   
To test that the evolutionary algorithm selects strategies properly when there is a 
clear best strategy, I run a model where the price prediction of a particular strategy is 
rewarded – specifically the long-run strategy with discovery expectations that match the 
expected value from the model.  Rules that come closest to predicting this price receive 
the best pay-off.  Figure 3.9 shows how closely the average price prediction of investors 
in the model follows this ‘best’ price prediction when it is favored by the evolutionary 
algorithm.    
Figure 3.9. Price predictions when selection favors best prediction 
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3.3 Model simulations 
In this section, we evaluate the outcomes of simulations of the model described in 
the last section.  Simulations are based on runs of the model using Repast for java, with 
different random number generators and different model assumptions.  
3.3.1 The standard model run with one year time horizons 
The first simulations we look at include the two extreme types of investors: those 
using long-run rules and those looking only one year into the future.  Investors also can 
vary in their expectations about the discovery rate of new reserves, and (in the case of 
short-run investors) in their assumptions about stocks at the end of their evaluation 
period.  The evolutionary algorithm determines which types of investors become the most 
common and control price-setting.   
3.3.1.1 Sample runs 
The results from running the full evolutionary model vary greatly from model run 
to model run, based only on changes in the random number generator used.  Three 
samples of the output are shown below, to get a sense for the different types of outcomes 
that can occur, and what leads to the differences.
8
 
In the first outcome we look at, long run investors dominate, and the price paths 
aren’t too different from the rational equilibrium outcome. 
 
                                                 
8
 Some of the sample runs included here were performed with the number of distinct oil 
deposits set to 50 instead of 500.  Changing this parameter did not substantially affect the 
results, except by slightly reducing the volatility at the end of the model run as resources 
approach exhaustion, so I continue to use some examples with the smaller number of 
deposits for illustrative purposes. 
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Figure 3.10. Run 1: percent of investors with short time horizons 
  
Figure 3.11. Run 1: price trajectory 
  
In these runs, the set of investors gradually become more and more dominated by 
long-run investors, until from year 90 on, almost all investors use long-run rules.  The 
price path looks similar to the path we saw when only long-run investors were allowed.   
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It is not surprising that an outcome close to the rational expectations outcome is 
possible.  If everyone else is using this strategy, then it leads to optimal price predictions, 
and so there is no way to improve on it, if this arrangement is reached.   
It is, perhaps, more interesting that other outcomes are also possible.  In the 
second model run we look at, short-run investors dominate the market for much of the 
model run.  Prices follow a path closer to that in the scenario with a single type of short 
run investor, with swings between higher and lower prices.  Prices never reach quite as 
high levels as in the simple short-run scenario, but this appears to be primarily because 
the amount of oil discovered turns out to be higher than usual in this model run.   
Figure 3.12. Run 2: percent of investors with short time horizons 
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Figure 3.13. Run 2: price trajectory 
  
 
The only difference between this model run and the previous run is the seed used 
for the random number generator.  The fact that random chance can lead to such 
divergent scenarios suggests that there may be a threshold effect that pushes the model to 
one equilibrium or another based on small variations in initial conditions.  This will be 
discussed further later on.   
A third model run shows a dramatic shift from mostly long-sighted to mostly 
short-sighted investors part way through the run, after which short-sighted investors 
dominate.  The reason for the shift is explored further in next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 109 
 
Figure 3.14. Run 3: percent of investors with short time horizons 
  
Figure 3.15. Run 3: price trajectory 
  
3.3.1.2 Settling on extremes   
One striking result from these model runs is that near the end of the model run, 
investors seem to either be almost uniformly using short-run rules, or almost uniformly 
using long-run rules, with mixes of the two rules being rare.  This results from an 
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evolutionary dynamic that rewards rules that are similar to the rules that everybody else is 
using.  The rational expectations solution produces the correct price predictions as long as 
everyone else is also using the same rule.  However, if everyone else is focusing on short-
run concerns, prices may stay low even when long-run shortages should drive up prices.  
An investor who insists on taking the long run shortages into account when nobody else 
is may produce a price prediction that is well off from the price that actually occurs.  The 
same is true in reverse – if everyone else is taking long-run shortages into account, people 
using short-run rules will be less likely to predict the raised prices that are brought on by 
the long-run investors. 
The variation in beliefs about resources and about forward cover of stocks can 
help to allow investors of the minority type to produce closer price predictions than they 
would have otherwise, since they can adjust these assumptions to be more consistent with 
the prices they are seeing.   
This can be observed in run 2 mentioned above.  In Figure 3.16, we focus on a 
period where there are mostly short-run investors in the model, but a few long-run 
investors still there.  By the end of this period the long run investors have mostly 
disappeared.  We see that the average price predictions of the long run investors (avg 
long-run pred) follows roughly the pattern of actual prices, though less closely than short-
run investors who are making the calculations that are actually being used in setting 
prices.  This is in contrast with the prices that long-run investors would have predicted if 
they had stuck with the best assumption about the discovery rate (best long-run pred), 
which does not follow actual prices at all.  By the end of the period, there are so few 
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long-run investors left around that the evolutionary algorithm stops working as well, and 
the long-run predictions diverge further from actual prices.   
Figure 3.16. Run 2: evolutionary updating of resource expectations 
 
3.3.1.3 Switching between extremes possible   
Run 3 from the sample runs is a good illustration of how the model can shift 
rapidly from having the majority of investors using long-sighted rules to the majority 
using short-sighted rules.   
Some additional graphs from model run 3 help to illuminate what is happening 
when this shift occurs.  The graph below shows actual prices switching from following 
the average predictions of long run investors to the average predictions of short-run 
investors.  The first thing to note is that the rise in prices starting around year 85 does not 
follow the pattern predicted by the best long-run rule – instead, it is driven by long-run 
investors with overly pessimistic views about resource discovery.  The shift from long-
run to short-run investors is initiated by a downturn in prices that the long-run investors 
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failed to anticipate.  This may have been due to a surprisingly fast discovery of new 
reserves, it may have been caused by more optimistic investors randomly appearing to 
drive prices down, or a combination of the two.  Once prices start moving down, 
investors that are making lower price predictions start performing better.  This includes 
both long-run investors with higher expected discovery rates and short-run investors.  As 
these types start becoming more and more common, this makes prices drop further 
leading to feedback effects that make the short-run predictions, which are the lowest, 
look more and more attractive, until everyone shifts to using the short-run rules.   
It should be noted that the predictions shown here are the fundamental predictions 
being made, before adjustments based on market information from the actual price of 
futures (see section 3.2.1.4).  The adjustment makes it so fundamental price predictions 
that are on the right side of the average prediction can be rewarded, even if they are 
farther away from the true value, which allows the short-run rules to look attractive 
sooner than one might expect. 
Figure 3.17.  Run 3: shift from long-run to short-run investors 
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3.3.1.4 Results from more model runs 
While it is useful to look at individual model runs to see the different possible 
behaviors that can occur, it is also important to look at some summary data from many 
model runs to see which behaviors are most common. 
We observed from looking at sample model runs that in the second half of the 
model runs, it tended to bifurcate into having either all short-run or all long-run investors.  
We look at the portion of short-run investors at different points in time from 40 model 
runs to see if this pattern is robust to many model runs, and to identify roughly what 
portion of the time it settles on the short-run outcome, and what portion it settles on the 
long-run outcome. 
Figure 3.18. Distribution of investor types by year over 40 model runs 
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By late in the model run, most runs have all investors at either one extreme or the 
other.  Out of these 40 runs, 21 had most investors with short-run rules, and 19 had most 
investors with long-run rules.  Figure 3.19 shows on average, for the 40 model runs, what 
percent of investors use short-run rules during the course of the model runs.  By the end 
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investors are slightly more likely to use short-run rules than long-run rules, but it is close 
to an even split.   
Figure 3.19. Average of 40 model runs: percent of investors with short time horizons 
  
3.3.2 Information cost 
The analysis to this point has assumed that investors will gravitate towards 
whichever policy performs best at predicting oil price movements.  This next section 
considers how the outcomes are affected if we add an additional consideration: the 
information requirements and calculation difficulties of the long-run approach may 
discourage investors from taking that approach, all else being equal.  If two strategies 
perform equally well at predicting price movements, the simpler strategy that requires 
less information should be more appealing.  In our model, the 1-year time horizon 
strategy is much simpler, since it only requires a projection as to what will happen to 
supply and demand in the next year.  The long-run strategy, on the other hand, requires 
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projections for demand, supply and discoveries as many as hundreds of years into the 
future.   
Work by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggests that information cost can be 
important in determining whether the rational actor model will be an equilibrium.  The 
argument from Grossman and Stiglitz doesn’t quite apply in our model, since not 
investing is not an option, however information costs still are important in determining 
model outcomes.  They play a particularly important role early on in model runs when 
long-run and short-run rules make similar predictions, and during key transition points 
when the model could be heading toward one or the other equilibrium.   
We add information cost to the model by replacing the payoff function from 
equation (3-12) with: 
  cfpdExpr ttt   111       (3-14) 
The size of the information cost measures how much improved accuracy an 
investor would need to get for it to be worth investing in the additional information and 
more complicated calculation.  An information cost of 0.1, for example, means that 
forecasts would need to be 10 cents more accurate to justify the information cost.   
We run a set of 50 model runs, with information costs ranging from 0 to 0.25.  
With information costs of 0.05 or higher, the vast majority of model runs converged to an 
equilibrium with primarily short-run investors.     
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Figure 3.20.  Percent of investors with short time horizons at year 170, with different 
information costs 
 
  
Of 40 model runs with information cost of 0.05, 27 of them, or 67.5%, had 
majority short-run investors in year 175. 
Figure 3.21. Distribution of investor types in year 175 over 40 model runs with 
information cost of 0.05 
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3.3.3 Different time horizons 
In future work, it would be interesting to look at how outcomes are affected if a 
wide range of possible time horizons are possible.  However, this would add some 
complication to the evolutionary model, and would make the results more difficult to 
interpret.  For now, we instead look at models where the prediction rules with 1-year time 
horizons are replaced by prediction rules with time horizons of 7 and 25 years.   
The results from runs with 7-year and 25-tear time horizon investors show similar 
evolutionary dynamics as with 1-year time horizons.  Model runs tend to diverge to 
outcomes with all investors having the same time horizon, though they are not pushed 
quite as strongly to the extremes with more chance of switching, especially in the case of 
25-year time horizons.  This could be because the price predictions made by the short-run 
approach can be closer to the long-run rule with longer time horizons.  Short-run 
outcomes also become slightly more common.   
The model runs dominated by short-run investors have smoother price paths than 
the corresponding 1-year runs, but are still too low in the middle of the model runs and 
too high near the end, as was the case when only 7-year or 25-year investors were 
included.  The general conclusion from the 1-year model runs still holds: investors may 
fail to fully anticipate future shortages leading to sub-optimal price paths.  The 
histograms of the percent of short-run investors at year 175 with 7 and 25 year time 
horizons are shown below:  
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Figure 3.22. Distribution of investor types in year 175 over 40 model runs with 7-year 
time horizons 
 
  
Figure 3.23. Distribution of investor types in year 175 over 40 model runs with 25-year 
time horizons 
 
  
 122 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
3.4.1 Goals 
The goal of this paper was to develop a theoretical model of oil markets with 
resource scarcity that would help evaluate whether the conclusions of rational actor 
models would hold in the presence of smart, knowledgeable but boundedly rational 
investors.  The lack of any behavioral modeling of how oil markets might behave in the 
face of resource scarcity was a major hole in the literature, given the importance of 
concerns about resource scarcity.  
The model cannot be used to fully resolve questions about whether investors are 
currently anticipating future scarcity properly, or whether prices in the real world are too 
low or too high.  In some model outcomes, investors do properly anticipate future 
shortages, and in some they do not, and I have made no attempt to evaluate whether oil 
market data is more consistent with one or the other of these scenarios.  The model 
outcomes also can be sensitive to the specific assumptions of the model, and changes to 
these assumptions could produce even more variety of results than have been observed so 
far.   
Still, the fact that this model can produce outcomes that vary substantially from 
the rational actor predictions is a result that is worth noting.  The prevailing view in 
economics is that anticipating future shortages is something that the market should do 
well.  There are substantial monetary benefits to making an accurate prediction of future 
price changes, and market structures should make it possible for a diverse set of players 
to take advantage of any useful information that the rest of the market is not accounting 
for.  It is surprising, therefore, that in a model where rules that correctly predict price 
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movements are rewarded, outcomes can persist in which most market participants are 
failing to properly anticipate future market developments. 
3.4.2 Model contributions 
In developing the model, I aimed to choose assumptions that would be simple 
enough that the model would be manageable and its output possible to interpret, while 
being realistic enough that the key results from the model runs would have plausible 
explanations. 
The underlying demand and supply models were made to be realistic enough to 
add credibility to the concerns about long-run scarcity, while also allowing short-run 
demand and supply constraints to play a role.  The negative outcomes associated with the 
failure to anticipate long-run scarcity are an important part of the conclusions of this 
study.  The model will not resolve all debates as to whether oil shortages will occur 
before alternatives develop enough to make these unnecessary.  However, by grounding 
the demand and supply models in the literature and (imperfectly) fitting them to data, this 
chapter does provide evidence that concerns about long-run scarcity are reasonable.   
The adaptive model of investor behavior is also designed to provide a reasonable 
representation of behaviors that occur in the real world.  Perhaps the main conclusion 
from the model runs is that investors can adopt behavioral rules that differ from the 
rational actor rule, and that this can lead to price paths that are too low in the middle and 
spike at very high levels as the resource approaches depletion.  It is important, then, that 
the key model assumptions that drive this outcome could reasonably be observed in 
actual oil markets. 
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The main reason that sub-optimal outcomes can persist is that when shortages are 
far enough into the future, there may be little monetary benefit of anticipating those 
shortages right now.  Until the anticipated shortage occurs, the performance of investors 
calculating the shortage into their pricing will depend on the behavior of other market 
participants.  If other participants also see the shortage coming and start to act on it, 
prices could go up well before the shortage occurs, leading to immediate benefits.  
However, if other participants are focused on more short-run concerns, prices may stay 
low for years or even decades.  During that time, the evolutionary algorithm will not 
favor people who continue to bet on an eventual rise in prices.  Investors who factor the 
future shortages into their price calculation may get discouraged, and are unlikely to be 
copied by others.  Even if it would eventually be a money-making strategy to bet on a 
long-run increase in prices, the short-term benefits or losses will be what others observe 
as they decide if it is a good strategy.  In this scenario, investors who do not factor the 
long-run shortage into their pricing decisions will have more immediate success, and 
therefore will continue to dominate the market. These factors that allow the sub-optimal 
outcome to persist in the model could plausibly occur in the real world.   
The role of information cost in helping determine the model outcome also seems 
plausible.  In runs with no information cost, purely random variation can lead the model 
to converge on either equilibrium.  When a small information cost is added, however, this 
makes it more likely that it will settle on an outcome with all short-run investors. 
The behavioral model can also capture situations where a speculative bubble can 
emerge.  In run 3 from section 3.3.1.1, starting around year 85 prices rose well above 
where they should have been based on the best long-run rule, driven by long-run 
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investors with overly pessimistic beliefs about new discoveries.  The price rise reinforced 
investors with those beliefs, bringing prices further away from their fundamental value.  
At some point, prices started to fall and investors with lower price predictions started 
performing better driving prices down further.  The predictions of the investors who 
initially caused the bubble started looking more and more unreasonable and the market 
became dominated first by investors with more optimistic views about resource 
discovery, and eventually by investors who focused only on short-run supply and 
demand.  These dynamics are remarkably similar to what may have happened in the 
1970’s and 80’s.  The price rises of the 1970’s led to concerns that resource exhaustion 
was contributing to the rise in prices.  When the bottom fell out of the market in the 
1980’s, these concerns were largely discredited.  Through the 1990’s, prices stayed low 
as short run developments tended to dominate discussions of oil prices, with little regard 
for concerns about future scarcity. 
3.4.3 Policy implications 
The possible outcome dominated by short-run investors is clearly sub-optimal, 
suggesting that there may be room for policy interventions to improve the outcome.  If 
the model in this paper is taken at face value, the information is available for policy 
makers to calculate what prices should be and intervene to be sure that prices followed 
the desired path.  However, this would be risky.  In addition to questions about whether 
policy makers could really make the correct calculation, policy makers would also have 
more incentive than markets to keep current prices low for political reasons, potentially 
leading to worse than market outcomes. 
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While it may not be advisable for the government to intervene directly in setting 
prices, there may be roles for government agencies in making information and analysis of 
oil markets readily available to investors to help reduce information costs, making it more 
likely that an equilibrium with long-run rules is reached.  The EIA in the US already 
plays this role to some extent, but it could contribute further by focusing more on long-
run analysis.   
The model developed in this paper could also be used to help evaluate policies 
that have already been proposed, such as a carbon charge or support for technological 
development to reduce demand.  It seems plausible that if we are following a path 
suggested by the model with short-run investors, then either of these government 
interventions could help reduce the severity of the shortages late in the model run, 
providing some additional motivation for implementing these policies.  However, more 
research would be needed to evaluate this claim.    
3.4.4 Future work 
The model developed in this chapter provides some useful insights into how 
investor behaviors could influence oil markets.  However, it also leaves many questions 
unanswered.  Addressing these questions about how well markets will anticipate scarcity 
is a huge task, and the model development and analysis done in this paper is just a first 
step.  Much more can be done in future work to build on it.   
3.4.4.1 Sensitivity analyses 
One big question with this model is how sensitive the results are to some of the 
specific assumptions made in developing it.  There are many parameters that I chose 
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values for along the way with varying levels of justification.  Some of the outcomes of 
the model runs could change if the parameter values are adjusted.   
For the purposes of this paper, I have been careful not to draw conclusions that 
rely heavily on the exact results from the model runs.  Even if the particular modeling 
assumptions are not perfect, the modeling exercise is useful in establishing a possible 
mechanism that could lead to a failure to anticipate shortages, and in clarifying our 
thinking about how and under what conditions this could occur.  However, other model 
output may be more sensitive to parameter choices.  Some examples include how likely 
the model is to settle on an extreme equilibrium, when this happens, which equilibrium is 
reached most frequently, and how common it is for shifts between equilibriums to occur.  
A thorough sensitivity analysis of how the model output responds to changes in the 
assumptions would help to establish which results are most robust to changes in the 
assumptions. 
3.4.4.2 More prediction rules 
One model assumption that could be relaxed in future iterations as the restriction 
of price prediction behaviors to the two categories of short-run and long-run rules.  This 
could help to drive the bifurcation of investors into being all of one type or the other.  If 
more variety of rules were allowed, some more interesting dynamics could occur. 
3.4.4.2.1 More time horizons 
While we experimented with changing the time horizon of short-run investors, we 
have not tried allowing more than two different time horizons in the model at once.  
Allowing this could be an interesting next step in the analysis.  There is an advantage in 
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investing in futures markets to predicting market developments one period before 
everybody else does.  This allows you to take a position in futures markets before prices 
move when others take the same position.  For this reason, there could be an advantage of 
having a slightly longer time horizon than most other players in the market.  This could 
lead to a gradual drift toward longer and longer time horizons.  However, the 
evolutionary pressures are not so clear if there is a mix of people with different time 
horizons all participating in the market.  It is not clear whether or not long enough time 
horizons will dominate to properly anticipate shortages.  This would be an interesting 
question to address in future analysis.   
3.4.4.2.2 More flexible rules 
There are many other types of rules that are possible for predicting price 
movements.  Many behavioral models focus on prediction rules that use past price 
patterns to predict future prices.  It would be interesting to see how these types of rules 
perform relative to rules that use projections of demand and supply to predict prices.  
Rules that are explicitly trend following could also increase the chances of having 
speculative bubbles in futures prices.   
3.4.4.3 Policy/Demand/Supply manipulations 
One interesting use of the model developed in this paper would be to observe how 
the model output would respond under different imposed scenarios.  As discussed in the 
policy implications section, it would be interesting to see how policies such as a tax on 
oil or imposed reductions in demand would affect the model output.  It could also be 
interesting to look at how the model responds to a temporary supply disruption in 
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scenarios with different types of investors.  The response to a temporary supply 
disruption could also be compared to a development that affects supply more 
permanently such as an unusually large new discovery.  
3.4.4.4 Comparisons with data 
One of the benefits of developing this model is that it provides a theoretical 
framework that could ultimately be used to test the results of model runs against 
historical data.  This could provide some validation of the model’s ability to explain 
historical price patterns, as well as some insight into which types of model output have 
been most consistent with different historical periods. 
Matching the model output to data effectively presents some significant 
challenges.  In some cases, the model variables, while sufficient for theoretical modeling 
purposes, may not match perfectly to the equivalent real-world variables.  For example, 
in matching futures prices from the model with real world futures prices, it would be 
important to consider whether the hedging role of futures markets leads to any bias in 
futures prices relative to the best guess of pure speculators.  The level of above-ground 
storage may also be difficult to match to real-world data since this model uses it as a 
proxy for in situ storage by producers when a long time trend of increasing prices is 
expected.  There may therefore be a need to grapple more thoroughly with the question of 
how suppliers might factor in their future price expectations into their supply decisions.    
There also will be challenges in identifying appropriate patterns from the model 
that can be tested for fit with real world data, and in figuring out how to adjust model 
assumptions to improve the fit.  However, the results could go a long way toward 
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addressing questions as to how investors have actually behaved up to this point, and 
provide more insight into what may be likely to happen moving forward.   
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CHAPTER 4  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF A CARBON CHARGE AND REVENUE 
RECYCLING ON US HOUSEHOLDS 
4.1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the impacts that a carbon charge or cap-and-trade policy 
would have on households of different income levels in the US.  As global warming has 
gained attention and governments have looked to find ways to address it, some form of 
carbon charge or cap-and-trade program has emerged as the most promising approach to 
combating it.  Carbon cap-and-trade policies have been adopted in Europe and at the 
regional level in the US.  Cap-and-trade legislation has also gained attention in the US 
congress, but has yet to be adopted.  As a result, studies of the impact of different 
variations of these policies are currently of great policy relevance. 
The effect of a carbon charge on income distribution is an important factor in 
political discussions.  A common objection to cap-and-trade programs is that they would 
hurt poor and middle class families by raising the price of fuels they rely on.  Analyses of 
the impacts of a carbon charge on households of different income levels are frequently 
cited in political commentaries and debates (Wall Street Journal, 2009; Yarow, 2009; 
Abar, 2009). 
The distributional effects are also important for normative reasons.  The amount 
of money that could be generated by these programs is enormous: it has been estimated 
that an auctioned permit program based on the carbon caps being considered in 
congressional proposals could generate enough revenue to supply a household of four 
with an average of $1600 to $4900 per year (Paltsev et al., 2007).  This means that there 
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is the potential for a significant redistribution of real incomes, which could be either 
progressive or regressive depending on how the policy is designed.  Any policy that 
restricts carbon emissions is in effect a reorganization of property rights to emit carbon, 
moving away from the open-access regime that currently exists, and the design of the 
policy can be seen as dictating who obtains these property rights.  If the rights are given 
to corporations, this could lead to a strong regressive redistribution of income.  A more 
egalitarian system of distributing the rights could have the opposite effect, increasing the 
wealth of most lower and middle-income households.   
The policy I focus on in this paper, known as cap-and-dividend, would auction 
permits, and return the revenues to households as equal per-capita dividends.  This policy 
was initially proposed by Peter Barnes (2001), and has been incorporated into bills 
proposed in the US Congress.
9
  The basis for this proposal is that the right to release 
carbon into the atmosphere should be equally owned by everyone.  
Many other variations of cap-and-trade policies have been proposed.  Most 
proposals include giving away a portion of the permits to fossil fuel companies, utilities, 
or other companies that might be impacted by the policy.  To evaluate this type of policy, 
I also consider the impacts on households if revenues are equally split between payments 
to households and payments to producers. 
While a number of studies have looked at the impacts of these policies before, 
there are still many unresolved questions.  Assumptions about how producers and 
consumers will respond to the policy vary from study to study, and some simplifying 
                                                 
9
 Two cap-and-dividend bills were introduced in the 111
th
 Congress, although neither 
were adopted.  These bills were Van Hollen’s H.R. 1826 in the House, and Cantwell and 
Collins’ S. 2877 in the Senate. 
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assumptions are common to most studies.  It is not well understood how these 
assumptions affect the results. 
My goals in this paper are to analyze the distributional impacts of a cap-and-
dividend policy, to clarify how different assumptions can affect the results, and to 
compare the impacts of a cap-and-dividend policy with a policy in which half the permits 
are given to producers. 
In the second section, I look at the current breakdown of carbon consumption in 
the U.S., and how that consumption can be attributed to households.  In the third section, 
I look at different issues that arise in the design of a carbon pricing policy.  In the fourth 
section, I look at the model of how producers and consumers respond to the policy.  In 
the fifth section, I discuss how the impacts are attributed to households, and how the 
distributional incidence results are presented.  In the sixth section, I present the results of 
the analyses.  In the seventh section, I summarize the main conclusions and discuss areas 
for further research. 
4.2 Description of carbon consumption in US 
Carbon dioxide is emitted primarily through the burning of fossil fuels.
10
  In the 
US in 2006, 44% of this was emitted by burning petroleum products, 36% by burning 
coal, and 20% by burning natural gas.  These are consumed by the electricity sector, 
                                                 
10
 Carbon dioxide is also emitted when bio-matter is burned or decays, and is removed 
when plants grow.  As a result, land use changes can also contribute to changes in 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  Small amounts are also emitted 
when cement is processed.  This paper focuses only on emissions related to the 
consumption of fossil fuels, as this is the largest contributor.  We also do not address 
emissions of other greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming, though a 
comprehensive greenhouse gas reduction policy would also put a price on these 
emissions.   
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which was responsible for 40% of US carbon emissions, the transportation sector (34%), 
the industrial sector (17%), the residential sector (6%), and the commercial sector (3%).  
If electricity-related emissions are attributed to the sectors that consumed the electricity, 
the percentages become 34% for the transportation sector, 28% for the industrial sector, 
20% for the residential sector and 18% for the commercial sector.  The full breakdown of 
consumption by sector and fuel type is shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1.  2006 US carbon dioxide emissions by fuel and sector 
  
Sector Petroleum Coal 
Natural 
Gas Other Total 
Percent 
via 
electricity 
Residential 113.7 717.4 362.4 4.3 1197.9 72.7% 
Transportation 1975.6 3.9 33.9 0.0 2013.4 0.2% 
Industrial 438.1 722.7 488.3 3.2 1652.4 39.4% 
Commercial 68.8 695.7 274.3 4.2 1043.0 80.3% 
Total 2596.2 2139.8 1158.9 11.8 5906.7 40.0% 
Percent of 
Total 44.0% 36.2% 19.6% 0.2% 100.0%   
Source: calculations from US EIA, "Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
the Residential and Commercial Sectors, by Fuel Type." 
4.2.1 Attributing carbon emissions to end users 
A more complete picture of the carbon footprint of households requires looking 
not only at their direct energy consumption, but also at the fossil fuels consumed in 
making the products they buy.  As with electricity, industrial and commercial emissions 
can be attributed to the end users (households or governments) that consume the products 
that are produced using fossil fuels.  The carbon footprint of a household that buys a car 
would include the fossil fuels consumed in producing the car, as well as those consumed 
in extracting and processing the metal used to make the car, and so forth. 
Determining a household’s carbon footprint therefore requires two steps: 
determining their consumption levels of different goods and services, and determining the 
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amount of carbon that was emitted in producing each type of good or service that they 
consume.  For household consumption levels, we use the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) produced by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  To calculate the carbon 
content of each expenditure category, we use input-output tables showing how much each 
industry consumes of inputs from different industries.  These can be used to produce 
carbon intensities for each industry by tracing indirect carbon consumption levels from 
when the fuels are burned to when the final products is consumed.   
4.2.2 Data and calculations  
4.2.2.1 Household expenditures 
For expenditure data, I use the quarterly interview survey portion of the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey.  Households participate in the survey for five quarters, 
with the first quarter discarded from the final data.  The quarterly CEX data is combined 
into extract files (NBER extracts) showing annual expenditures for each participating 
household by John Sabelhaus and Ed Harris of NBER.  I use pooled annual expenditure 
data for households whose participation in the survey was primarily in 2003 (those that 
began participating between the 4
th
 quarter of 2002 and the 2
nd
 quarter of 2003.)  I use 
only households that participated in the survey in all four quarters, and use adjusted 
weights provided by the NBER extracts to account for the households that are lost during 
this process.  This reduces the total number of households in our sample from 7960 to 
4470.
11
  Expenditures are grouped into 48 categories, including break-downs into fossil-
                                                 
11
 The adjusted weights designed by NBER to make the reduced sample representative 
assign zero weights to an additional 955 participants, leaving 3515 households with 
positive weights. 
 136 
 
fuel intensive categories such as electricity, natural gas, other household fuels (primarily 
heating oil) and gasoline. 
4.2.2.2 Carbon intensities 
To calculate the carbon content of each expenditure categories, we use Input-
Output tables from 2003 produced by BLS, combined with EIA data on carbon 
consumption.
12
  The data I use is based on 2003 input output tables.  This is the same as 
used in Boyce and Riddle (2009), but is updated from Metcalf (1999), which uses data 
from 1992 Benchmark IO tables, and Boyce and Riddle (2007), which use Metcalf’s data 
adjusted for price changes. 
Total carbon consumption levels by fossil fuel in 2003 are taken from EIA data
13
.  
Carbon consumption from coal is attributed evenly to all output from the coal industry.  
Carbon consumption from oil is attributed primarily to the portion of output of the oil and 
gas industry that is processed by the petroleum refining industry, and carbon 
consumption from natural gas is attributed to the output of the oil and natural gas industry 
that is purchased by other industries
14
.  The total carbon intensity of the product of a 
particular industry i  can then be attributed to direct (first level) consumption of fossil 
fuels ( 1ic ), second level consumption ( 2ic ), which consists of fossil fuels used in 
                                                 
12
 The 2003 Input-Output tables do not provide break-downs into sufficiently detailed 
industry and commodity categories, so I supplement them with 2002 benchmark tables.  
These are used to determine breakdowns within the 2003 industry and commodity 
categories.   
13
 This data is from EIA’s International Energy Annual 2006, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/carbon.html. 
14
 Based on EIA data, 99.4% of oil consumed is processed by refiners, so we attribute 
this portion of total oil output to consumption by refineries.  The rest is divided evenly 
between all other products of the oil and gas industry, with the exception of that portion 
that is used by natural gas distributers, which is assumed to be entirely natural gas. 
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producing the inputs they use, third level consumption ( 3ic ), which consists of those used 
in producing the inputs used in producing the inputs they use, and so forth.  In matrix 
form, we can write 
nn CAC 1 , where nC  is a vector of the nth level carbon intensities 
for each of the I industries, and A is an II   table with entries ija  showing the percent of 
industry i ’s total output value that goes to purchasing the product of industry j .  A 
vector of total carbon intensity for each industry, C , can then by written as: 
  12321 CAAICCCC       (4-1) 
If A  is invertible, this converges to 1
1)( CAI   .  This can be translated into 
carbon intensities for each commodity using the make table from the I-O accounts, and 
adding the direct impact of the charge on the consumption of the commodity.   
4.2.2.3 Matching expenditures with carbon intensities 
The expenditure categories from the CEX need to be matched with the carbon 
intensities from the I-O tables, which are from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA).  This is made more difficult by the fact that the data come from 
different sources, and are not perfectly consistent with each other.  To match the two data 
sets, we use a combination of two sources.  The first is a bridge matrix provided by the 
BEA to match the Input-Output account commodity categories with Personal 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) categories used in the National Income and Product 
Accounts.  The second is the NBER documentation, which provides relationships 
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between the PCE categories and the consumption categories in the NBER extracts of the 
CEX.
15
 
An additional difficulty is that the total household expenditure estimates found 
using these two sources do not match up perfectly, with the data from NIPA being 
generally larger than the CEX data.  These differences can lead to inconsistencies in the 
estimate of total carbon levels for the economy if they are not reconciled.  There are 
many reasons for the difference, which have been analyzed in some detail (Garner et al., 
2006).  A number of different approaches have been adopted in studies of carbon control 
policies to deal with these differences.  Dinan and Rogers (2002) adjust CEX 
expenditures to match with the NIPA estimates.  Burtraw et al. (2009) use the CEX 
expenditure data, and adjust the loading factors for indirect expenditures to meet total 
carbon emissions estimates from EIA data.  Boyce and Riddle (2009) adjust the total 
expenditures from the CEX data to match estimates of household consumption from 
NIPA, with non-profit consumption removed, but keep the expenditure proportions for 
different goods from the CEX data.  I adopt the approach of Boyce and Riddle (2009), 
adjusting all expenditures by the same constant ratio so that total household carbon 
consumption will be consistent with the household share of carbon consumption found 
using input-output analysis based on NIPA.  One difference is that I do not separate 
household consumption from the consumption of non-profits serving households, since 
costs borne by these non-profits are likely to ultimately be passed on to households.  This 
                                                 
15
 In a few cases, the PCE categories provide less detailed break-downs than the IO 
commodity categories or the CEX consumption categories.  Most importantly, natural gas 
and electricity are grouped into one ‘utilities’ category in the PCE.  As a result, an 
adjustment is needed to ensure that the natural gas carbon intensity is matched up with 
the natural gas consumption category, and the electricity carbon intensity is matched up 
with the electricity consumption category.    
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leads to an adjustment ratio of 1.62, which is consistent with the ratio of aggregate 
expenditures in the CE and PCE found by Garner et al. (2006, p. 22).   
4.2.3 Differences between poor, rich households 
Table 4.2 shows average expenditures patterns for households of different income 
levels, based on CEX data.  For ease of presentation, the less carbon-intensive of the 48 
expenditure categories are aggregated into broader categories, leaving ten broad 
expenditure categories: electricity, gasoline, natural gas, heating oil, air transport, other 
transport, industrial goods, food, housing, and services/other.  Households are broken 
down into ten deciles, based on their total expenditure level per household member.
16
  
Expenditure on every category of goods increases with total expenditure, but at differing 
rates.  Poorer households spend a larger share of their expenditures on electricity, natural 
gas, heating oil, gasoline, food and housing, while richer households spend a larger share 
of their expenditures on air transport, industrial goods and services/other.  This suggests a 
pattern that will become clearer later – that household fuels are generally necessities that 
make up a larger share of the budget of poor households than rich ones.  As a result, 
policies that raise the price of these goods are likely to be regressive.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Per capita household expenditures are used as a proxy for how well-off the household 
is.  The reasons for this choice are explained in more detail in section 4.5.3. 
 140 
 
Table 4.2a. Direct fuel expenditure breakdowns by per capita expenditure decile 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
Electricity 
expenditure 
share (%) 
Nat. gas 
expenditure 
share (%) 
Heating oil 
expenditure 
share (%) 
Gasoline 
expenditure 
share (%) 
1 4964 6.83% 1.65% 0.49% 6.31% 
2 7629 6.37% 2.02% 0.42% 6.39% 
3 9925 5.39% 1.49% 0.75% 6.46% 
4 12187 4.59% 1.80% 0.43% 5.74% 
5 14510 4.27% 1.52% 0.56% 5.57% 
6 17290 3.93% 1.64% 0.43% 5.25% 
7 20735 3.45% 1.28% 0.44% 4.74% 
8 25038 3.17% 1.15% 0.38% 4.57% 
9 31460 2.81% 1.09% 0.37% 4.14% 
10 53819 2.01% 0.81% 0.29% 2.92% 
Average 19756 4.28% 1.45% 0.46% 5.21% 
Source: NBER extracts from 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
 
Table 4.2b. Indirect expenditure breakdowns by per capita expenditure decile 
  
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
Air trans. 
exp. share 
(%) 
Other 
trans. 
exp. 
share (%) 
Food 
exp. 
share 
(%) 
Indust. 
good 
exp. 
share(%) 
Services / 
oth. exp. 
share (%) 
Housing 
exp. share 
(%) 
1 4964 0.25% 0.60% 31.37% 11.26% 24.10% 17.14% 
2 7629 0.30% 0.20% 28.79% 12.41% 29.74% 13.37% 
3 9925 0.41% 0.31% 26.35% 13.97% 32.42% 12.46% 
4 12187 0.49% 0.39% 23.98% 16.03% 33.46% 13.10% 
5 14510 0.62% 0.30% 22.74% 20.20% 33.26% 10.95% 
6 17290 0.68% 0.38% 20.99% 19.27% 36.70% 10.73% 
7 20735 0.75% 0.52% 19.63% 22.88% 35.29% 11.02% 
8 25038 0.89% 0.43% 18.42% 25.31% 35.46% 10.23% 
9 31460 1.00% 0.47% 16.87% 28.75% 34.99% 9.51% 
10 53819 1.21% 0.53% 13.78% 36.12% 33.57% 8.77% 
Average 19756 0.66% 0.41% 22.29% 20.62% 32.90% 11.73% 
Source: NBER extracts from 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey   
4.2.4 Household carbon footprints 
Table 4.3 shows the average carbon intensities for each expenditure category.  
Not surprisingly, the most carbon intensive categories are direct energy purchases, with 
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transportation showing intermediate loading factors and services and housing being the 
least carbon-intensive. 
Table 4.3. Carbon intensities by consumption category 
 
Consumption 
category 
tC per $1000 (2003 
dollars) 
Electricity 2.00 
Natural Gas 1.95 
Heating Oil 1.92 
Car Fuels 1.54 
Air Travel 0.37 
Other Transport 0.28 
Food 0.14 
Industrial Goods 0.13 
Services and Other 0.12 
Housing 0.05 
Source: Calculated from 2003 input-output tables; 
see text for details 
 
Combining these carbon loading factors with the expenditure data from Table 4.2 
allows us to calculate the amount of carbon that can be attributed to each household.  The 
results are shown in Table 4.4.  For an average household, 61% of the carbon footprint 
can be attributed to direct fuel expenditures, including electricity, and 39% is due to 
indirect carbon usage from the consumption of other goods and services.  The total 
carbon footprint of households increases with expenditures.  Rich households consume 
more of every expenditure category, and as a result are responsible for more emissions.  
However, the carbon intensity of expenditures is higher for poorer households than it is 
for richer households, reflecting the fact that poor households spend a larger share of 
their income on more carbon-intensive expenditure categories.  This relationship between 
carbon footprint and total expenditures has important implications for the distributional 
impacts of a carbon charge, to which we will return later. 
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Table 4.4.  Carbon footprints by expenditure 
   
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
Carbon from 
direct 
energy 
expenditures 
Carbon 
from 
indirect 
sources 
Total 
carbon 
footprint 
per capita 
Carbon 
intensity 
of 
expend. 
1 4964 1368 524 1892 0.38 
2 7629 2086 815 2901 0.38 
3 9925 2489 1029 3518 0.35 
4 12187 2726 1240 3965 0.33 
5 14510 3075 1540 4616 0.32 
6 17290 3457 1831 5288 0.31 
7 20735 3642 2211 5853 0.28 
8 25038 4099 2698 6797 0.27 
9 31460 4674 3456 8130 0.26 
10 53819 5739 6159 11898 0.22 
Average 19756 3336 2150 5486 0.31 
Source: author's calculations from Tables 4.2 and 4.3.   
4.3 Implementation of charge 
To reduce carbon emissions, economists have generally suggested that the most 
effective methods are policies that put a price on carbon – either through a carbon tax or 
through a cap-and-trade program.  There are many variations on how this can be done, 
which I will explore in some detail in this section. 
4.3.1 Prices vs. Quantities 
A price can be placed on carbon emissions either through a carbon tax, or through 
emission permits, the total number of which is set by a cap.  Permits would fix the 
permissible quantity of emissions, and let the market determine the price, while a tax 
would fix the price of emissions and let the market determine the quantity.  There are 
advantages to both approaches.  Fixing the number of permits would ensure that a 
scientifically or politically determined target will be met, while fixing the price could 
help limit the economic costs of the policy if abatement costs turn out to be different than 
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expected.  Which policy is likely to be more efficient in the face of uncertainty about 
abatement costs and climate benefits of a policy depends on the elasticities of the 
abatement cost and climate benefit curves (Weitzman, 1974).  To see why, consider a 
case where the climate benefits are known and abatement costs are uncertain.  If the 
marginal climate benefits of each unit of abatement are roughly constant, a shift in the 
abatement cost curve will change the target quantity much more than the target price, so 
fixing the target price would be more efficient.  On the other hand, if the marginal climate 
benefits decrease dramatically as emissions are reduced, then fixing the quantity can be 
more efficient.  In the case of climate control policy, some researchers have found that a 
tax is likely to be more efficient (Pizer, 1997).   
Some alternative hybrid approaches have also been proposed.  A cap with a 
maximum permit price, or safety valve, is commonly included in policy proposals, 
intended to limit the economic costs of the policy (Pizer, 1997).  However, this approach 
causes two problems.  First, it fails to protect again downward volatility in permit prices, 
which has proven to be more common in existing policies.  Second, it creates insufficient 
incentive for investment in new technologies (Burtraw et al., 2009).  A better approach 
would be a symmetric safety valve, with both a maximum and a minimum price, so that if 
abatement costs turned out to be lower than expected, there would be an incentive to 
reduce emissions beyond the target set by the cap (Burtraw et al., 2009). 
While the choice of a price or quantity-based policy may be important in the face 
of uncertainty, it does not have a significant impact on the distributional impacts of the 
policy.  If a tax leads to the same amount of emissions reduction as an equivalent cap-
and-trade program, the impacts of both policies will be the same.  In this paper, I use a 
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fixed price, rather than a fixed quantity, in all scenarios I analyze.  However, the results 
can be interpreted either as the result of a carbon tax with that price, or of a cap-and-
permit policy that leads to permits being purchased at that price.  I refer to both policies 
interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.   
4.3.2 Emissions Covered by Policy  
The policies evaluated here cover all emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
burning of fossil fuels that is associated with U.S. consumption.
17
  Covering all emissions 
from fossil fuel consumption can be done most efficiently through an upstream charge 
that is imposed on fossil fuel producers and importers as the carbon enters the economy.  
With this approach, there would be only about 2000 collection points in the U.S., keeping 
administrative costs to a minimum (Kopp et al., 1999; CBO, 2001). 
For the charge to cover emissions associated with all U.S. consumption, but not 
foreign consumption, import tariffs and export subsidies would need to be imposed on all 
products based on their carbon content.  This would eliminate price differences between 
domestically and foreign produced goods, reducing the impact that the policy would have 
on U.S. exporters and U.S. producers that compete with importers.  There are some 
concerns about how this approach would be implemented and whether it could run into 
problems with international trade agreements (Kang 2010), but a recent WTO report on 
the subject opened the door for some forms of carbon border tax adjustments to be 
allowed (WTO 2009).  Border adjustments also may not be necessary if our trading 
partners also have carbon control policies in place.  However, it is a useful assumption in 
                                                 
17
 As mentioned earlier, other greenhouse gasses and land-use related carbon emissions 
are not covered.  These would have to be addressed separately. 
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that it simplifies the analysis by avoiding questions about the effect on domestic 
producers of an increase in domestic production costs that does not affect international 
production costs.  In many studies, this assumption is made implicitly without being 
stated explicitly by the combination of assumptions that all costs are passed on to final 
consumers and that all of those costs can be attributed to consumers in the US. 
4.3.3 Keeping the government whole 
A carbon charge will impose both direct and indirect costs on state, local and 
national governments.  In this paper, I adopt the assumption that the government will set 
aside enough revenues to offset these costs, so that the policy is revenue-neutral.  This is 
the assumption made by most studies, either explicitly or implicitly by only counting 
revenues collected from consumers (CBO, 2000; Barnes and Breslow, 2003; Metcalf, 
2002; Boyce and Riddle, 2007; Burtraw et al., 2009).  
Boyce and Riddle (2008) look at this question in more detail.  They find that the 
government could offset its costs if they distributed their revenues to households as 
dividends, and taxed those dividends as income.  While taxing dividends has advantages, 
it is more straightforward to assume that dividends will not be taxed and that the 
government will withhold enough money to offset increases in government payments due 
to the policy.  
4.3.4 Permit price 
In all the scenarios analyzed in this paper, I use a carbon charge or permit price of 
$100 per metric ton of carbon, or $27.3 per metric ton of carbon dioxide.  This is within 
the range of current legislative proposals.  For example, CBO (2009) estimates that the 
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Waxman-Markey bill that was passed by the House in 2009 would lead to a permit price 
of $28 per metric ton of carbon dioxide in 2020.   
The permit price could vary significantly depending on the details of the policy.  
Changes in the permit price would change the magnitude of the effect of the charge on 
households, the amount that carbon emissions are reduced, and the extent of the 
adjustment costs that producers and consumers would face.  However, the relative impact 
on households of different income levels should not change significantly if the carbon 
price changes, so the distributional results found in this paper should be valid for a range 
of possible permit prices. 
4.3.5 Distributing Revenues (or permit value) 
The most important aspect of the policy design for studies of distributional 
impacts is how the government distributes the value of the permits, or the revenue from a 
carbon charge.  The government can give some or all of the permits for free, or they can 
auction the permits (or collect tax revenue) and use the money they collect for a wide 
range of purposes.  Giving away free permits is essentially equivalent to auctioning the 
permits and giving away the permit value, so it is simpler to assume that the permits are 
sold initially and consider different methods for distributing the revenue. 
The uses of the revenue that are most often discussed fall into three categories: 
returning revenues to households, compensating other parties that might be harmed by 
the policy, or investing in technologies that could aid in the clean energy transition.  Each 
of these could be done in different ways.  Revenues could be returned to households 
through lump-sum payments, reductions in taxes, or distributions to electricity rate payers 
by way of utility companies.  Other parties that may be compensated include fossil fuel 
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companies and exporters of carbon-intensive products, workers in coal mining and other 
industries that may face job losses, and state and local governments that face higher fossil 
fuels prices.  Finally, a wide variety of technologies could be targeted for investments, 
ranging from renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar, to ‘clean’ coal and 
carbon sequestration.  The impacts of a policy will depend greatly on which of these uses 
of the revenue are chosen. 
I will consider the distributional impacts of two of the most commonly analyzed 
proposals: a cap-and-dividend policy where all revenues not needed to offset government 
expenditures are returned to households as equal per capita dividends; and a hybrid 
policy where some of the revenues are given to producers and some of the revenues 
returned to households as dividends.   
4.3.6 Time frame 
The analysis conducted here is a short-run, static analysis.  It looks at the effects 
that might be expected in the first few years after the implementation of the policy.  Also, 
I do not try to project changes in baseline expenditures or emissions in the absence of a 
policy; instead, I assume that the expenditures and emissions with no policy would be the 
same as they were in 2003, the year from which the data for the analysis are taken. 
4.4 Modeling Response to Carbon Charge 
As a carbon charge is applied, producers and consumers will respond to this by 
adjusting their prices and consumption levels.  Producers, faced with higher prices for 
fossil fuels and other inputs, are likely to raise output prices, and may also adjust their 
production levels and the ratio of inputs that they consume.  Consumers will respond to 
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changes in prices by adjusting their consumption levels of different goods.  It is through 
this process that a carbon charge works to reduce carbon emissions.  The effect of the 
carbon charge on companies and households depends on how they respond to the new 
price structure.  
4.4.1 Supply model 
In analyses of the incidence of carbon charges, the most common approach to 
determining how a carbon charge would affect commodity prices has been to use input-
output accounts to trace price changes through the economy, based on work by Leontief 
(1986).  The methodology commonly used with this approach is based on the assumption 
that suppliers do not adjust their input ratios, and the entire charge is passed on to 
consumers through higher prices (Hassett et al., 2007, p. 21).   
The assumption of fixed input ratios eliminates an important mechanism through 
which emissions could be reduced in response to a carbon charge.  With higher fuel 
prices, companies may be able to engage in fuel substitution or other process shifting in 
the short to medium run, and may invest in more efficient technologies in the long run, in 
order to reduce their use of the higher priced inputs without reducing output (EAAC, 
2010, pp. 23-25).  A number of models have been built to model supplier response to 
carbon pricing policies (see Stern, 2006 for a review).  However, most of these models 
are designed to determine the overall costs of climate control policies, and not the 
incidence of the policies on different groups.   
Our model does not attempt to model supplier efforts to adjust input ratios in 
response to the new price structure; instead we adopt the usual assumption that input 
ratios are fixed.  As a result, we will most likely underestimate how much total carbon 
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emissions will be reduced in response to a rise in prices. However, the incidence 
calculations that are central to this paper should not be much affected by this assumption. 
The extent to which it could affect the incidence calculations will be discussed later.   
The other simplifying assumption used in standard input-output analysis is that 
price increases are fully passed through to consumers.  This plays a more important role 
in determining the incidence of the charge.  The assumption of full pass-through is 
commonly used, and has been supported by some general equilibrium models that have 
found that consumption taxes are fully passed forward to consumers (Holak et al., 2008, 
p. 33).  It is consistent with a model of perfect competition with constant returns to scale 
if there are no fixed costs, and it simplifies the analysis considerably.   
However, there are several reasons to question the validity of this assumption in 
models of supplier response to carbon charges.  In any short-run analysis, fixed cost can 
be expected to lead to supplier adjustment costs and incomplete pass-through.  In the 
electricity industry, fixed costs can be particularly long-lived, as power plants can remain 
in use for many decades (Burtraw et al., 2009a, p. 20).  Extractors of fossil fuels may also 
have inelastic supply curves due to the limited availability of the resource (Holak et al., 
2008, p. 33).  Also, industries may not be perfectly competitive, and firms may change 
the amount that they mark up their final price above their marginal costs in response to 
changes in input prices.   
A few studies have looked at how the incidence of a carbon charge would change 
if a portion of the costs of the charge is borne by producers rather than consumers (Shah 
and Larsen, 1992; Boyce and Riddle, 2007).  These studies do not explicitly model how 
prices change in the presence of partial pass-through; instead, they simply combine 
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incidence results for households from a full pass-through scenario with information on 
the distribution of stock ownership by income level to determine the overall incidence 
with different assumptions about the share of costs that are borne by households. 
A few studies have used explicit models of supplier behavior in key industries to 
look at how the costs of a carbon charge might be broken down between producers and 
consumers.  Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) focus on the role of fixed capital, and look at 
the loss of producer surplus that would occur in the short run in response to cost increase 
resulting from a carbon charge.  Holak et al. (2008) uses the EPPA model developed at 
MIT to determine how much suppliers will raise prices in response to a system of carbon 
permits.  Burtraw et al. (2009a) assume full pass-through in all industries except 
electricity generation, but use a complicated model of the electricity market developed by 
Resources For the Future, known as Haiku, to analyze the effects of fuel price increases 
on the electricity industry.   
No studies that I am aware of have evaluated how changing the pass-through 
assumption could influence the commodity price increases and supplier impacts that 
would result from a carbon charge, or used this to determine the distributional incidence.  
This study aims to fill this gap by evaluating several alternative pass-through assumptions 
using a variation of the commonly used approach to input-output analysis.  In addition to 
a full pass-through scenario, two alternative scenarios with different pass-through rates 
assigned uniformly to all industries are considered, as well as one scenario with variable 
pass-through rates by industry.  
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4.4.1.1 Full pass-through 
The baseline analysis in this paper takes the commonly used assumption that costs 
faced by suppliers will be fully passed on to consumers.  With this assumption, the full 
impact of the carbon charge will be borne by consumers, in proportion with their share of 
carbon consumption.  The price increase for each good can be calculated simply by 
taking the carbon intensity calculations from section 4.2.2.2, and multiplying by the 
carbon charge or permit price.  Here we use an alternative way of making this calculation 
that produces the same result, but that is easier to adjust in subsequent alternative 
scenarios.  First, we set up equations that show how the price of the product of each 
industry depends on the prices of the inputs, as well as on the direct charge that they face: 
 111112122111111 )()()( pxvtpxtpxtpx NNN    
 222222222212112 )()()( pxvtpxtpxtpx NNN     (3-2) 
… 
NNNNNNNNNNNN pxvtpxtpxtpx  )()()( 222111   
In these equations, ijx  is the consumption of the product of industry i  by industry 
j , ix  is the total production of industry i , ip  is the price of good i , and ijt  is the tax on 
industry j ’s consumption of industry i ’s product, expressed as dollars per unit of 
industry i ’s goods. 
We can break prices down into their initial prices from the input-output tables, 
ip , plus the change in their price, ip : 
 iii ppp           (3-3) 
The initial prices satisfy the input-output table identities for each industry: 
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 iiiNNiii pxvpxpxpx  2211       (3-4) 
By breaking down the prices and subtracting the input-output table identities from 
each line, we get: 
11112122111111 )()()( pxtpxtpxtpx NNN    
 22222222212112 )()()( pxtpxtpxtpx NNN     (3-5) 
… 
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After dividing both sides of each equation by ix , this can be expressed in matrix 
form as: 
 PDPA t          (3-6) 
A  is a matrix with entries 
j
ij
ij
x
x
a   as before, and tD  is a vector with the direct 
impacts of the carbon charge on input prices, NiNiiiiii tatatad  2211 .  Solving for 
P , we get  
 tDAIP 
1)( .         (3-7) 
This gives us the increases in prices paid to each industry for their product.  As 
before, to translate this into commodity prices, I multiply by a make table matrix, and add 
the direct tax placed on final consumption of each commodity.  The household share of 
carbon consumption is calculated from the commodity price increases using lines from 
the input-output tables that give the amount of final consumption and private investment 
of each commodity by households.  The government share comes from eight lines of the 
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input-output accounts representing federal, state and local government final consumption 
and investment.   
This calculation is similar to that presented in Metcalf (1999) and in Hassett et al. 
(2007), but with one important difference: Metcalf expresses the charge levied on each 
fossil fuel as a percentage increase in the price of the fuel (an ad valorem tax), while we 
express it as a charge that is in proportion to the quantity of the fuel consumed (a quantity 
tax).  This makes a difference, even in a static analysis where prices aren’t changing 
independently over time, because the tax will increase the cost of inputs used in 
extracting the fuels, and therefore the pre-tax fuel prices.  This is a slight problem with 
the widely used loading factors calculated by Metcalf, as the tax rates they use are 
designed to collect a specified amount of revenue from each industry at the initial fuel 
prices, but the revenues collected will actually be a bit higher due to the rise in pre-tax 
fuel prices.  The size of the difference may also vary between fuels, so the relative 
charges for different fuels may also be slightly off.  Carbon intensities based on ad 
valorem tax calculations using Metcalf’s methodology are used in virtually all 
distributional analyses of carbon charges in the U.S., with the exception of Boyce and 
Riddle (2009).  The approach used in this paper corrects this problem.   
4.4.1.2 Partial pass-through 
The first alternative supply model I examine is one in which all industries pass the 
same fixed portion of their costs onto consumers.  In this model, all costs faced by 
producers are paid either directly to the carbon charge or indirectly via higher input prices 
– there are no additional adjustment costs.  This is consistent with a model with no fixed 
costs, constant marginal costs and fixed input ratios, but with imperfect competition, so 
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that companies change the amount that they mark up their product in response to a 
change in costs.    
To model this, I modify equations (4-5), so that only a portion r of the increase in 
costs will be passed on as higher prices:  
  11112122111111 )()()( pxtpxtpxtpxr NNN    
   22222222212112 )()()( pxtpxtpxtpxr NNN     (4-8) 
… 
  NNNNNNNNNNN pxtpxtpxtpxr  )()()( 222111   
After dividing both sides of each equation by ix , this can be expressed in matrix 
form as: 
 PDrPAr t          (4-9) 
As before, A  is a matrix with entries 
j
ij
ij
x
x
a   and tD  is a vector with entries 
NiNiiiiii tatatad  2211 .  Solving for P , we get:  
 tDrArIP 
1)( .         (4-10) 
As before, to translate this into commodity prices, I multiply by a make table 
matrix, and add the direct tax placed on final consumption of each commodity.  The 
household share of policy costs is calculated from the commodity price increases using 
lines from the input-output tables that give the amount of final consumption and private 
investment of each commodity by households.  The government share of costs is 
calculated from lines that give consumption and investment levels for each commodity by 
state, local and national governments.  The share of costs borne by each industry is found 
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by multiplying the cost increase they face by r1 , and the total industry share is the sum 
of the individual industry shares.
18
  
A portion of the change in industry profits will be passed on to governments via 
reduced payments into corporate income taxes.  We follow CBO (2000, p. 20) in 
assuming that 45% of a change in corporate profits – whether an increase or a decrease – 
will be passed on to governments.
19
     
It should be noted that we use the initial output and consumption numbers from 
the input-output accounts in these calculations, and do not adjust for changes in demand.  
If we used adjusted demand quantities, it would not affect the price increases, since they 
depend only on the input shares for each industry which would not change.  It would 
have a small effect on the shares of the carbon cost borne by consumers, producers and 
government.  However, adjusting for this would require a complicated iterative process, 
since quantities consumed would affect the share of corporate burden and the size of 
dividends, which would affect consumer incomes and therefore the quantities consumed, 
and so on.  The minor changes that would result from this process do not justify this 
added effort.  
Changes in the quantity demanded could have a more substantial effect on 
individual supplier profits.  However, the effects of these changes in demand on the 
profits of different industries should roughly offset each other, because with revenue 
                                                 
18
 The import and export lines of final consumption from the input-output tables are not 
included in the calculation of total permit value, since the policy being analyzed only 
covers emissions associated with domestic consumption.  Private inventory adjustments 
are also not included. 
19
 This assumed rate seems unrealistically high, but we adopt it since this CBO study 
appears to be the most reliable source that has made this calculation in a comparable 
setting.  
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recycling and no supplier adjustment costs, total demand will not change.  Since we don’t 
have data on which households own shares in which industries, we are more interested in 
changes in total industry profits than in identifying the effect on specific industries, so we 
do not calculate the effects of changing demand on the profits of particular industries.  
4.4.1.2.1 Pass-through rate 
The rate of pass-through depends on several factors, including the degree of 
market power of the firms, the shape of the demand and marginal cost curves, and even 
consumers attitudes about the legitimacy of the price increases.  In some situations, more 
than 100% pass-through may be possible if companies can use the new policy as an 
excuse to raise prices more than necessary.   
There is surprisingly little empirical work that addresses this question.  The few 
studies that do look at rates of pass-through of price increases are based on estimates of 
supply and demand curve elasticities, but do not consider whether there will be changes 
in the mark-up rate.  Holak et al. (2008, p. 20), in their 287 bmt emissions scenario, find 
that coal producers will pass on 98% of their costs to consumers in 2015, and 94% in 
2030; oil producers will pass on 89% of their costs to consumers in 2015 and 84% in 
2030; and natural gas producers will pass on 73% of their costs to consumers in 2015 and 
252% in 2030.  The rise in natural gas prices in 2030 is due to the model’s finding that 
there will be a large increase in demand for natural gas as electricity producers shift from 
coal to natural gas production.  Burtraw et al. (2009, p. 20), report that in the electricity 
industry, consumer impacts are eight times as great as producer impacts.  Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2000) do not explicitly provide the pass-through rates that result from their 
analysis, but suggest that the costs to producers are relatively small compared to the total 
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value of the permits: at a carbon tax rate of $25 per ton, producer equity values could be 
maintained by giving 4.3% of permits to the coal industry and 15% to the oil and gas 
industry.    
Theoretical models of price setting in a monopoly do not provide much guidance 
either.  If the monopoly profit-maximizing price and quantity are p  and q  and the 
inverse demand function is )(qDIp  , and the marginal cost function is MC(q), then the 
change in p  in response to a marginal change in costs is given by:  
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This can be any number depending on the shape of the demand curve.  Even 
knowing the elasticity of the demand curve does not help, since it depends crucially not 
only on the derivative but also the second derivative of demand.  In the simple case with 
a linear demand curve and constant marginal costs, this simplifies to 0.5, or 50% pass-
through.   
We analyze two alternative pass-through scenarios: one with 90% pass-through, 
and one with 50% pass through.  The 50% pass-through scenario is intended to illustrate 
an extreme case, based on the monopoly model with linear demand, which will 
demonstrate the effect of large changes in this assumption.  The 90% pass-through 
scenario is intended to be a more realistic illustration of the impact of a carbon charge 
with partial pass-through, and is chosen as a round number that is roughly in line with an 
average of the estimated pass-through rates found in the literature.      
It should be noted that the rate of pass-through is not the same as the portion of 
the charge that is ultimately borne by consumers.  When 90% of the cost increases are 
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passed through several intermediate industries before reaching consumers, each industry 
passes only a portion the cost increases it faces on to the next industry in line, so the 
amount of the charge that is ultimately passed on to consumers will be less than 90%.   
4.4.1.3 Demand-dependent pass-through rates 
The second alternative supply model I analyze is based on a model of perfect 
competition with fixed costs and increasing marginal costs.  In this model, the change in 
the price of each product depends not only on the shift in the marginal cost curve, but 
also on the change in demand for each product. 
With revenue recycling, nominal incomes will rise, shifting the demand curve up 
at the same time as costs are increasing.  Some products will see increases in the quantity 
demanded and others will see decreases, depending on whether the demand increase or 
the marginal cost increase is larger.  Products that are more carbon-intensive, and 
therefore face a greater increase in marginal costs, are more likely to see a decrease in 
quantity demanded, while less carbon-intensive products are more likely to see an 
increase in quantity demanded.  If the quantity demanded increases, this will lead to a 
movement up the marginal cost curve, so prices will rise by more than the shift in 
marginal costs.  If the quantity demanded decreases, prices will rise by less than the 
increase in marginal costs.  In other words, pass-through rates will be less that 100% for 
carbon-intensive goods, and greater than 100% for goods that don’t use as much carbon. 
To illustrate the effects of pass-through rates that vary based on the carbon 
content of the product, I set the pass-through rates using a simple linear demand and 
supply model.  First, I assume that the increase in demand from revenue recycling will be 
the same for all products, and will be the same as the increase in marginal costs in an 
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industry with average carbon content.  This way, industries with average carbon content 
will have 100% pass-through, industries with above average carbon content will have less 
than 100% pass-through, and industries with below average carbon content will have 
more than 100% pass-through.  Since the average pass-through rate is about 100%, the 
average impact on consumers should be similar to the impact in the full pass-through 
scenario; the difference will be in the relative prices of the different products.   
Second, I use linear demand and supply curves, with identical price elasticities at 
the point of consumption of d =-0.14 and s =1.0. While these assumptions are not 
perfectly consistent with the assumptions of the full demand model discussed in the next 
section, they are sufficient to provide a set of pass-through rates that vary by industry 
based on the carbon content of the industry’s product.
 20
    
With these assumptions, the change in price that results from a shift in the 
marginal cost curve by )( ii qMC  can be calculated with the set of equations:  
sqMCrp iii  )(  
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 The demand elasticity is chosen to replicate the amount of demand shifting that occurs 
in the full demand model, as measured by the reduction in carbon emissions.  It is less 
than the final demand elasticities used in the demand model for several reasons; the most 
significant is that it reflects the elasticities of demand from all users, including 
intermediate users as well as end users, and intermediate demand elasticities are small 
because input ratios are sticky or fixed.   
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Here, r is the rate of pass-through of cost increases, s is the increase in prices 
caused by the increase in demand, and MC  is the average of the marginal cost curve 
increases in a 100% pass-through scenario, weighted by industry output. 
This leads to the system of equations: 
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This can be solved for P  to give  
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As before, A  is a matrix with entries 
j
ij
ij
x
x
a  , and tD  is a vector with entries 
NiNiiiiii tatatad  2211 .  S is a vector with all entries equal to s.   
The price increases by commodity and the impact on consumers in this scenario 
can be calculated from P  as before.  However, the impact on producers is more 
complicated.  The amount that producers pay into the carbon charge, either directly or 
indirectly through changes in input prices, can be calculate as before, by subtracting the 
increase in price from the increase in the marginal cost curve.  This amount could be 
positive or negative depending on the rate of pass-through.   
In addition to this cost, firms may also face transition costs caused by the change 
in quantity demanded, which represent a true economic cost of the policy rather than a 
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transfer.  In a standard short-run market supply model under perfect competition with 
fixed costs, average costs are at a minimum near the equilibrium point.  If the quantity 
demanded shifts either right or left, average costs will increase.  The size of these 
transition costs can be calculated by finding the area of the triangle between the original 
marginal cost curve and the original price level, running from the old to the new quantity 
level, using the formula:   
 
 
2
)( iiii
i
qMCpq
tc

        (4-15) 
The changes in quantities for each industry are estimated based on the same 
supply and demand elasticities used to estimate pass-through rates for each industry.  
These transition costs are added to the charge costs faced by producers.  This makes the 
total costs faced by industries and consumers add to more than the total revenue available 
to be returned to households.   
Since we are assuming that input ratios are fixed, these cost calculations do not 
include the effects of supplier efforts to reduce emissions on the costs faced by suppliers.  
Since abatement efforts are done because they become profitable with the new price 
structure, these efforts should reduce the costs faced by suppliers in response to a given 
increase in input prices.  For example, if the carbon charge makes natural gas cheaper 
than oil, the cost increase faced by producers will be less if they do switch to natural gas 
than if they don’t.  This on its own should not have much effect on whether producers or 
consumers would bear more of the cost of the charge, however.  A smaller cost increase 
would mean lower costs for both producers and consumers, assuming that the same 
portion of the cost increase is passed on to consumers in both cases.   
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The distributional impacts could be affected slightly by the decrease in the 
amount paid into the charge due to the abatement efforts, which would leave less money 
available to distribute back to households.  Payments into the charge would decrease by 
more than the decrease in supplier costs, so this would be another source of economic 
costs of the charge.  A full discussion of the effects of this assumption on the economic 
costs of the charge is put off until after discussing the demand model, since the abatement 
costs faced by consumers would also be affected by the smaller price increases that 
would result from this abatement activity.   
4.4.2 Demand model 
As with supply, the most common demand model used in studies of the incidence 
of carbon charges is the simplest: that demand does not change in response to changes in 
product prices (Burtraw et al., 2009, p. 4).  This approach is taken by several U.S. 
studies, including Metcalf (1999), CBO (2000) and Barnes and Breslow (2003). 
On the other extreme are studies that estimate a complete demand model directly 
from a panel of expenditure survey data, combined with commodity price data.  This 
approach was taken in studies of the UK (Symons et al. 1994) and Spain (Labandeira et 
al. 2004), but has not been done in the US.  These studies combine data from a number of 
sources to estimate parameters representing own price elsticities and income elasticities, 
as well as cross price elasticities for every pair of products.  They use this fitted demand 
model to predict demand responses to price changes caused by a carbon charge policy. 
Other studies take intermediate approaches.  Cornwell and Creedy (1996, pp 25-
26) estimate income (or total expenditure) elasticities from expenditure survey data, and 
derive price elasticities from them using theoretical restrictions based on the assumption 
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of an additive utility function.  Burtraw et al. (2009a) use a partial equilibrium analysis 
where they adjust consumption levels of each good independently based on elasticity 
estimates from the literature.  However, they do not adjust expenditures in response to 
income changes caused by revenue recycling.  Boyce and Riddle (2007; 2008; 2009) use 
price elasticity estimates from the literature to adjust expenditures in response to changes 
in relative prices, and also increase or decrease expenditures on all products in response 
to income changes.   
There are problems with each of these approaches.  Failing to account for demand 
changes does not allow an analysis to address one of the goals of a climate policy – to 
stimulate behavioral responses that will reduce emissions – and may lead to an 
overstatement of the costs faced by consumers.  On the other hand, directly estimating 
demand model parameters, as in Symons et al. (1994) and Labandeira et al. (2004), 
requires very extensive data, and even with good data produces imprecise parameter 
estimates.  For some parameters this is acceptable, but for the key parameters, 
particularly the own-price elasticities of demand for fuels, it may be preferable to use 
elasticity estimates that are based on results from the large body of work that has focused 
specifically on estimating these parameters.  Cornwell and Creedy’s (1996) approach 
reduces the data requirements, but their price elasticity estimates are even less reliable, as 
they are derived from questionable theoretical assumptions, rather than from data.   
Burtraw et al. (2009) use more reliable price elasticity estimates from the 
literature, but by failing to account for demand responses to changes in income they are 
missing what could be an important part of the picture of how demand will respond to a 
carbon charge.  Their approach would predict that households that receive more than 
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enough in dividends to compensate for the higher prices they face will still reduce their 
expenditure levels.  This will lead to estimated emission reductions that are due as much 
to decreases in overall expenditure as to shifts from more carbon-intensive to less carbon-
intensive products.  Boyce and Riddle (2007; 2008; 2009) produce more reasonable 
estimates of demand response by accounting for responses to income changes as well as 
price changes, but there is little theoretical basis for the demand response rules they use.   
The approach taken in this paper is to model how each individual in the 
expenditure survey adjusts their expenditures in response to the new price levels, and 
construct decile averages based on these individual responses.  The demand model used 
to adjust expenditures satisfies theoretical restrictions on demand such as homogeneity 
and additivity, and is consistent with the own-price demand elasticities used by Boyce 
and Riddle, as well as initial consumption shares from the consumer expenditure survey. 
The demand model I use to implement this is a simplified version of the Almost 
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).  The AIDS is among 
the most commonly used demand systems in studies of how demand responds to price 
changes, including studies that focus on demand responses to changes in energy prices 
(Labandeira et al., 2004, Symons et al., 1994, West and Williams, 2004).  It has a number 
of advantages: it is flexible, allowing price elasticities of demand for each good to be 
specified; it satisfies the homogeneity and additivity properties of a demand system as 
long as the parameters used follow simple rules; and it is consistent with an indirect 
utility function that can be used to estimate changes in utility in response to demand 
changes.  
The full AIDS demand equations are given by: 
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In this equation, iw  is the budget share 
x
qp ii  for good i, jp  is the price of good j, 
x is total expenditures on all goods, P is a price index term
21
, i  are parameters that 
determine the relative demand for each product if prices were equal, ij  are parameters 
that determine both the own-price and cross-price elasticities for each product, and i  are 
parameters that determine the income elasticity of demand for each product.  In order for 
the model to satisfy homogeneity and additivity, the parameters must satisfy the 
following set of restrictions: 
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To simplify the model, I assume, as in Boyce and Riddle (2009), that if prices are 
fixed, a change in total expenditure will lead to a proportionate change in expenditure on 
each good.  This is equivalent to assuming 0i  for all i, so it simplifies the demand 
equations to: 
(18) 
j
jijii pw log  
                                                 
21
 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p. 314), for a definition of the price index term.  I 
do not discuss it here, because with the simplifications I make, it is no longer needed. 
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This simplifies the analysis considerably, as it allows me to avoid the use of the 
price index parameter, P, and ensures that carbon consumption will be a linear function 
of income, making equilibrium calculations that will be discussed later much more 
straightforward.   
If total expenditures change by the same amount as income, this would be 
equivalent to assuming income elasticities of 1.0 for all goods.  However, total 
expenditures may not change by as much as income changes.  I assume that 90% of 
income changes from revenue recycling will be translated into increased expenditures in 
the short run.  This is based on estimates in Carroll (2001), of the effect of an unexpected 
permanent change in income on consumption, using a theoretical model with parameters 
based in real data.  A review by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2009), suggests that this is the 
best estimate of its kind, and that empirical studies that try to identify the effect of this 
type of change in income have found mixed results, some higher than 0.9 (0.91-1.02, p. 
37) and some lower (0.65, p. 41).  
 The ij  parameters are chosen using a two-part approach, with the own-price 
elasticity parameters ii  specified first, followed by the cross-price elasticity parameters 
jiij , .  The own-price elasticity parameters are chosen to be consistent with 
estimated elasticities from the literature.  The most important elasticities in determining 
how demand will respond to a carbon charge are the own-price elasticities for energy 
products.  These have been extensively studied, and these studies have been summarized 
in several reviews (Bohi, 1981; Dahl, 1993).  The price elasticities for heating oil, 
gasoline, natural gas and electricity are short-run elasticities taken from Dahl (1993), 
which is the most comprehensive review of this literature.  The price elasiticities for other 
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products are chosen based on Williamson’s (2006) “stylized facts of demand”.  They are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5.  Price elasticities of demand 
 
Consumption 
Category 
Own price elasticity 
of demand (short 
run) 
Food 0.60 
Industrial Goods 1.30 
Services/Other 1.00 
Electricity 0.20 
Natural Gas 0.20 
Heating Oil 0.27 
Car Fuels 0.26 
Air Transport 0.25 
Other Transport 0.25 
sources: Dahl (1993); Willamson(2006) 
 
The own-price elasticity parameters ii  are related to actual own-price elasticities 
based on the formula: 
 iiiii w )1(         (4-19) 
Where ii  is the own price elasticity from the literature, and iw  is the share of 
expenditure on good i.  I assume that all individuals have the same own price elasticity 
parameters ii , and calculate these common parameter values using aggregate CEX data 
on expenditure shares, so that the aggregate elasticity estimate will match the elasticities 
from the literature.  Individual elasticities may be different from the aggregate elasticity if 
the expenditure shares for the individual are different from the aggregate. 
Cross price elasticities for each pair of products are not easily available, so instead 
of using estimates from the literature, I use restrictions on the parameters in the AIDS 
demand models to generate cross-price elasticity parameters that will satisfy these 
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conditions.  This requires making the simplifying assumption that the cross-price 
elasticities between two products depend only on the own price elasticities of the two 
products.  Products that have high (negative) own price elasticities, and therefore are 
easily substitutable will also have high cross price elasticities.  We do not try to identify 
pairs of products that might substitute for each other particularly well for other reasons.   
Based on this assumption, the cross-price elasticity parameters needed to satisfy 
the parameter restrictions  
i
ij 0 , and  
j
ij 0  are found to be:  
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One shortcoming of the AIDS demand model is that it can predict negative 
expenditures for some sets of input prices (Rothman et al., 1994).
22
  This occurs 
primarily when the initial expenditures on a particular category of goods is zero.  To limit 
the extent of this problem, we make the assumption that households whose initial 
expenditures are zero on a good will continue not to buy that good if prices change.  So, 
for each individual, we construct the AIDS parameters based only on those goods for 
which they have positive expenditures.  This results in slightly different cross-elasticity 
parameters for each household, as the n in the denominator of equations (4-20) can be 
                                                 
22
 This is true of most of the flexible demand systems that are used, including the 
Rotterdam model.  One model that does not allow this is the generalized logit model, but 
this model has the disadvantage that to calculate demand shares for a given set of prices 
and expenditures, it requires iteration of a nonlinear equation that is not guaranteed to 
converge (Rothman, Hong and Mount, 1994).   
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different for each household depending on the number of goods for which they have 
positive expenditures
23
.   
The last parameters that need to be calculated are i , which would determine the 
share of expenditures on each good if prices were equal.  They will be different for each 
individual in the expenditure survey, and are calculated using the formula:   
 
j
jijii pw log        (4-21) 
I define units so that prices are all initially equal to 1, which simplifies this 
expression to ii w , where iw  are shares of expenditure from the CEX data for the 
household. 
Once the demand system parameters have been calculated, we can estimate 
demand responses to the commodity price changes generated by the supply model, and 
the income changes generated by recycling the carbon charge revenue.  Since the amount 
of revenue generated by the carbon charge depends on the amount of carbon 
consumption, which in turn depends on the amount of revenue recycling, it is necessary 
to determine equilibrium consumption levels, carbon charge revenue, and revenue 
recycling levels that are consistent with each other.  The linear relationship between 
changes in income and carbon consumption can be estimated simply by running the 
                                                 
23
 Cross price elasticities are undefined in the case of two or fewer goods, which reflects 
the fact that it is impossible to specify independent own-price elasticities for both goods 
in a two good demand system.  In our study there are two households with zero 
expenditure, and 17 with expenditures on only two goods – these households are dropped 
from the analysis. There remain a few cases where the model predicts that an individual 
will have negative expenditures on a category of goods, but this is rare, and should not 
have much effect on decile averages.  
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model twice with arbitrarily chosen income changes, which makes this equilibrium 
calculation straightforward.   
4.5 Attributing impacts to households 
Households can be impacted by a carbon charge in several different ways.  
Increases in the prices of products they use will decrease the amount that they can 
consume, while dividend payments will increase their well-being.  Changes in producer 
profits, either because of changes in input prices and demand or because of free permit 
receipts, will also affect households that own shares in those companies.   
Reductions in carbon emissions will also provide environmental benefits to 
households.  A full accounting of the impacts of the policy should include these benefits 
as well as the costs.  However, it is difficult to know the magnitudes of the environmental 
benefits, or how they will be distributed among households.  Because of this, I adopt the 
common approach of allocating only the costs (including abatement and permit costs) and 
the monetary benefits to households, and presenting the reduction in carbon emissions 
separately.   
4.5.1 Impacts on consumers 
Impacts on consumers are divided into permit costs, which are monetary 
payments that go directly or indirectly to the carbon charge, and abatement costs caused 
by reductions in consumer utility from shifting to less carbon-intensive consumption 
patterns.  These consumer abatement costs are the primary economic costs in our model 
since producers do not change their input ratios.  Boyce and Riddle (2007; 2009) focus 
only on permit costs because including abatement costs but not environmental benefits 
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can lead to misleading conclusions that total costs exceed total benefits.  I sympathize 
with this view, but since it is more common to include abatement costs (US CBO, 2000; 
Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Burtraw et al., 2009a, etc.), and since the distributional 
incidence of these cost can be analyzed more easily than the climate benefits, it is useful 
to present the incidence results with these costs included.     
Monetary payments are found based on final consumption levels, subtracting the 
amount they would have paid for their final consumption bundle at old prices from the 
amount they pay at the new prices. Additional utility costs are calculated using the 
indirect utility function associated with the cost function from which the AIDS demand 
model is derived (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 313).  The cost function associated 
with the demand model we use is given by: 
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The new parameters in this equation, 0  and 0 , determine the size of the utility 
numbers, but are eliminated once the utility numbers are converted to dollar equivalents, 
so for simplicity I set 00   and 10  . 
The indirect utility function associated with this is: 
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From this, the utility associated with both the initial and final prices and 
expenditure levels can be calculated.  This can be converted to dollar equivalents by 
calculating the amount of expenditure that would be needed to generate each of these 
utilities at the original prices using the cost function.  Finally, extra unspent income is 
added to the final utility numbers, since households are assumed to spend only 90% of 
 172 
 
new income they receive from dividend payments and changes in profits.  The change in 
the dollar equivalent of utility as a result of the policy can then be broken down into 
monetary payments resulting from the charge and abatement costs. 
4.5.2 Allocating producer profit impacts to households 
Changes in producer profits are allocated to households based on the distribution 
of stock ownership by income level.  The data for this are the same as those used in 
Boyce and Riddle (2007), and are taken from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.  
They include both direct ownership of stocks and indirect ownership through mutual 
funds and other sources.  The distribution is shown in Table 4.6.
24
   
Table 4.6. Stock ownership by income decile 
 
Per capita 
income 
decile 
Stock 
ownership 
Share of total 
stock 
ownership 
1 7437 0.8% 
2 4564 0.5% 
3 8697 0.9% 
4 16069 1.7% 
5 23066 2.4% 
6 40296 4.2% 
7 54571 5.7% 
8 67427 7.0% 
9 116542 12.1% 
10 626335 64.9% 
Source: 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances 
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 I would like to have data on the distribution of stock ownership by per capita 
expenditure, rather than per capita income, as this is how we present the rest of our 
results.  However, there do not appear to be good data available on the distribution of 
stock ownership by expenditure. Holak et al. (2008) use capital holdings from the 
consumer expenditure survey for this purpose, but it is not clear exactly what is included 
in this variable, and it is likely to be less reliable than data from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, which is designed for this purpose.  I therefore use the more reliable Survey of 
Consumer Finances data and assume that the distribution of holdings by expenditure will 
be the same as the distribution by income. 
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4.5.3 Grouping households 
The goal in presenting results is to show how the impacts of the policy vary by 
household, depending on how well-off the household is.  There is no consensus on the 
best way to show this.  A common approach is to break households into income groups, 
and show the impacts for each income group.  However, many researchers have called 
into question whether annual income is the best measure of how well off a household is.  
Stratifying households by annual income produce results that look more regressive than 
they would if a better measure of lifetime income were used (Poterba, 1992; Metcalf, 
1999; Hasset et al., 2007). 
For this study, I use total expenditures, rather than income, to group households, 
and present results as a portion of total expenditures.  Expenditures are often seen as a 
better proxy for lifetime incomes than annual income (Poterba, 1992).  This is also the 
approach taken by Boyce and Riddle (2007; 2008; 2009).   
Another question that has received less attention is whether to group households 
by total income/expenditure or per capita income/expenditure.  This study uses per capita 
expenditures to group households, and presents all impacts in per capita terms.  Deciles 
are also constructed so that there are the same number of people in each decile, rather 
than the same number of households. 
While using total household incomes or expenditures is more common, per capita 
income is often seen as a better measure of household well-being than total household 
income, since larger households have more people to support, and therefore will be less 
well off with the same total income (Datta and Meerman, 1980).  Neither total income 
nor per capita income is a perfect measure of household well being, but more 
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complicated measures are less transparent and require more detailed data.  Using per 
capita numbers is also consistent with the approach of the cap-and-dividend policy, 
which makes payments proportional to the number of people in the household.   
4.6 Incidence results 
In this section, the results of the analysis are presented.  They are divided into 
several different scenarios, which represent different assumptions about how the policy is 
implemented and how suppliers respond to price changes. 
4.6.1 Baseline Scenario 
The baseline analysis looks at the impact of a $100/ton carbon charge if all the 
revenues not needed to offset increased government expenditures are returned to 
households, and suppliers pass-through all of their increased costs to consumers.   
The results are presented in Tables 4.7 through 4.10.  Table 4.7 shows the 
distributional impacts of a carbon charge on its own, both in per person terms and as a 
percentage of expenditures.  Table 4.8 shows the distributional impacts of the policy after 
the dividends are distributed.  Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show in more detail how the demand 
model assumptions influenced the distributional impacts.   
4.6.1.1 Emission reductions and abatement costs 
The baseline policy leads to a reduction in carbon emissions by 3.6%.  This 
relatively small reduction reflects the short-run nature of the analysis, and the fact that it 
only represents carbon reductions caused by changes in final demand.  In all scenarios 
evaluated in this paper, suppliers do not change their input ratios in response to a change 
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in prices, which means they can not improve the energy efficiency of their production, or 
substitute low-carbon fuels for high-carbon ones.  As a result, the carbon reductions we 
find should be interpreted as a lower bound estimate on the total emission reduction that 
is likely to occur in response to the policy.  
The abatement costs calculated are also relatively small. In this model, the only 
abatement costs are those faced by consumers due to their shifting consumption patterns. 
These per person abatement costs are $8.8 per year, or only 1.63% of the average cost 
faced by households. The abatement costs of a $100/ton carbon charge could be higher if 
producers were able to adjust their input ratios to reduce their emissions. Allowing more 
abatement options would lower the marginal abatement cost curve, so more abatement 
would take place at the same permit price, leading to a higher total abatement cost.  
However, if the amount of emission reduction were fixed, allowing more abatement 
options would reduce the abatement cost.  Our calculation of $8.8 per person therefore 
represents an upper bound on the cost of achieving a 3.6% reduction in carbon emissions. 
Higher emission reductions would require higher abatement costs, but would produce 
greater climate benefits as well.   
To check that our average abatement costs are reasonable, we compare them to a 
simple estimate based on calculating the area under the marginal abatement cost curve 
between the business as usual emission levels and the reduced levels.  If the marginal 
abatement cost curve is linear, the total abatement costs will equal the size of reduction in 
carbon emissions times the marginal cost of abatement, or the permit price, divided by 
two.  This calculation produces an estimated total abatement cost of $9.8 per person, 
which is close to the $8.8 per person cost we found with our full calculations.  The 
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difference reflects the fact that the demand function used in the full calculations does not 
produce a linear abatement cost curve. 
Several other studies have looked at the abatement costs associated with a carbon 
charge, and found them to be higher.  For example, CBO (2000) finds substitution costs 
to be 7.9% of the total costs faced by households, and Burtraw et al. (2009a) find them to 
be 9.3% of the total costs
25
.  These higher abatement costs can be partly explained by 
different assumptions about the permit price and the reduction in carbon emissions that 
are being analyzed.  For example, the higher adjustment costs found by CBO (2000) are 
consistent with the abatement cost curve calculation presented above, based on a larger 
assumed reduction in carbon emissions (15%) and a higher permit price ($100 per ton 
CO2).
26
   
4.6.1.2 Distributional incidence of charge 
The results in Table 4.7 show that although rich households pay more into the 
charge than poor households, the charge on its own would be regressive in that its impact 
on poor households is greater as a percentage of their total expenditure.  This is consistent 
with the carbon footprint patterns shown in section 4.2.4: low income households have 
lower carbon footprints than high income households, but the carbon intensity of their 
                                                 
25
 While Burtraw et al. (2009a) do not explicitly report abatement costs, these costs 
should be reflected in the average net impacts on household of the policies they analyze if 
revenues are returned to households.  The abatement cost ratio we report is found by 
dividing the average net impact on households from Figure 7 by the average cost of the 
charge to households from Table 3.   
26
 The numbers in Burtraw et al. (2009a), on the other hand, do not appear to be 
consistent with this calculation.  The average net impacts of revenue-neutral policies on 
households appear to be about twice what they should be based on the estimated 
abatement costs calculated from their permit price of $20.87 per ton CO2 and 7.4% 
reduction in carbon emissions.   
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consumption is higher.  It is also consistent with the results of other studies done in the 
US (Poterba, 1989; Metcalf, 1999; CBO, 2000; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Barnes and 
Breslow, 2003; Parry, 2003b; Boyce & Riddle, 2007; Hassett et al., 2007; Holak et al., 
2008; Burtraw et al., 2009a). 
Table 4.7. Distributional incidence of carbon charge 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Initial per 
capita 
expenditure 
($) 
Cost per 
person 
Cost 
as % of 
expend. 
1 4964 193 3.9% 
2 7629 288 3.8% 
3 9925 346 3.5% 
4 12187 388 3.2% 
5 14510 451 3.1% 
6 17290 515 3.0% 
7 20735 571 2.8% 
8 25038 663 2.6% 
9 31460 793 2.5% 
10 53819 1169 2.2% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
4.6.1.3 Incidence with dividends 
In this scenario, 86% of the revenue from the carbon charge is devoted to 
dividend payments, which are divided among households on a per capita basis.  The 
remaining 14% is retained to offset higher costs paid by local, state and national 
governments.   
Table 4.8 presents the full incidence of a cap-and-dividend policy as a percentage 
of total expenditures.  The distribution of equal per capita dividends more than 
compensates for the regressive impact of the charge.  The efficiency costs are too small to 
have much effect on the overall incidence of the policy.   
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The net impacts range from a benefit of 6.8% of initial expenditures for the 
bottom decile to a cost of 1.2% of expenditures for the top decile.  The average net 
impacts of the policy on households in the bottom six deciles are positive, while the 
averages for the top four deciles are negative.  This is also consistent with the results of 
other studies that have looked at this, although the number of deciles that benefit and the 
number that are hurt vary somewhat among the studies (CBO, 2000; Dinan and Rogers, 
2002; Barnes and Breslow, 2003; Parry, 2003b; Boyce & Riddle, 2007; Holak et al., 
2008; Burtraw et al., 2009a).  
Table 4.8. Distributional incidence of cap-and-dividend 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% of expenditures 
Costs Dividend Net Impacts 
1 4964 -3.9% 10.7% 6.8% 
2 7629 -3.8% 6.9% 3.2% 
3 9925 -3.5% 5.3% 1.8% 
4 12187 -3.2% 4.3% 1.2% 
5 14510 -3.1% 3.6% 0.5% 
6 17290 -3.0% 3.1% 0.1% 
7 20735 -2.8% 2.6% -0.2% 
8 25038 -2.6% 2.1% -0.5% 
9 31460 -2.5% 1.7% -0.8% 
10 53819 -2.2% 1.0% -1.2% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
4.6.1.4 Role of demand model 
Since we devoted some attention to improving the model of how consumer 
demand responds to changes in prices, it is useful to evaluate how the demand response 
affects our results.  The most significant affect of the demand model is on our 
conclusions about how much emissions are reduced, and the size of the abatement costs. 
The model used in this paper produces a more accurate estimate of expected quantity-
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based emission reductions than could be found through a simple elasticity calculation. 
While this is only part of the total carbon emission reductions that would be likely to 
occur, since producer responses are not included, it is useful to have a good estimate of 
the size of the demand response. 
The demand response has less impact on the relative incidence of a cap-and-
dividend policy on different deciles.  Table 4.9 compares the incidence results from the 
full demand model with the incidence results with no demand response to price changes.  
The demand response leads to only small changes in the impact of the charge on all 
deciles, with the middle income deciles receiving slightly more benefit from their shifts 
in demand than the top and bottom deciles.  There is very little change in the regressivity 
of the charge payments on their own.  There is also little impact on the conclusions about 
the net impact of a cap-and-dividend policy.  There is slightly less redistribution from 
rich households to poor households because dividend payments are reduced slightly, but 
the changes are very small.   
Table 4.9. Distributional incidence of cap-and-dividend with different demand responses 
 Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Initial per 
capita 
expenditure 
($) 
Charge Net Impact 
Fixed 
Demand 
Full 
demand 
response 
Fixed 
Demand 
Full 
demand 
response 
1 4964 -3.8% -3.9% 7.2% 6.8% 
2 7629 -3.8% -3.8% 3.4% 3.2% 
3 9925 -3.5% -3.5% 2.0% 1.8% 
4 12187 -3.3% -3.2% 1.2% 1.2% 
5 14510 -3.2% -3.1% 0.6% 0.5% 
6 17290 -3.1% -3.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
7 20735 -2.8% -2.8% -0.2% -0.2% 
8 25038 -2.7% -2.6% -0.5% -0.5% 
9 31460 -2.6% -2.5% -0.8% -0.8% 
10 53819 -2.2% -2.2% -1.2% -1.2% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
  Source: Author's calculations 
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This neutral impact of the demand response to a cap-and-dividend policy masks 
two offsetting features of the demand response.  Demand for carbon-intensive products 
decreases in response to the new price structure, but increases because of the dividend 
payments. The positive demand response to dividend payments is greater for lower 
income deciles, because the payments are a higher percentage of their income. However, 
the negative demand response to the price changes is also greater for lower income 
deciles.  The size of the demand responses to the income and price changes, as well as the 
total demand response, are presented in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10. Demand responses to cap-and-dividend 
  Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Initial per 
capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% change in carbon 
emissions due to 
dividend payment 
% change in 
carbon emissions 
due to price 
changes 
Total % 
change in 
carbon 
emissions 
1 4964 9.7% -9.4% -0.6% 
2 7629 6.2% -9.2% -3.5% 
3 9925 4.8% -8.6% -4.2% 
4 12187 3.9% -7.9% -4.3% 
5 14510 3.3% -7.5% -4.5% 
6 17290 2.8% -7.2% -4.6% 
7 20735 2.3% -6.3% -4.2% 
8 25038 1.9% -5.8% -4.0% 
9 31460 1.5% -5.2% -3.7% 
10 53819 0.9% -3.1% -2.2% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
  Source: Author's calculations 
    Note that the last column is the compounded effect of the previous two columns rather than the  
  sum, so (1+a)(1+b)=(1+c) rather than a+b=c 
 
It is an interesting conclusion of our model that lower income deciles decrease 
their carbon emissions more in response to higher carbon prices.  This is a question that 
has attracted some attention, though there has been little empirical work that has 
addressed this issue.  I am not aware of any studies that address this question in the 
context of a US carbon charge.  Studies conducted in other countries or for particular 
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fuels such as gasoline have found mixed results, with some reporting higher price 
elasticities for rich households, and others reporting higher elasticities for poor 
households (West and Williams, 2004; Kayser, 2000; Labandeira et al., 2004).   
This differential demand responses by income group found in this paper are not 
based on any empirical evidence of how different households have responded to price 
changes in the past.  Instead, they are based on our theoretical demand model, combined 
with information from the expenditure survey on the expenditure shares of different 
households on different products.  The logic behind the demand model helps to build an 
argument why greater adjustments by lower income deciles are likely, but this conclusion 
is tentative due to the lack of empirical evidence. 
The relative demand responsiveness of different income groups is generated by 
our assumption that all households have the same set of elasticity parameters ii , and that 
own price elasticities ii  are related to the elasticity parameters ii  based on the formula:  
 1
i
ii
ii
w

          (4-24) 
This means that as a household spends a higher share of their budget on a 
particular good, the own price elasticity for that good will get closer to -1.0.  This is 
consistent with a theoretical restriction that any demand model must satisfy: as the budget 
share approaches one, the own-price elasticity must also approach one in order to keep 
total expenditures from changing in response to a price change.   
In the case of energy goods, which are generally inelastic (that is, they have own-
price elasticities that are less than one in magnitude), households with higher budget 
shares spent on energy goods will have higher own-price elasticities for those goods.  The 
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household expenditure data shows that poorer households spend a larger share of their 
budgets on energy goods, which leads to the conclusion that poorer households will on 
average reduce their carbon emissions more that rich household in response to a change 
in carbon prices.   
4.6.2  Partial pass-through scenarios 
Two different partial pass-through scenarios are analyzed, one with 90% pass 
through and one with 50% pass through.  In the 90% pass-through scenario, carbon 
emissions are reduced by 3.3%.  In the 50% pass-through scenario, emissions are reduced 
by just 1.7%.  Reducing the pass-through rate lowers the reduction in carbon emissions 
because prices do not increase by as much, so consumers do not adjust their consumption 
patterns as much.  The adjustment costs faced by consumers are also reduced: with 90% 
pass-through, the average adjustment cost is 1.34% of the total costs faced by consumers, 
and with 50% pass-through it is 0.41% of total costs. 
The incidence results are presented in Tables 4.11 and 4.12.  The costs are 
increased for the top decile, as they bear the brunt of the producer costs by virtue of their 
larger share of corporate stock ownership.  The remaining deciles benefit or stay even.  In 
the 90% pass-through scenario the charge on its own is less regressive than with full 
pass-through.  In the 50% pass-through scenario, it becomes progressive, with the costs 
being a higher percentage of expenditures for the top decile than all other deciles.  The 
net impact with dividend payments also becomes positive for more households.  In the 
90% pass-through scenario, the net impact for the seventh decile becomes barely positive 
on average, and in the 50% pass-through scenario, the bottom eight deciles all see net 
positive impacts. 
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Table 4.11. Distributional incidence of cap-and-dividend with 90% pass-through 
 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% of expenditures 
Consumer 
costs 
Producer 
costs 
Total 
costs Dividend 
Net 
Impacts 
1 4964 -3.3% -0.1% -3.4% 10.2% 6.8% 
2 7629 -3.2% 0.0% -3.2% 6.6% 3.4% 
3 9925 -2.9% -0.1% -3.0% 5.1% 2.1% 
4 12187 -2.7% -0.1% -2.8% 4.2% 1.4% 
5 14510 -2.6% -0.1% -2.7% 3.5% 0.8% 
6 17290 -2.5% -0.2% -2.7% 2.9% 0.3% 
7 20735 -2.3% -0.2% -2.5% 2.4% 0.0% 
8 25038 -2.2% -0.2% -2.4% 2.0% -0.4% 
9 31460 -2.1% -0.3% -2.3% 1.6% -0.7% 
10 53819 -1.7% -0.8% -2.6% 0.9% -1.6% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Table 4.12. Distributional incidence of cap-and-dividend with 50% pass-through 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% of expenditures 
Consumer 
costs 
Producer 
costs 
Total 
costs Dividend 
Net 
Impacts 
1 4964 -1.5% -0.4% -2.0% 9.3% 7.4% 
2 7629 -1.5% -0.2% -1.7% 6.1% 4.4% 
3 9925 -1.3% -0.3% -1.6% 4.7% 3.1% 
4 12187 -1.2% -0.4% -1.6% 3.8% 2.2% 
5 14510 -1.2% -0.5% -1.6% 3.2% 1.6% 
6 17290 -1.1% -0.7% -1.8% 2.7% 0.9% 
7 20735 -1.0% -0.8% -1.7% 2.2% 0.5% 
8 25038 -0.9% -0.8% -1.7% 1.9% 0.2% 
9 31460 -0.9% -1.1% -1.9% 1.5% -0.4% 
10 53819 -0.7% -3.3% -4.0% 0.9% -3.1% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
There are two reasons that incomplete pass-through might affect the distributional 
incidence.  First, and most importantly, part of the impact of the charge is now borne by 
producers rather than consumers.  In the 90% pass-through scenario, 86.4% of the costs 
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are borne by consumers, and 13.6% by producers.  In the 50% pass-through scenario, 
40.5% of the costs are borne by consumers, and 59.5% by producers.  The difference 
between the pass-through rate and the ultimate share of costs reflects the fact that when 
the costs of the charge are passed through several industries before reaching consumers, 
90% pass-through in each intermediate industry can lead to less than 90% of the charge 
ultimately being passed on to end users.  The government share of carbon consumption 
and the tax rate on corporate profits also play a role in the calculation of final impacts. 
The effect of a shift in costs from consumers to producers has been studied 
before.  Since a large share of producer profits is attributed to households in the top 
decile, it is not surprising that these studies have found that shifting costs to producers 
will lead to more progressive incidence results (Boyce and Riddle, 2007; Holak et al., 
2008).  
  An additional consequence of assuming incomplete pass-through is that the 
relative prices of different products are different than with full pass-through.  For all 
products, prices do not increase by as much as they did with full pass-through, but the 
difference is greater for products that consume fossil fuels indirectly than for direct fuel 
purchases.  This is because each firm along the production line will not pass on the full 
impact of the increase in their input costs.  The changes in relative prices with incomplete 
pass-through actually contribute to making the carbon charge slightly more regressive 
because lower income households consume a higher share of their carbon directly 
through fuel purchases, while rich households use more carbon indirectly.  This is 
consistent with findings from other studies that charges on the direct consumption of 
fossil fuels are more regressive than charges on indirect consumption (Bull et al., 1994; 
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Hassett et al., 2007).  This is incorporated into the incidence results presented above, but 
the effect of relative prices is overshadowed by the transfer of costs between consumers 
and producers.  Table 4.13 isolates the effects of relative prices on consumers by looking 
at the share of the total consumer costs borne by each decile in each of the three pass-
through scenarios.  The impacts on the bottom deciles are highest relative to impacts on 
other deciles when the pass-through rates are lowest.  However, the differences are small, 
especially in the more reasonable 90% pass-through case.   
Table 4.13. Comparison of consumer impacts with different pass-through rates 
 
er capita 
expenditure 
decile 
decile share of all consumer 
costs of charge 
100% 
pass-
through 
90% 
pass-
through 
50% 
pass-
through 
1 3.6% 3.7% 4.0% 
2 5.3% 5.5% 6.0% 
3 6.4% 6.6% 7.1% 
4 7.2% 7.3% 7.8% 
5 8.4% 8.5% 8.9% 
6 9.6% 9.7% 10.1% 
7 10.6% 10.7% 10.8% 
8 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 
9 14.7% 14.6% 14.3% 
10 21.7% 21.1% 18.8% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
4.6.3 Fixed-cost supply model 
This section presents the results using the supply model based on fixed costs and 
an increasing supply curve.  In this model, pass-through rates vary by industry, with more 
carbon-intensive goods having lower pass-through rates.  Suppliers also face adjustment 
costs as they shift their production to meet changes in the quantity demanded of their 
product.  The exact assumptions are explained in more detail in section 4.4.1.3. 
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In this scenario, carbon emissions are reduced by 2.8%.  This is less than in the 
full pass-through scenario because price increases in all industries are closer to the 
average prices increase, which sends a less strong signal to consumers as to how they 
should adjust their demand to reduce emissions.  Consumer abatement costs are 1.27% of 
total costs, and producer abatement costs are 0.21% of total costs.  This makes the total 
efficiency costs 1.48% of total costs, which is less than in the full pass-through scenario, 
and consistent with the smaller reduction in carbon emissions.   
Table 4.14. Distributional incidence of cap-and-dividend with fixed cost supply model 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% of expenditures 
Consumer 
costs 
Producer 
change in 
profits 
Total 
costs Dividend 
Net 
Impacts 
1 4964 -3.6% 0.0% -3.6% 10.1% 6.4% 
2 7629 -3.5% 0.0% -3.5% 6.5% 3.0% 
3 9925 -3.2% 0.0% -3.2% 5.0% 1.8% 
4 12187 -3.0% 0.0% -3.0% 4.1% 1.1% 
5 14510 -2.9% 0.0% -2.9% 3.4% 0.5% 
6 17290 -2.8% 0.0% -2.8% 2.9% 0.1% 
7 20735 -2.6% 0.0% -2.6% 2.4% -0.2% 
8 25038 -2.5% 0.0% -2.5% 2.0% -0.5% 
9 31460 -2.4% 0.0% -2.4% 1.6% -0.8% 
10 53819 -2.1% 0.0% -2.1% 0.9% -1.1% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Table 4.14 presents the incidence results.  Overall, there is very little difference 
from the 100% pass-through scenario.  Consumers bear all of the costs, while the effect 
on producer profits is negligible.  This is because the model was set up so that the 
industries with more than 100% pass-through would roughly offset the industries with 
less than 100% pass-through.  The costs are slightly lower for all deciles, as are the 
dividend payments.  There is a slightly greater reduction in costs for low-income 
households than high-income households, reflecting their higher share of consumption of 
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high carbon-intensity products, which see smaller price increases than in the full pass-
through scenario.  However, this effect is barely noticeable.    
4.6.4  Partial grandfathering of permits 
This section looks at how the incidence of the policy would change if 50% of the 
permit value that is available for recycling were given away to producers, with the other 
50% given to consumers as before (this amounts to 43% of the total permits for each 
purpose, with the remaining 14% retained to offset government expenses).  The full pass-
through supply model is used. Carbon emissions are reduced by 3.8%, slightly more than 
when all permit value is recycled to households. This is because the transfer of income 
from poor to rich households leads to a shift toward the less carbon-intensive 
expenditures of rich households. Consumer adjustment costs are also slightly higher at 
1.64%.  
Table 4.15 shows the distributional incidence of the policy.  It is dramatically 
different from the cap-and-divided results.  Instead of having a progressive impact with 
the bottom six deciles benefitting, the only deciles that benefit are the ones at the 
extremes, the 1
st
 and 10
th
 deciles, while there is no effect on the 2
nd
 decile.  The lowest 
decile benefits because their carbon consumption is low enough that 50% of the permit 
revenue is enough to compensate them.  The top decile benefits because they get the 
largest share of the increase in profits resulting from the free permits.  The remaining 
deciles of middle-class households do not receive enough in dividends to offset the 
higher costs they face, but also don’t own enough stock to benefit much from the higher 
producer profits. 
 
 188 
 
Table 4.15. Distributional incidence of cap with revenues split between dividends and 
payments to producers 
 
 
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile 
Per capita 
expenditure 
($) 
% of expenditures 
Consumer 
costs 
Change 
in 
producer 
profits 
Total 
costs Dividend 
Net 
Impacts 
1 4964 -3.7% 0.4% -3.3% 5.3% 2.0% 
2 7629 -3.7% 0.2% -3.5% 3.5% 0.0% 
3 9925 -3.4% 0.2% -3.2% 2.7% -0.5% 
4 12187 -3.1% 0.4% -2.8% 2.2% -0.6% 
5 14510 -3.1% 0.4% -2.6% 1.8% -0.8% 
6 17290 -3.0% 0.6% -2.3% 1.5% -0.8% 
7 20735 -2.7% 0.7% -2.0% 1.3% -0.7% 
8 25038 -2.6% 0.7% -1.9% 1.1% -0.9% 
9 31460 -2.5% 1.0% -1.5% 0.8% -0.7% 
10 53819 -2.2% 3.2% 1.0% 0.5% 1.4% 
Based on a carbon charge of $100 per tC 
Source: Author's calculations 
4.7 Conclusions 
This study confirms what has been found elsewhere in the literature: that a carbon 
charge on its own is likely to have a regressive impact, and that equal per capita 
redistribution of revenues to households will more than offset these regressive impacts.   
In addition to confirming these basic results, this paper contributes to the 
literature by developing new modeling techniques to evaluate supply and demand 
responses to the charge.  It improves on the methods used by Metcalf (1999), Hassett et 
al. (2007) and others to calculate price increases for different products from input-output 
tables, by modeling the policy as a quantity tax, rather than an ad valorem tax.  It also 
develops new techniques for using input-output tables to model price increases based on 
supply models with incomplete pass-through.  Specifically, this paper examines two ways 
of relaxing the full pass-through assumption – either by assuming a fixed rate of pass-
through that is less than one, or by using different pass-through for different products, 
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based on a model of perfect competition with fixed costs.  It then evaluates how changing 
these assumptions affects the distributional impacts.   
It seems that the most important parameter in determining the distributional 
incidence is how much of the costs are ultimately borne by producers and how much by 
consumers.  The impact is seen most clearly in the extreme scenario with only 50% pass-
through, which shifts the impacts of the charge very heavily toward the top income 
decile.  This effect is also apparent, though less dramatically, in the 90% pass-through 
scenario.   
In addition to affecting how much of the charge is borne by producers vs. 
consumers, these assumptions can also have an impact on which consumers bear the 
burden of the charge.  With the partial pass-through assumption, products that use carbon 
directly show more of a price increase than those that only use carbon indirectly, leading 
to more regressive incidence results on the consumption side.  With the fixed costs 
assumption, the price increases for the most carbon-intensive products are reduced, while 
the price increase for less carbon-intensive products are increased.  The magnitude of the 
distributional impacts on consumers is relatively small, however, suggesting that the 
simple full pass-through assumption may be reasonable if the only consumer impacts are 
being considered. 
The paper also improves on the demand models used in prior studies, and 
evaluates how the demand model assumptions affect the distributional incidence of the 
charge.  It finds that under reasonable assumptions about demand behavior, low-income 
consumers will be more responsive to changes in energy prices than high-income 
consumers, and that the difference in demand response to price changes by income level 
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can be fairly substantial.  However, this effect can be offset by demand responses to 
income changes if revenues are returned to households on an equal per capita basis, 
increasing incomes in the bottom deciles by a larger percent than in the top deciles.   
Finally, this paper looks at the abatement costs faced by suppliers and consumers 
under different model assumptions, and finds that they are small, and do not have much 
impact on the results. The size of the abatement costs could increase for any given carbon 
charge if suppliers were allowed to adjust their input ratios in response to a change in 
input prices, but so would the environmental benefits from further reductions in 
emissions.   
4.7.1 Areas for further study 
There are several limitations of this analysis that could be improved on with 
further study.  One limitation is the static nature of this study.  Few attempts have been 
made to evaluate how the distributional incidence of a policy could change over time, and 
this is a rich area for future research.  It would also be instructive to look at how allowing 
firms to change the inputs they use in response to input price changes could affect the 
results.  This could lead to a more complete picture of the emissions reductions that 
would result from a given carbon price, and of the adjustment costs that firms would face.  
It would also be interesting to see how the role of adjustment costs changes as the price 
set for carbon changes.   
The demand model could be improved by allowing income elasticities to vary by 
product.  If income elasticities for energy products are lower than average, this could 
dampen the increase in carbon consumption by low-income households in response to the 
dividend payments they receive.  It would also be interesting to look at how much the 
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results would change if price elasticity parameters were allowed to vary depending on the 
total expenditures of the household. 
4.7.2 Policy conclusions 
The cap-and-dividend policy evaluated here has many attractive features.  By 
putting a price on carbon emissions it would spur changes throughout the economy to 
reduce carbon emissions.  Unlike many other cap-and-trade proposals, it would do this 
without hurting the pocketbooks of lower and middle income consumers.  In fact, most 
low-to-middle income households would come out ahead financially as a result of the 
policy.   
This stands in stark contrast to the mixed policy we evaluate, in which only half 
of the permits are auctioned and the other half are given away for free to firms.  If 
revenues are thereby split between producers and consumers, most households in middle-
income deciles are not compensated sufficiently to offset their costs.  This difference 
could have important implications for the reception each of these policies would receive.  
While there may be short-run political advantages to giving some of the permit revenues 
to producers in key industries to maintain their support, a cap-and-dividend policy is 
more likely to generate sustained support from the general public.  
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APPENDIX A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPLY MODEL AND HUBBERT’S PEAK 
The relationship between this paper’s model and Hubbert’s peak can be seen by 
looking at the model if prices are constant at p , there is no quadratic term in the 
regression )0( 2 Sb and there is no stochastic variation.  With these assumptions, the 
shape of the curve will satisfy: 
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The continuous time equivalent of this equation is:  
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The solution is a flexible variation of Hubbert’s curve, where the rate of increase 
going up the curve need not be equal to the rate of decrease going down.  The variable 1b  
determines the rate of increase on the way up, and the rate of decrease on the way down 
is set by the quantity )1( pAec  .  This can be shown rigorously by demonstrating that 
if the solution to this equation is extended to   on the left, it will approach an 
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exponential curve tbeD 11  , with rate of increase 1b  as t , and that as t , the 
solution will approach rteD 2  where the rate of decrease is )1(
pAecr  .
27
   
To look at the limit as t , it is useful to notice that the solution )(tQ S
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 The two functions are equivalent as t  approaches   in the sense that the ratio 
between the actual solution and this exponential curve approaches one. 
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Therefore, for small values of t, the curve approximates an exponential curve that 
is increasing at rate 1b .  The constant term 1D  determines the level of the curve at any 
given time, but not the rate of increase.  
As t , the solution to equation (2) approximates rteD 2 , where 
)1( pAecr  .  This can be shown by trying out an equation of this form, and showing 
that the integral equation approaches being satisfied as t .  First note that for an 
exhaustible resource, over an infinite time horizon, the entire resource stock will be 
exhausted, so the initial stock of the resource will equal the total cumulative production 
over time: 
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Simplifying, this becomes: )1( pAecr  , so for that value of r, the equation 
will be satisfied for all t.  Therefore, as t , the solution approaches a decreasing 
exponential function that is decreasing at rate )1( pAec  .  (Any value for D2 would 
satisfy this equation – the exact value for D2 will depend on the level of 0R  and making 
sure the equation 


  dQR S )(0  is satisfied.  ) 
If the initial rate of increase and the final rate of decrease are equal – that is 
)1(1
pAecb   – then the solution to this equation is exactly Hubbert’s Curve, with 
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Evaluating the integral, this becomes: 
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Simplifying further, this reduces to: 
)1(1
pAecb   
So the equation is satisfied by Hubbert’s curve as long as the rate of increase, b1, 
and the rate of decrease, )1( pAec  , are equal.   
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APPENDIX B 
HEDGING AND SPECULATION ROLES OF FUTURES MARKETS 
I consider a problem where an oil market participant (the agent) is simultaneously 
making a decision that affects how much oil they will buy or sell in the next period, while 
at the same time deciding how many oil futures to buy or sell. The agent chooses an 
amount x that represents the amount of oil it will sell in the next period minus the amount 
they will buy.  Their overall profit of the agent will be 1)(  tpxxf , where f(x) catches 
everything else that affects profits and is assumed to be independent of the price of oil in 
the next period (is this assumption necessary? There may be an alternative formulation 
without this assumption, but risk offsetting in futures markets would be more 
complicated.)  In addition, they choose to take a long or short position in futures markets.  
They choose qf , which can be positive if they take a long position or negative if they 
take a short position.  Their net profit from this decision is )( 1 ft ppqf   . 
I assume that they are risk averse, with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA).  
This can be represented by a utility function u of the form )()( cExpcu  . 
The producer’s problem is to choose x and qf to maximize their expected utility:   
  )()( 11 ftt ppqfpxxfuE   .   
A change of variables to xqfqf  2  helps separate the expression into two 
independent terms.  The problem becomes choosing 2qf  and x to maximize  
  )()( 12 ftf ppqfpxxfuE    
Using CARA utility function, this becomes 
    )()( 12 ftf ppqfupxxfuE    
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With independence assumption this becomes 
     )()( 12 ftf ppqfuEpxxfuE    
Since only x is in the first term, and only 2qf  is in the second term, the values of 
x and 2qf  that maximize each term can be calculated separately, independent of the value 
of the other term. 
The choice of 2qf  is the speculators’ role, and the choice of x is the 
producers/storage holders’ role.  In total, the producer will ‘buy’ xqfqf  2  futures.  
The x  is done to offset risk – the hedging function of futures markets.  In principle, by 
this logic, everyone who expects to sell oil next year should take a short position in 
futures markets to offset the risk from price volatility, and everyone who expects to buy 
oil should take a long position.  These effects would cancel each other out, leaving the net 
effect on futures markets to be driven by the speculative part of participation of futures 
markets, which is governed by participants’ predictions of what prices will be.   
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